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Caught in an Ambush or Bound by Rigidity? 
 
 
Ar Rumaythah, a desert town in Iraq, around midnight. A unit of the Dutch Military 
Police (MP) is on its way back to their base. When they cross a bridge and enter the 
centre of the town, the streetlights turn off and the streets suddenly seem deserted. 
They continue driving. But then the sound of automatic rifles firing breaks the 
silence. One moment, the unit is completely stunned. Then the vehicles quickly 
accelerate and manage to escape by driving at full speed through the dark streets. 
A few kilometers further, one of the vehicles breaks down, and the unit comes to a 
halt. One of the servicemen has been deadly injured during the shooting, two others 
have been wounded. The unit contacts the command post of the Dutch base near 
Ar Rumaythah. Although it is not directly clear what happened, company command 
immediately sets emergency procedures in motion. A Quick Reaction Force (QRF) 
with an ambulance is mobilized and sent out to provide assistance. A Medevac 
(helicopter for medical evacuation) is requested from Tallil airbase, to evacuate the 
wounded. Battalion headquarters in As Samawah (30 kilometers south-east) is 
informed.  
Half an hour after the first report from the stranded unit, the QRF arrives at 
the scene. They have chosen a different route than the MP unit, avoiding the town’s 
centre. They have also been fired upon, but not as heavily as the MP unit, and at a 
different location. They secure the perimeter and contact company command to give 
a situation update. The company commander decides to send a second QRF, for 
additional medical aid and protection. The second QRF consists of unarmored 
vehicles, just as the first QRF. In the meantime, the battalion in As Samawah has 
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also deployed a QRF, to provide assistance from the south. Company command, 
however, decides to call this QRF to a halt before they arrive at the location of the 
stranded MP unit. 
As the second QRF enters the town’s centre, it is again surprisingly silent on 
the streets. But then, all hell breaks loose. It starts with a heavy explosion, followed 
by the sound of guns firing and grenades exploding. The QRF receives heavy fire 
from both sides of the road. They return fire while increasing their speed to escape 
the shooting, but it lasts for several kilometers. When the convoy makes a turn left, 
the last vehicle goes off the road and is hit by a Rocket Propelled Grenade (RPG). It 
breaks down. The four passengers can barely leave the vehicle before a second 
RPG hits it. Their vehicle starts burning and the four servicemen have to abandon it 
while under heavy fire. They manage to get away from the car and find cover in a 
backyard. Three of them are wounded.  
When the remaining vehicles of the second QRF arrive at the location of the 
stranded MP unit, several of the men are wounded. They contact company 
command and report that one of their vehicles is missing. The company commander 
decides to deploy a third QRF, this time with armored vehicles, to search and 
rescue the missing soldiers. This unit also encounters heavy opposition, but 
manages to push forward when Apache helicopters arrive at the scene. They finally 
find the four stranded men and return them back to the base. At the same time, the 
Medevac transports the wounded servicemen from the MP unit back to their base. 
About four hours after the start of the attack, all units have returned. Five of the 
servicemen have been seriously injured and several others suffered minor injuries. 
One serviceman of the Military Police lost his life.1  
Research Question 
This incident took place in the night of 14 to 15 August 2004, during the Dutch 
participation in Stabilisation Force Iraq (SFIR). It sets the scene for the topic of this 
dissertation: team performance under threat. In this dissertation I present research 
that aims to uncover how threat affects team performance during complex tasks and 
how teams can be protected against negative effects of threat.  
Such knowledge has relevance for the military, because military teams face 
threats as part of their job. Teams in other safety critical work environments may 
                                                 
1 This description of events is based on a case study including a series of interviews with servicemen 
involved in this incident (Delahaij, Kamphuis, Van Bezooijen, Vogelaar, Kramer, & Van Fenema, 2009). 
CHAPTER 1 
 11 
face threats on a regular basis too. Think of aircrews, emergency medical teams, 
and crisis management teams. But even in non-safety critical work environments, 
teams may face threats, such as potential financial loss, hostile takeovers, or 
negative publicity.  
These threats have the ability to negatively affect the performance of teams. 
Many tragedies in the military, aviation, and other safety critical work environments 
have been attributed to teams giving way under threat (e.g., Cannon-Bowers & 
Salas, 1998b; Flin, Slaven, & Stewart, 1996; Helmreich & Schaefer, 1994). In 
addition, many of the worst decisions made by top management teams and 
governments were made in the face of threat (e.g., Janis, 1972; Staw, Sandelands, 
& Dutton, 1981). Teams, consequently, appear to be vulnerable to the effects of 
threat. 
Despite this apparent vulnerability, little is known about how threat exactly 
affects the performance of teams (e.g., Burke et al., 2004; Ellis, 2006; Turner & 
Horvitz, 2001), especially during complex tasks. Teams, however, increasingly have 
to deal with complex tasks, as the complexity of the workplace continues to grow 
(e.g., Salas, Cooke, & Rosen, 2008). Understanding which processes play a role in 
the reaction of teams to threats performing complex tasks is vital to improving their 
performance. Only when it is known how threat affects teams, it will be possible to 
develop adequate measures to protect them.  
In the remainder of this chapter, I will define threat and discuss a theory that 
proposes how teams react to threat, using the incident as an illustration. Then, I will 
review the research that has been done in this area. Subsequently, I will describe 
the design of the present research and end with an overview of this dissertation. 
Threat 
Threat can be defined as a possible impending event perceived by a person or 
group of persons as potentially causing material or immaterial loss to, or the 
obstruction of goals of that person or group of persons (cf. Argote, Turner, & 
Fichman, 1989; Lazarus, 1966; Staw, Sandelands, & Dutton, 1981; Turner & 
Horvitz, 2001). In research, threat and stress are often mentioned in one breath. 
According to the transactional theory of stress (e.g., Lazarus, 1966, Lazarus & 
Folkman, 1984) threat is one of the major determinants of stress. A person 
experiences stress when the demands of the environment exceed his or her 
resources and endangers his or her well-being (Lazarus & Folkman, 1984). Thus, 
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stress is the reaction of an individual to its environment, while threat can be the 
environmental event leading to this reaction.  
The effects of threat as potential stressor have not been investigated much 
because threat is hard to manipulate in experimental settings (e.g., Turner & 
Horvitz, 2001). In the present research, however, we focus on threat, because of its 
key role in stressful appraisals. Moreover, rather than combining multiple stressors 
to maximize the stress response (e.g., Driskell, Salas, & Johnston, 1999), we chose 
to investigate threat as single potential stressor, because different stressors may 
lead via different mechanisms to distinct effects (e.g., Broadbent, 1963; Hancock & 
Warm, 1989). A combination of potential stressors therefore, might obscure the 
unique underlying processes (cf. Klein, 1996). 
Theoretical Framework 
Let us return for a moment to the incident described above. For it looks as if the way 
the Dutch troops handled this incident is an exception to the image drawn above of 
teams being vulnerable to the effects of threat. After all, the consequences of such 
an ambush could have been far worse. To some extent this may be true. The 
comparatively favorable outcome can be partly attributed to the professionalism of 
the Dutch servicemen. However, closer inspection shows that they also seemed to 
have had luck on their side. Imagine, for example, that the first rather than the last 
vehicle of the second QRF would have broken down during the ambush. It then 
would have obstructed the passage way for the other vehicles, which would have 
become easy targets for the attackers. In that case, the ambush could have resulted 
in far more casualties. Just looking at the outcome, therefore, is not enough to 
determine if and how threat affected team performance in this situation (cf. Smith-
Jentsch, Johnston, & Payne, 1998).  
If we take a closer look at the process instead, some questions arise. For 
example, why was a second QRF ordered to drive straight into the ambush? Why 
didn’t this second QRF avoid the town’s centre, just as the first QRF did? Why did 
this second QRF consist of unarmored vehicles? And why was the QRF of the 
battalion ordered to abort their action? To be able to find some answers to these 
questions, we first have to turn to the theory.  
The most comprehensive theory addressing the effects of threat is the threat-
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Schematic overview of the Threat-Rigidity Thesis 
 
It states that there is a general tendency for individuals, groups, and organizations 
to behave rigidly in threatening situations. This rigidity consists of two types of 
effects: a restriction in information processing and a constriction in control. 
Examples of a restriction in information processing are a narrowed field of attention, 
a reduction in the number of alternatives considered, adherence to previously 
learned solutions, and reliance upon prior hypotheses. Constriction in control may 
be demonstrated by leaders tightening the reins on their subordinates, power and 
influence becoming concentrated in higher levels of a hierarchy, and fewer people 
making the decisions. 
Together these effects cause a system’s behavior to become less diverse 
and flexible. Instead, the system will emit its most well-learned or dominant 
response (Zajonc, 1966). This dominant response may be either adaptive or 
maladaptive, depending on the task environment in which it is produced. In stable 
and predictable environments, a dominant response can be successful. After all, it 
has been learned in the same environment and therefore should be appropriate. 
Conversely, in dynamic, complex, and unpredictable environments, a dominant 
response can be maladaptive, because in this environment the dominant response 
may no longer be appropriate and flexibility rather than rigidity is necessary to 
perform well (Staw et al., 1981, Weick, 1979). Looking at the incident in Ar 
Rumaythah again, we may try to answer the questions posed above, using the 
threat-rigidity thesis as an explanatory framework.  
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Analysis of the Incident2 
Nature of the task environment 
As described above, the threat-rigidity thesis predicts different outcomes of rigidity 
reactions depending on the nature of the task environment in which these reactions 
are produced. Therefore, it is important to understand the nature of the task 
environment the company command team found themselves positioned in. Although 
task complexity is difficult to define, researchers (e.g., Brown & Miller, 2000; Kelly, 
Futoran, & McGrath, 1990; Rasmussen; 1986; Staw et al., 1981; Volkema, 1988; 
Wood, 1986) have identified a number of attributes that contribute to the complexity 
of a task, including:  
 information load (the sheer amount of information that must be processed 
to successfully complete the task, and the number of different information 
sources);  
 number of subtasks (the number of acts requiring specific knowledge and 
skills that must be carried out to accomplish the task);  
 unfamiliarity and non-repetitivity (the extent to which well-learned skills or 
procedures to perform the task are lacking);  
 task uncertainty (the ambiguity of information in the task, the lack of 
knowledge concerning the relationship between processes and outcomes, 
and the novelty of potential outcomes);  
 number of goals or pathways to goals (referring to how many goals must be 
attained and in how many different ways these goals can be reached); 
 time-varying conditions (relating to the dynamic nature of the task 
environment, with changing circumstances and rules). 
 
Looking at the task environment of the company command team, we may notice a 
number of things. As the incident unfolded, more and more parties were involved, 
each creating an information flow to company command, causing a high information 
load. In addition, company command was responsible for multiple subtasks, 
including gathering information, creating situation awareness, directing the QRFs, 
controlling medical and attack helicopters, reporting to battalion, and taking 
appropriate decisions. Although emergency procedures do exist for these kinds of 
situations, the task of company command can by no means be described as familiar 
                                                 
2 The analysis of the incident is based on Kamphuis & Delahaij (2009). 
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or requiring well-learned, repetitive actions. In fact, this was the first time that this 
company encountered an incident of this scale. Lack of clarity about the nature of 
the incident, the location of the stranded MP unit, the location of the enemy, and the 
scale of the incident guaranteed a high level of task uncertainty. This uncertainty 
about the situation also resulted in multiple different pathways in which the stranded 
MP unit could be reached and supported (e.g., with armored or with unarmored 
QRFs, avoiding the town’s centre or going through it, with or without help from the 
battalion, with or without close air support). Finally, the command team’s task 
environment continually changed, due to new information becoming available, and 
due to the enemy’s actions. Taken together, it seems reasonable to conclude that 
the company command team faced a complex task. The threat-rigidity thesis 
proposes that in such an environment rigidity in reactions will be maladaptive, and 
flexibility rather than rigidity is necessary to survive. But is there evidence for rigidity 
in reactions on the side of the company command team? 
Restriction in information processing 
The concept of a restriction in information processing directs our attention to the 
way the company command team dealt with incoming reports of the incident and 
how their image of the incident developed over time. It turns out that it took quite a 
while before company command had an accurate view of the scale of the incident. 
This may very well have been caused by the effects of threat.  
Initially, after the reports of the unit of the Military Police, company command 
had the impression that the incident was a hit-and-run attack by local insurgents. 
This was their original hypothesis. The threat-rigidity thesis proposes that under 
threat, an entity will be inclined to adhere to this original hypothesis. New 
information will be perceived in terms of this hypothesis, or even be ignored if it 
does not fit. It seems that this is exactly what happened during the incident in Ar 
Rumaythah. This is apparent from the way company command dealt with 
information from the first QRF they sent out. This QRF reported that they had also 
been fired upon, but at a different location. Based on this report, company command 
could have drawn the conclusion that more insurgents were involved in the attack 
than initially thought. They also could have drawn the conclusion that these were 
the same people as those who fired at the MP unit, but that they had moved to a 
different location. With the threat-rigidity thesis in mind, the conclusion of the 
company commander is not surprising:  
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Then (i.e., after the report of the shooting of the first QRF) I drew this 
conclusion: the people that trapped the MP unit on this location (…) were 
retreating and then accidently stumbled upon (…) the first QRF, fired a few 
rounds at them as well and then left. In itself, that makes perfect sense. 
 
Company command thus adheres to its initial hypothesis and tries to make sense of 
new information by fitting it in to that image. The result is that company command, 
at this moment, has the point of view that there are at most a handful of insurgents, 
who have already left the scene, while in reality the centre of Ar Rumaythah is 
teeming with rebels. The inaccurate image of company command contributes to 
their decision to employ a second QRF and letting them use unarmored vehicles. It 
also contributes to the decision of the commander of the second QRF to drive 
through the centre of Ar Rumaythah, rather than avoiding it, just like the first QRF. 
Because the situation they are dealing with is not stable and predictable, but instead 
dynamic and complex, these standard routines are not appropriate. And thus, 
restricted information processing moves everything into position for a potentially 
catastrophic ambush. The fact that in the end every serviceman of the second QRF 
survived this ambush may be nothing short of a miracle.  
Constriction in control 
The second proposition of the threat-rigidity thesis, predicting a constriction in 
control under threat, turns our attention to the way the company command team 
directed the operation. On the one hand, they had to command their own troops. On 
the other hand, they had to report to their next-higher level, battalion command. In 
both these directions, the actions of the company command team show that they 
tried hard to maintain control (or a sense of control) over the situation. Again, the 
threatening nature of the circumstances may have been an important cause of this.  
One instance that illustrates the way company command tried to withhold 
their next-higher level from interference in the situation, pertains to the deployment 
of a QRF by battalion command. As described above, battalion command deployed 
a QRF on their own initiative, to provide assistance from the south. When the 
company commander heard of this deployment, he immediately intervened and 
calls this QRF to a halt: 
 
I remember having shouted: “Abort that operation! When I need something, 
I’ll say so myself”. So they (i.e., the QRF of the battalion) immediately hit the 
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brakes and pulled over somewhere in the next hundred meters. Try to 
imagine: they would have driven in completely blind, while I’m in control of the 
situation here (…) At that moment, I have absolutely no use for a unit from 
outside. As long as I can handle it myself, as long as I have a cook that is still 
able to mount, I don’t need you around here! 
 
The company commander thus tries to stay in control by not letting other units enter 
his area of responsibility. Allowing this would have meant a loosening of control, 
whereas his aim is to maintain and constrict control, to keep the situation 
manageable. However, in doing so, company command shuts off useful resources. 
Although the battalion is 30 kilometers away, they can reach the location of the 
stranded MP unit without having to go through the town’s centre, and they can do so 
in time, because battalion command sent out their QRF rapidly after the first reports 
of the attack on the MP unit. 
Thus, the rigidity in reactions by company command again seems 
inappropriate in the current circumstances. However, the QRF of the battalion 
somehow does continue on its way, despite the orders of company command, and 
nevertheless arrives at the location of the stranded MP unit. At this location they are 
deployed by the on scene commander to secure the landing point of the Medevac. 
Hence, eventually the control exerted by company command in this case did not get 
the chance to exert its negative effects. Once again, it becomes clear that threat 
actually did negatively affect the performance of the command team, but that these 
effects somehow did not get the chance to have an effect on the operation as a 
whole. 
Another instance illustrates how company command constricts control with 
regard to their own troops, although in a different manner. This happens when the 
incident seems to have come to an end. The wounded have been transported and it 
appears to have become quiet. At that moment, company command orders that all 
troops gather together inside the base, so they can be addressed by the company 
commander. But just when he is about to start speaking to the troops, the base is 
attacked with Rocket Propelled Grenades (RPGs). The troops have to run for cover 
and take up their positions again. They start shooting back with all means at their 
disposal until peace returns. Luckily, none of the RPGs hit the base and no one gets 
injured. 
This constrictive action of company command aimed to regain a sense of 
control over the situation. The urge to bring everyone together to foster this sense of 
control made that the company cut itself off from the outside world. This made them 
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blind to what happened outside the gates. Their enemies immediately exploited this 
weakness. Once more, it becomes apparent that in a situation that does not 
correspond to the original expectations, but rather proves to be complex and 
unpredictable, constriction in control may have disastrous consequences. In the 
words of the company commander: 
 
That (i.e., gathering everyone inside) was wrong. That’s something I have 
learned from this experience. You can’t create a situation in which you’re 
completely blind, directly after a combat situation. That’s just not acceptable. 
Of course, it’s only human (…) but after this incident, we have never done it 
this way again. 
 
Evidently, it is not possible to conclude with certainty that without threat, things 
would have unfolded differently. It is, after all, always difficult to deduce causal 
relations from single events. But it is not unlikely that without the effects of threat, 
company command would have sooner replaced their initial hypothesis of a hit-and-
run attack with an alternative hypothesis. And they might also have felt more 
inclined to accept assistance from the battalion.  
Although the analysis of a single incident may deliver valuable knowledge, 
more controlled research is useful to test the propositions of the threat-rigidity thesis 
and establish causal relationships between threat on the one hand, and team 
processes and performance on the other hand. Below we review previous research 
that has addressed the effects of threat on team performance in controlled settings. 
Previous Research 
Only a small number of studies tested propositions of the threat-rigidity thesis at the 
team level. Below, we review the results of these studies. 
Gladstein and Reilly (1985) investigated how teams in a six day management 
simulation responded to threatening events. These simulated events consisted of 
incidents with potentially severe negative financial consequences (e.g., a strike). 
Participants reported to have restricted their information processing in response to 
these events, by using less information to make a decision. However, no evidence 
was found for a constriction in control.  
Argote et al. (1989) investigated the effects of threat on the centralization of 
communication structures in teams using a simple laboratory team task (discovering 
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which of five colors displayed on cards distributed to each team member was held in 
common). They manipulated threat by suggesting that participants would lose the 
opportunity to win additional money if they did not perform well and by creating time 
pressure. They found that higher levels of perceived threat were associated with 
more centralized communication structures, which is an indication of a constriction 
in control.  
Driskell and Salas (1991) investigated the effects of threat on team decision 
making, using a simple team task too (choosing which of two patterns contained a 
greater area of white). Threat was manipulated by telling participants that during 
task performance a small amount of tear gas would be introduced into the room 
(which, in reality, did not happen). They found that high status team members under 
threat accepted more influence on their decisions from low status team members 
than high status team members under normal conditions did. The researchers 
interpreted this result as a loosening of control under threat rather than a 
constriction in control predicted by the threat-rigidity thesis.  
Harrington, Lemak, and Kendall (2002) investigated how threat affected 
teams participating in a student team project. Threat was not manipulated, but 
assessed by the researchers on the basis of the importance and the complexity of 
the project, the level of competition, and time pressure. Participants facing higher 
levels of threat reported to have used a more rigid approach to the decision making 
process, indicating both a restriction in information processing and a constriction in 
control. 
Two recent studies suggested that a restriction in information processing 
under threat may extend to team information as well (Driskell et al., 1999; Ellis, 
2006). In other words, team members under threat might not only overlook or ignore 
important task information, but they might also ‘forget’ that they are part of a team 
and become self-focused rather than team-focused. Driskell et al. (1999) 
investigated how a combination of time pressure, task load, and auditory distraction 
affected team processes and performance during a tactical decision-making task. 
The authors concluded that stress resulted in a narrowing of team perspective (the 
extent to which members feel like a team and are oriented at team rather than 
individual activities during the task), which in turn led to impaired team performance.  
In addition, Ellis (2006) investigated how this narrowing of team perspective 
under threat affected the transactive memory systems (TMSs) and performance of 
teams during a tactical decision-making task. A TMS is a set of distributed, 
individual memory systems for encoding, storing and retrieving information that 
combines the knowledge possessed by particular members with a shared 
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awareness of who knows what (Wegner, 1995). Due to an effective TMS, team 
members can retrieve knowledge from each other, anticipate each other’s actions 
and needs, and thus work together effectively (e.g., Moreland, 1999). Threat was 
manipulated by videotaping participants and telling them that if they would not 
perform well, the tape would be shown to their entire class as an example of 
ineffective teamwork. In addition, every 5 minutes these teams received warnings 
that they did not have much time left. Results of the study showed that threat 
negatively affected TMSs which mediated the relationship between threat and team 
performance.  
Taken together, these studies provide initial support for the proposition of a 
restriction in information processing in teams under threat. The studies show that, 
under threat, teams use less information and adopt a more rigid approach in the 
decision-making process (Gladstein & Reilly, 1985; Harrington et al., 2002). 
Moreover, this narrowing of attention does not only pertain to task information but 
also causes team members to shift from a broader, team perspective, to a more 
narrow, individualistic focus (Driskell et al., 1999). This shift in focus negatively 
affects TMSs in teams, which in turn leads to deteriorated team performance (Ellis, 
2006).  
Results of the described studies regarding the proposition of a constriction in 
control, however, are less straightforward. Some studies reported findings in line 
with this proposition (Argote et al., 1989; Harrington et al., 2002), whereas other 
studies found no effects (Gladstein & Reilly, 1985) or even results indicating a 
loosening of control rather than a constriction in control (Driskell & Salas, 1991). 
Hence, it seems that on the basis of these studies, no definite conclusions regarding 
the exercise of control under threat can be drawn. 
Although the studies reviewed above provide valuable initial insights into the 
effects of threat on the performance of teams, for a more thorough understanding 
several aspects that have not been adequately addressed by previous research 
need closer attention. First, most studies investigating the effects of threat on team 
performance used simple laboratory tasks, or tactical decision-making tasks. 
Although these tasks may deliver valuable knowledge, they are not suited to 
investigate some of the processes that characterize team performance in complex 
environments. Simple team tasks, for example, lack inherent role differentiation, as 
a result of which no real interdependence exists between team members. Team 
processes, such as coordination and supporting behavior, therefore can not be 
investigated with simple team tasks. In tactical decision-making tasks, team 
members typically do have different roles, but these roles are often so well-defined 
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that they rule out the possibility of engaging in processes such as performance 
monitoring and supporting behavior (Weaver, Bowers, Salas, & Cannon-Bowers, 
1995). In addition, the actions required from team members in these tasks are 
repetitive and rule-based as a result of which processes such as hypothesis 
generation, planning, and problem-solving cannot be investigated (Weaver et al., 
1995).  
Second, although a number of studies addressed the proposition of a 
constriction in control in teams under threat, in none of these studies, a formal 
leadership role was assigned to one of the team members. This is remarkable 
because in most organizational teams, one person does bear final responsibility and 
can be considered the leader. In the proposition of a constriction in control of the 
threat-rigidity thesis, leadership plays an important role. Therefore, it might be 
problematic to draw conclusions about the absence or presence of a constriction in 
control under threat on the basis of teams in which the leadership role is lacking. 
Third, to our knowledge, no study has investigated the effects of physical 
threat on team performance during complex tasks. Instead, other kinds of threats 
were used (e.g., social or material). Previous research, however, has shown that 
physical threat (i.e., threat of electric shock) may have other effects than material 
threat (i.e., threat of small monetary loss; Klein, 1976). Therefore, it remains to be 
seen, to what extent results from experiments using non-physical threats can be 
generalized to physical threat situations. 
Fourth, most studies mixed up time pressure with their threat manipulation. 
Although time pressure indeed may be a critical component of the environments in 
which many teams have to operate, using it in this way only serves to obscure the 
effects of threat. After all the effects of time pressure on information processing 
coincide for a large part with the effects of threat, because time pressure also 
causes team members to attend to a more restricted range of cues and engage in 
more heuristic information processing (cf. the Attentional Focus Model, Karau & 
Kelly, 1992; Kelly, Jackson, & Hutson-Comeaux, 1997; Kelly & Karau, 1999). 
Therefore, if one is interested in the effects of threat, time pressure should be held 
constant over the conditions.  
Fifth, although a number of studies investigated the effects of threat on team 
processes, few studies investigated how these effects influenced team 
performance, and none of these studies simultaneously addressed the total set of 
relevant mediating processes in the relationship between threat and team 
performance. Knowledge concerning the mediational properties of these processes, 
and the way they relate to each other, however, is relevant, since some of these 
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processes might be far more important in causing deterioration of team performance 
than other processes. Interventions aimed at mitigating the effects of threat on team 
performance should target those processes that are responsible for the 
performance deterioration. 
Finally, hardly any research has addressed the question of how to mitigate 
the effects of threat on team performance. Knowledge of the specific effects threat 
has on team processes could be very useful in developing interventions aimed at 
reducing the negative effects of threat. Organizations could greatly benefit from 
such interventions in preparing teams for operations in dangerous environments.  
Present Research 
The present research thus investigates how threat affects team performance during 
complex tasks, and what can be done to protect teams against these effects. The 
design of this research aims to address the aspects that have not received sufficient 
attention in previous research.  
To test the propositions from the threat-rigidity thesis in a controlled way, an 
experimental approach was adopted. In this approach, teams had to perform an 
experimental team task that embodied the complexity many present-day teams 
face. Since none of the existing tasks used in team research fully satisfied the 
requirements of both, complexity and controllability, we decided to develop a new 
task environment. This task environment had to permit controlled experimental 
research into team planning, problem-solving, and decision-making behavior in a 
complex world.  
The resulting flexible research platform, called PLATT (PLAnning Task for 
Teams; Kamphuis, Essens, Houttuin, & Gaillard, 2009; Kamphuis & Houttuin, 2007), 
allowed the controlled investigation of team processes characteristic of teams 
operating in complex environments, while offering a broad range of automated and 
embedded team process measurement possibilities. PLATT consists of a modular 
software architecture in which research-specific scenarios can be run. The 
scenarios developed for the present research were planning and problem-solving 
scenarios in a military context. Team members occupied different roles with unique 
responsibilities, expertise, and tasks. One of the team members occupied the 




The task environment in combination with the specific scenarios made it 
possible to investigate all relevant processes pertaining to the constructs of interest: 
information processing, exercise of control, and team perspective. The use of the 
PLATT task environment in the present study thus addressed the above described 
overemphasis on simple laboratory tasks and rule-based decision making tasks, 
while maintaining sufficient experimental control. Because all relevant processes 
could be studied simultaneously and linked to team performance in a meaningful 
manner, we were able to investigate the full complexity of the threat rigidity thesis. 
In doing so, we also could attend to the relative importance of the different threat-
rigidity effects as mediating variables in the relationship between threat and team 
performance, a subject that had been largely ignored by previous research.  
In addition, the developed scenarios addressed the lack of a formal 
leadership role in previous studies that tested propositions from the threat-rigidity 
theory at the team level. This made it possible to investigate constrictions in control 
in line with the original proposition of the threat-rigidity thesis. This helped to shed 
some light on the seemingly contradictory results that have been found for the 
effects of threat on the exercise of control in teams. 
Furthermore, in the present research, we manipulated physical threat. In 
doing so we aimed to fill the research gap that existed because no research 
previously investigated the effects of physical threat on complex team performance. 
We also manipulated social threat, making it possible to compare results of both 
threat manipulations with each other. Because we did not aim to maximize the 
stress response, but rather set out to determine the specific effects of threat, we did 
not combine threat with other potential stressors, such as time pressure, or auditory 
distraction. Because of this, threat effects could not be attributed to, or obscured by, 
other potential stressors, making it possible to determine the effects unique to 
threat.  
Finally, the knowledge gained in this research about the effects of threat on 
team processes was used to develop a training intervention aimed at protecting 
teams against the negative effects of threat. This training intervention was tested 
experimentally. Given the vulnerability of teams to the effects of threat, and the 
signaled lack of research addressing methods to mitigate these effects, this 
intervention could be of considerable value to the domain.  
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Overview of this Dissertation 
As outlined above, the objective of the present dissertation is to uncover how threat 
affects team performance during complex tasks and in what way teams can be 
protected against the negative effects of threat. The following chapters describe the 
development of a suitable research environment and the empirical research that has 
been conducted in this environment to answer these research questions. These 
chapters have been written as individual papers, intended to be read separately. As 
a consequence, there is some overlap between these chapters. See Figure 1.2 for a 
schematic overview of the chapters. 
Chapter 2 describes PLATT, the task environment we developed for 
controlled research on team processes in complex environments. In this chapter, we 
sketch the complexity present-day teams face and present an overview of 
previously used tasks for team research. Then we formulate requirements for an 
environment that enables controlled research on team performance in a complex 
world. We describe the software architecture of PLATT, the military evacuation 
scenario that has been developed for the present research, and the range of 
measurement possibilities this environment offers. In addition, we describe some 
potential research applications of this environment and illustrate its possibilities by 
describing a number of experiments that have used PLATT for a variety of research 
questions. 
Chapter 3 describes an experimental test of the reactions proposed by the 
threat-rigidity thesis in teams under physical threat. We investigated whether 
physical threat lead to a restriction in information processing, a constriction in 
control, and a narrowing of team perspective in teams performing a complex 
planning and problem-solving scenario in PLATT. Participants were civilians, 
recruited from a pool of volunteers of the research institute. Physical threat was 
manipulated in a between-teams design by letting participants in the threat condition 
believe that they would possibly be subjected to reduced oxygen levels during task 
execution. In reality, no reduction of oxygen level occurred. Team processes 
(information processing, leadership, communication, coordination, and supporting 
behavior) were measured by automated behavior recordings and questionnaires, 
and team performance was determined on the basis of the final plan the team 
delivered. 
Chapter 4 extends the findings of Chapter 3 by examining the 
appropriateness of threat-rigidity reactions for team performance in a complex 
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Figure 1.2 
Schematic overview of the chapters 
 
negatively affected team performance through restricted information processing, 
constricted control, and a narrowed team perspective. Participants were officer 
cadets of the Netherlands Defence Academy. We used a similar PLATT-scenario as 
in Chapter 3, but this time we manipulated a social threat in a between-teams 
design. This threat consisted of creating an evaluative situation with potentially 
negative social consequences in case of poor performance. Again, relevant team 
processes were measured through behavioral recordings and questionnaires, and 
team performance was assessed on the basis of the plan the team delivered. 
Chapter 5 describes the development and experimental testing of a training 
intervention aimed at protecting teams from the negative effects of threat. This 
training intervention was built on the knowledge we developed regarding the effects 
of threat on team processes. It aimed to reinforce team perspective by enhancing 
transactive memory in teams. This Transactive Memory training intervention (TM-
training) combined a focus on sharedness of knowledge, with a focus on distribution 
and compatibility. The TM-training intervention was tested in a study with officer 
cadets of the Netherlands Defence Academy engaging in a complex planning and 
problem-solving scenario in PLATT, with social threat and TM-training as between-
teams factors. Behavioral and self-report measures were collected to assess 
transactive memory, transactive memory systems, performance monitoring, and 
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supporting behavior. Team performance was determined on the basis of the plan 
the team delivered. 
Finally, Chapter 6 provides an overview of the main findings of the present 
research, and discusses theoretical and practical implications. Strengths and 










A Flexible Platform for Experimental Research 
on Team Performance in Complex Environments1 
 
 
This chapter introduces PLATT, a recently developed task environment for 
controlled experimental research on team performance in complex 
environments. PLATT was developed to meet the research demands posed 
by the complexity present-day teams face. It consists of a flexible, modular 
software architecture and research-specific scenarios. The scenarios can 
target various types of tasks in different operational contexts. Different 
software configurations can be used to investigate questions pertaining to 
team structure, team virtuality, and multiteam systems. In this chapter, we 
describe the software architecture, one of the scenarios, and the broad range 
of automated and embedded measurement possibilities PLATT offers. To 
illustrate PLATT’s possibilities, we describe a number of experiments that 
have used PLATT for a variety of research questions. We conclude that 
PLATT meets the formulated demands and provides researchers with a 
flexible platform to investigate the complex issues present-day teams face. 
 
Teams are everywhere. They can accomplish tasks that exceed the capabilities of 
single individuals. In our age of information, teams have to be able to cope with an 
                                                 
1 This chapter is based on Kamphuis, Essens, Houttuin, & Gaillard (2009). 
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increasingly complex world. Large amounts of information, with an often ambiguous 
and contradictory nature, tax the abilities of teams. They have to be effective in 
dynamic and unpredictable environments. To complicate matters even more, team 
members may be geographically dispersed, necessitating the use of technology to 
communicate with each other.  
The complexity present-day teams have to meet, requires scientific 
understanding (cf. Salas, Cooke, & Rosen, 2008). Research is needed that aims to 
gain more insight into the present-day factors affecting team effectiveness, in order 
to contribute to the development of training methods, interventions, and technology 
to improve team effectiveness. Studies with existing teams in field settings can 
provide initial understanding of the conditional factors of teamwork. To test 
predictions derived from these field studies systematically and establish causal 
relationships, more controlled experimentation is necessary. For these studies, 
experimental team tasks are necessary. On the one hand, these tasks have to 
embody the complexity present-day teams face. Only then relevant processes 
emerge and can be measured. On the other hand, these tasks have to allow a good 
degree of control. Only then processes of interest can be measured in a systematic 
way. Hence, there is a complexity-control trade-off. This chapter describes a 
recently developed task environment that facilitates controlled experimental 
research on team performance in complex environments: PLATT2.  
Previous Research 
Team researchers have conducted research on both ends of the simplicity-
complexity continuum. They have used either simple tasks in highly controllable 
laboratory experiments, or complex tasks in realistic, high-fidelity simulations. As an 
example of a simple task that has been used for the study of team performance 
consider the “Winter Survival Exercise” (Johnson & Johnson, 1987), in which 
participants have to reach a consensus concerning the ranking of 12 items salvaged 
from a crashed plane, according to their relative survival value (see, for example, 
Durham, Locke, Poon, & McLeod, 2000). High-fidelity simulations to study team 
performance are, for example, business management simulations like “Tycoon”, 
                                                 
2 PLATT is an acronym for PLAnning Task for Teams. This name had its origin in the first scenarios 
developed for the task environment, which were planning scenarios. In developing the environment, 
flexibility increased as a result of which more types of tasks could be simulated. Nonetheless, we decided 
to adhere to the original name, since it had already been established. 
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developed by the Amos Tuck School of Business Administration in 1973 (see, for 
example, Gladstein & Reilly, 1985), or the “Management Game” (MCC, 1993; see, 
for example, Van der Vegt & Van de Vliert, 2005).  
Although both types of research can deliver valuable knowledge, the tasks 
used seem to be less useful in light of the mentioned team research needs of 
complexity and controllability. With the simple team tasks the complexity present-
day teams face cannot be investigated. In addition, many of the processes 
characteristic of teams are absent in these tasks due to a lack of inherent role 
differentiation. The high-fidelity simulations elicit real team behavior, but do not 
provide enough experimental control.  
A more recent approach positioned between these two ends, is the use of 
low-fidelity simulations: networked multi-player computer games that reflect reality 
to a certain degree, but still offer control (Weaver, Bowers, Salas, & Cannon-
Bowers, 1995). The past quarter century produced a wealth of low-fidelity 
networked computer simulations. Consider, for example, DDD (Distributed Dynamic 
Decision-Making Simulation; Kleinman, Serfaty & Luh, 1984), TIDE2 (Team 
Interactive Decision Exercise for Teams Incorporating Distributed Expertise; 
Hollenbeck, Sego, Ilgen & Major, 1991), TANDEM (Tactical Navy Decision Making 
task; Weaver et al., 1995), TPAB (Team Performance Assessment Battery; see 
Weaver et al., 1995), Team-Track (Jentsch, Bowers, Compton, Navarro, & Tait, 
1996), ARGUS (Schoelles & Gray, 2001), C3Fire (Granlund, 2002), and FFTT (Fire 
Fighting Team Task; Rasker, 2002). All these tasks are in essence monitoring tasks 
in which targets have to be monitored or detected, and subsequently correctly dealt 
with. Team members repeatedly have to bring together distributed information about 
these targets, take decisions concerning these targets, and take appropriate 
actions.  
This category of tasks makes it possible to investigate real team behavior 
under controlled conditions. The focus of these tasks, however, is on the action 
aspects of team performance. Since judgments and decisions in these tasks are 
rule-based and become routine, little higher-level, non-routine, problem-solving 
processes are demanded. Weaver et al. (1995) already noted that although these 
simulations appear quite dynamic, in reality they do not allow for much complexity 
since the actions required from the team members are repetitive in nature and their 
roles are too well-defined. Consequently, these low-fidelity simulations do not fully 
satisfy the mentioned team research needs, as these needs also pertain to higher-
level, complex problem-solving aspects of team performance (cf. Salas et al., 2008). 
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Purpose and Requirements 
Since none of the above approaches seemed to be able to fully address the 
complexity present-day teams face in a controlled setting, we decided to develop a 
new task environment. This task environment had to initiate a research program on 
team performance in a complex, networked world. The environment had to permit 
controlled experimental team research on complex planning and problem-solving 
behavior. In terms of the described approaches, the environment was to be 
positioned between the low- and high-fidelity simulations. 
Specifically, we formulated six requirements the task environment had to fulfill 
(also see Kamphuis & Houttuin, 2007). First, participants performing the task should 
exhibit real team behavior. In line with Salas, Dickinson, Converse, and 
Tannenbaum (1992), we defined teams as distinguishable sets of individuals who 
have each been assigned specific roles or tasks to perform and who work 
interdependently toward a common goal. The most important necessity stemming 
from this definition is that the task should have a division of roles with different 
specializations leading to interdependence among team members to reach the 
common goal.  
Second, the task environment should be suited to study the higher-level team 
processes that surface in complex environments, in addition to processes that are 
necessary to accomplish rule-based tasks. The latter include processes such as 
decision making, information exchange, communication, supporting behavior, and 
team initiative (e.g., Smith-Jentsch, Johnston, & Payne, 1998), whereas higher-level 
team processes comprise processes such as information search and selection, 
hypothesis generation, planning and replanning, priority setting, and problem 
solving. To be able to measure these processes, the task should be constructed in 
such a way that teams need to demonstrate these processes to accomplish their 
goal. The task environment therefore should allow the possibility of a high 
information load to necessitate information selection; the use of different media to 
impose active information searching; new information becoming available during the 
task to necessitate adjusting and replanning; and complex problems that demand 
problem-solving behavior.  
Third, the task environment should offer a good degree of experimental 
control. It should be possible to keep all circumstances constant across teams, 
including the events in the task. The task therefore should only be dynamic with 
respect to scripted changes, not with respect to participants’ actions. In this way, 
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differences in processes and effectiveness can be attributed solely to experimental 
manipulations.  
Fourth, the task environment should allow relatively efficient data collection. 
More precisely, it should be possible to perform the task without specific 
foreknowledge and without extensive training in a relatively short amount of time. 
The task should be capable of being constructed in multiple comparable versions (to 
enable within team designs and practice rounds).  
Fifth, the task environment should offer a broad range of team process 
measurement possibilities, both behavioral and self-report. It should be capable of 
taking unobtrusive, real-time automated behavioral measures (cf. Salas et al., 2008) 
and collect these in a single log file. In addition, it should offer the possibility of 
online, embedded questionnaires that have to be filled out during task performance. 
The task environment should allow the measurement of team cognition (e.g., 
Canon-Bowers, Salas, & Converse, 1993; Klimoski & Mohammed, 1994). 
Finally, the software should allow a high degree of flexibility. Much of the 
existing software for investigating teams is intended for investigating specific 
research questions and does not leave much room for alterations in configuration 
(e.g., Kerr, Aronoff, & Messé, 2000). As a result of this, experimenters frequently 
have to develop their own software to be able to investigate a specific research 
question. The present task environment should address this problem and have a 
generic structure that can be tailored to specific research questions. It should be 
possible to investigate a wide array of research questions within the same task 
environment. The task environment should, for example, be suitable for Multi Team 
Systems research (Mathieu, Marks, & Zaccaro, 2001), and allow larger numbers of 
players, the configuration of multiple teams and multiple hierarchical levels.  
PLATT 
In response to these requirements we developed PLATT, a flexible software 
platform for controlled experimental research on team performance in complex 
environments. PLATT consists of a modular software architecture in which 
research-specific scenarios can be run. The software architecture is research 
question independent and guarantees a large degree of flexibility. The scenarios are 
developed on the basis of a theory-based research model, in response to specific 
research questions. Participants playing the scenarios receive messages, search for 
information on web sites, interact with a shared workspace and communicate with 
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each other via e-mail. The scenarios can target different types of tasks, like 
planning, problem solving, and decision making. Moreover, the scenarios can take 
place in different operational contexts, for example, the military, organizational 
settings, or crisis management contexts. There is no limit to the number of 
participants that can join in a scenario. 
Software Architecture 
The PLATT software architecture (see Figure 2.1) is a distributed application. It 
consists of a Scenario Player, a Web Agent, and a Participant Interface with 
different components. In addition, there is a separate Data Analysis Tool. PLATT 
has been created using the JADE agent platform. JADE (Bellifemine, Caire, Poggi, 
& Rimassa, 2003) is a widespread agent-oriented middleware system, distributed as 
open source software under LGPL license. All distributed parts of PLATT (i.e., 
Scenario Player, Web Agent, and Participant Interface) are implemented as JADE 
agents that communicate using the JADE communication infrastructure.  
The Scenario Player reads the configuration file and the scenario file. During 
an experiment, the Scenario Player sends scenario events to the team members 
and defines changes on the web sites they can visit. It also creates a log file with 
detailed information of all scenario events and all actions participants perform during 
task execution (i.e., sending, opening, and receiving e-mails, selecting web browser 
or shared workspace tabs, opening web pages, etc.). 
The Web Agent keeps track of the access rights of different participants to 
web pages and registers the current version of a web page. Information on web 
pages can be made dynamic (i.e., changing over time) by creating different versions 
of the same web page, and having the scenario define which version of a web page 
should be available at what moment. When the web server receives a page request 
from a participant (via the web browser), it consults the Web Agent and handles the 
request in accordance with the access rights and the version information of the web 
page. If the participant has the proper access rights, the web browser shows the 
requested page in return.  
Finally, the Participant Interface shows the different applications participants 
can use during the scenario. It consists of multiple windows positioned on top of 
each other. In the standard PLATT set-up, the Participant Interface contains three 























































Schematic overview of the PLATT software architecture 
 
When participants open their e-mail window, they can use an e-mail 
application to communicate with each other (via text messages). In this e-mail 
application team members also receive the scripted events sent by the Scenario 
Player. The events they receive can have different formats. An event can be a text 
message, an audio message, a video message, or a hyperlink to a web page.  
In the web browser window, participants can search for additional 
information. This information is part of the scenario, and the scenario controls which 
information is available at what moment. The web browser allows for the 
presentation of virtually any textual, visual and multimedia content. Because of this, 
the scenario content can be as rich as the content that can be found on the internet.  
The last window is the shared workspace window. The shared workspace is a 
digital area that allows for parallel viewing and editing by team members with the 
appropriate authorization. In this space, team members may work jointly on certain 
team tasks, or it may act as a common operational picture that is constantly being 
updated according to changes in the situation.  
The client software has a modular design that has been established using a 
component framework. All participant applications (e.g., e-mail, web browser, 
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shared workspace) are independent PLATT components that can be plugged into 
the framework and configured in the central configuration file. Every component is 
loaded on a new tab in the Participant Interface. This plug-in architecture makes it 
relatively easy for researchers to extend PLATT with new PLATT components using 
the framework software interface. Different kinds of shared workspaces have 
already been implemented and used in experiments (e.g., a digital editable map, a 
bulletin board for sharing e-mails, and a shared whiteboard). Similarly, different 
kinds of communication media could be plugged in (e.g., chat or video-
conferencing), and different web browsers could be used. This modular design 
contributes to the flexibility of the PLATT software platform. 
The Data Analysis Tool converts the log file of an experimental run into 
meaningful measures (e.g., total number of unopened e-mails as a measure of 
information selection). It uses the directory with log files as input and delivers one 
Excel sheet with team summaries and total summaries as output. 
The complete configuration of an experiment is captured in a single file. This 
file defines the roles of participants, the communication structure of the team (or 
teams), and the interface components each participant receives. The file also 
defines what computer is assigned to what role. Using this information, the Scenario 
Player controls the starting, running, and stopping of all remote clients, making it no 
longer necessary to perform these actions at every separate participant workstation 
during the experiment.  
Scenarios 
The scenarios that run in the software architecture are composed of a scenario file, web 
sites, and content for the shared workspace (e.g., a map of the area). Scenarios can be 
written by experimenters for their own specific question. No programming knowledge is 
required, as the scenario files can be written in Excel format (spreadsheets). Scenarios 
can be tested by using the accelerate function of the Scenario Player. In this modus, the 
scenario unfolds at 10 times normal speed. This allows the experimenter to ensure that 
all events occur at the expected time, that hyperlinks direct to the right pages, that 
questionnaires automatically pop up, and so forth. 
Scenario files consist of predefined events on a linear timeline. In the 
scenario file, every line is one event. The events fall into three categories. The first 
category of events consists of the messages that are sent to the participants. These 
messages can have text, audio, or video formats, and they may contain hyperlinks 
to web pages. For each event, the experimenter defines in the scenario file: the time 
at which the event should start; the sender of the message; the recipient of the 
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event; the subject of the message; the message content; and, if applicable, the 
hyperlink that comes with the message.  
The second category consists of changes in the information that can be found 
on the (scenario-specific) web sites. In the scenario file, the experimenter can define 
which version of a web page has to be accessible at what moment. In this way, the 
same web page can show different information at different moments. For these 
events, the experimenter has to define the time, the recipient (who is allowed to visit 
this webpage), the hyperlink to the web page, and the version of this web page.  
The last category of events in the scenario file consists of hyperlinks that 
open automatically when the participant receives the link. This category is used for 
the online questionnaires participants have to fill out during the task. For these 
events, the experimenter has to define the time, the recipient, and the hyperlink. 
Research Model 
The development of a scenario is guided by the research model. The purpose of 
this model is to secure that the intended research will be about real team behavior, 
that it will be possible to measure relevant team processes, and that there will be a 
meaningful link between these processes and the team’s performance. First, to 
measure real team behavior, there has to be task and goal interdependence 
between participants (for a taxonomy of different classes of interdependence, see 
Saavedra, Earley, & Van Dyne, 1993). In a scenario, the experimenter has to realize 
this by creating different roles, with different responsibilities, expertise, and tasks, 
for each of the team’s members. In addition, the quality of the output of the team’s 
performance on the scenario has to be dependent upon the input from every team 
member. The preconditions for team processes to emerge are fulfilled when the 
expertise from all team members is necessary to accomplish the task, and when 
team members are motivated to perform well as a team. 
Second, the experimenter has to determine what team and task processes 
are of interest, given the research question, and how these processes can be 
elicited by the scenario. For example, if one is interested in supporting behavior, the 
scenario should incorporate situations or events in which there is an opportunity for 
team members to assist fellow team members with their task. This opportunity could 
be created by overloading one of the roles with information at a certain moment, 
while giving a fellow team member at that same moment the time and means to 
step in and help out. In addition, engaging in these processes needs to be relevant 
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in view of the overall goal, because otherwise team members would not be required 
to demonstrate them.  
Finally, the experimenter has to think about ways to make the relevant 
processes measurable. This can be done at the behavioral level, by, for example, 
designing critical events (events that need to be dealt with in a specified way), and 
investigating how participants dealt with these events on the basis of the log file. It 
can also be done at the cognitive level, by integrating online measurement 
techniques.  
Scenario Example 
As an example of a scenario that has been developed for PLATT, we describe a 
military evacuation scenario that has been used in a series of studies with military 
personnel and with civilians (e.g., Kamphuis, Gaillard, & Vogelaar, 2008, 2009c).  
Task 
In this scenario, participants have the assignment to develop a plan to evacuate a 
group of people from a hostile area to a safe place. More than a dozen routes can 
be used for the evacuation. The team has to determine the fastest route and plan 
how they will employ their transportation, engineer, and infantry units. Whether a 
route is appropriate does not only depend on the length of the roads, but also on the 
condition of these roads, and whether there are enemy activities on these roads.  
Roles 
The scenario contains three roles, each of which has its own responsibilities, 
expertise, and tasks: Operations, Intelligence, and Logistics. Operations has the 
leadership role and is responsible for coordinating the activities of the other team 
members. Operations is the only team member who is allowed to edit the shared 
map of the area in which the evacuation has to take place. Intelligence is 
responsible for all safety information and has unique expertise concerning 
determining the reliability of all information sources in the scenario. Logistics is 
responsible for personnel and materiel, and for the condition of the roads. Logistics 
has unique expertise concerning calculating the duration of the various routes. 
Every team member receives role-specific training. 
Instruction 
Teams receive approximately 30 minutes of instruction. This instruction consists of 
a 20-minute standard video with information about the team’s assignment and the 
use of the participant interface. Afterwards, team members receive a written 
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instruction containing information about their own roles in the scenario. Every team 
member receives a different instruction, with role-specific knowledge and 
information. 
Events 
During the scenario, the team receives a large amount of information concerning 
road conditions, enemy activities, delays due to different causes, the position of 
their units, personnel and materiel problems, weather conditions, unrelated events, 
and so forth. This information varies in relevance and is sent by many sources 
differing in reliability. The information can be ambiguous, or in contradiction with 
information the team received earlier. The events in the scenario are constructed in 
such a way that at different moments different routes are optimal, so the team has 
to adjust initial plans and adapt to circumstances.  
Websites 
Both Intelligence and Logistics have access to web sites. Intelligence can search 
this web site for information concerning the safety of the roads in the area. Logistics 
has a web site containing information about the availability and the capacity of the 
units, and the condition of the roads. The scenario file controls changes in 
information on these web sites. 
Shared workspace 
The shared workspace in this scenario consists of a digital, editable map of the area 
in which the evacuation has to take place (see Figure 2.2). All three roles can view 
this map, but only Operations is allowed to edit it. Operations can put symbols in the 
map to indicate, for example, enemy activities, locations of units, and road 
conditions. In addition, Operations can use text to ‘write’ information in the map. 
These map-updates are visible to Intelligence and Logistics. 
Potential Research Applications 
Because PLATT makes it possible to write new scenarios for every specific 
research question, the opportunities to investigate team performance in complex 
environments are numerous. Already, scenarios have been developed for 
investigating team processes in complex problem-solving tasks, networked 
decision-making tasks, and crisis management tasks. In addition to having the 
capability to write different scenarios, or adjust existing scenarios for different 
research questions, experimenters also have the ability to choose different software 




Participant interface showing the shared workspace of the military evacuation scenario. The 
symbols on the right hand side can be used to represent specific information in the map. The 
other two applications (e-mail and web browser) can be opened by clicking the tabs in the 
upper left corner. 
 
configurations to investigate certain research questions. Below we give three 
examples of theoretically and practically relevant manipulations based on the 
software configuration. 
Team Structure 
In PLATT, it is possible to manipulate the team’s structure by defining who can 
communicate with whom. In this way, different team structures can be compared to 
each other. In a team with three roles, for example, the experimenter could create a 
centralized team structure in which only one of the roles can communicate with both 
other roles, and both of the other roles can communicate only with this one role and 
not with each other. This could be compared to a decentralized situation in which 
every role is able to communicate with both other roles. Such a manipulation has 
relevance in light of the possibilities created by current information and 
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communication technologies. Currently, lower levels in organizations (‘the edges’) 
can easily have all of the information necessary to make their own decisions at their 
disposal. Power and decision rights therefore could be given to these edges of the 
organization (Alberts & Hayes, 2003), leading to decentralized organization 
structures. By simulating these circumstances in PLATT, decision speed, accuracy, 
and effectiveness as well as other team measures (e.g., trust, shared awareness, 
and leadership) in self-organizing, edge team structures could be compared to 
traditional hierarchical team structures. 
This functionality of PLATT is comparable to the characteristics of another 
recently developed software environment for team research called ELICIT 
(Experimental Laboratory for Investigating Collaboration, Information-sharing and 
Trust; Ruddy, 2006, 2007). ELICIT has been developed to compare traditional 
command and control, hierarchical organizational structures with networked, self-
organizing, edge organizational forms in decision-making tasks (Ruddy, 2007). 
ELICIT requires teams of 17 members to collaborate in a network-centric 
environment to identify the who, what, where, and when of an adversary attack. In 
order to solve this puzzle, participants receive information elements (called factoids) 
containing information corresponding to the four kinds of information required. As 
standard experimental manipulation, participants receive instructions about the 
nature of their organizational structure (either hierarchical or edge) and the ways 
they can exchange information with team members. Team members exchange 
information by posting factoids on common screens, or sending factoids directly to 
one another. No other communication is possible. Eventually, team members 
individually have to indicate their solution to the problem.  
ELICIT certainly appears to be an interesting environment to investigate 
differences between hierarchical and edge organizations in a controlled, 
experimental manner. Similar research questions can be addressed in PLATT too. 
However, PLATT has the advantage that fewer participants are required for 
experimental runs. In addition, researchers can configure the PLATT software 
themselves in many ways, and consequently any organizational form can be 
created and investigated. Moreover, in PLATT, participants are allowed to 
communicate with each other via e-mail, ensuring more realistic teamwork 
processes. Because of this, and because of other PLATT features (e.g., the 
individual web sites) more diverse process and outcome variables can be measured 
using PLATT. 
PLATT – A PLATFORM FOR EXPERIMENTAL TEAM RESEARCH 
40 
Information Sharing and Team Virtuality 
Another software-based manipulation, related to the one above, pertains to the 
distribution of information within the team. The experimenter has the ability to define 
which role has access to which information on the web sites. In addition, the 
experimenter determines who can view the shared workspace and who cannot. 
With these manipulations it is possible to investigate the effects of shared 
information (information held by all group members) versus unshared information 
(information only held by one group member) on decision making in groups. Since 
the introduction of the biased sampling model of group discussion by Stasser and 
Titus (1985), an extensive line of research has investigated information pooling 
behaviors in groups. Many studies have shown that teams perform suboptimally 
because they spend more time discussing shared information than unshared 
information. In so doing, teams are not employing the informational advantage they 
should have over individuals (see for a recent meta-analysis Mesmer-Magnus & 
DeChurch, 2009).  
The great majority of studies in this domain has used hidden profile tasks 
(e.g., select the best candidate), in which shared information supports an inferior 
alternative, whereas unshared information supports a superior option (Stasser & 
Titus, 1985). The external validity of these tasks has been questioned (Mohammed 
& Dumville, 2001) and the Mesmer-Magnus and DeChurch (2009) meta-analysis 
showed that the relationship between information sharing and team performance is 
partly caused by the use of these hidden profile tasks. In addition, in this paradigm 
the primary dependent variables of interest have been the number of times 
particular information is mentioned and the quality of the decision made. Other team 
processes and team cognition have received far less attention. Researchers 
therefore have called for new directions within this research domain (e.g., Mesmer-
Magnus & DeChurch, 2009). PLATT could be a useful platform to facilitate this 
research, because scenarios can be made more realistic, and a broad range of 
process and outcome measurement possibilities are available (see below). In 
addition, in PLATT different software-based manipulations are possible that make 
research in new directions feasible. One of the new proposed research directions, 
for example, pertains to virtual teams (Mesmer-Magnus & DeChurch, 2009). This 
research should examine information sharing under various configurations of team 
virtuality (as determined by the team’s use of virtual tools, the informational value of 
these tools, and the synchronicity of team member interactions; Kirkman & Mathieu, 
2005). PLATT can be configured to conduct this kind of research, because the 
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experimenter can manipulate the level of team virtuality by, for example, varying 
communication media (e.g., e-mail, voice-, and video-conferencing), the access to 
the digital shared workspace, and the nature of this digital shared workspace (e.g., 
a map of the area or a postings board).  
Multiteam Systems 
Another new direction in information sharing research proposed by Mesmer-Magnus 
and DeChurch (2009) concerns the area of multiteam systems. Recently, 
organizations have begun to employ this new form of work arrangement. In a 
multiteam system two or more teams work interdependently toward the 
accomplishment of at least one collective distal goal, while at the same time 
pursuing different proximal goals (Mathieu et al., 2001). Team researchers have 
stressed the need for research in this area (e.g., Marks, DeChurch, Mathieu, 
Panzer, & Alonso, 2005; Mesmer-Magnus & DeChurch, 2009). In PLATT, it is 
possible to conduct this kind of research. Multiple teams can be defined, each with 
their own website and shared workspace. In addition, these teams may also have a 
workspace and website that is shared across teams. The experimenter can define 
which role within a team has the rights to communicate with members of other 
teams. This makes it possible to define different hierarchical levels: one level where 
two or more teams primarily work to attain their own proximal goals and a higher 
level where representatives of these teams work towards accomplishment of the 
common, more distal goal. All kinds of variations are imaginable, with different roles 
responsible for maintaining contact with the other teams, different ways of framing 
the goal hierarchy, and different hierarchical structures. 
Measures 
PLATT offers the experimenter a broad range of measurement possibilities, both 
behavioral and self-report. In line with the plea of Cooke, Salas, Kiekel, and Bell 
(2004), these measurement possibilities are both automated and embedded. 
Automated behavioral measurement takes place as a result of logging by the 
Scenario Player, and online embedded questionnaires can be integrated in the 
scenario, enabling the measurement of team cognition. In this way, task disruptions 
due to measurement are reduced, experimenter measurement errors are minimized, 
and experimenter costs are lowered. Additionally, these real-time measurement 
PLATT – A PLATFORM FOR EXPERIMENTAL TEAM RESEARCH 
42 
possibilities allow for the measurement of the more dynamic aspects of team 
processes and team cognition (e.g., Cooke, Salas, Cannon-Bowers, & Stout, 2000). 
Behavioral 
As we mentioned above, the scenario player creates a log file with detailed 
information of all scenario events and all actions participants perform during task 
execution. On basis of this information different real-time unobtrusive measures can 
be constructed with help of the data analysis tool. The experimenter can, for 
example, construct measures concerning information processing (e.g., number of 
web site visits, selective attention to information, and time spent on shared 
workspace) and communication (e.g., number of e-mails, use of subjects in 
headings, and content of communication). In addition, it is possible to measure 
behavioral indicators of relevant cognitive constructs (e.g., Cooke et al., 2000).  
As an example, consider the use of behavioral indicators to measure the 
functioning of transactive memory systems (TMSs). A TMS consists of a set of 
distributed, individual memory systems that combines the knowledge possessed by 
particular members with shared awareness of who knows what (Wegner, 1995). At 
the behavioral level, a TMS is indicated by directory updating, information allocation, 
and retrieval coordination (Wegner, 1995). Through directory updating, team 
members learn about each other’s areas of expertise. Through information 
allocation and retrieval coordination, information is communicated to and retrieved 
from the teammate with the relevant area of expertise (e.g., Ellis, 2006; 
Hollingshead, 1998). 
Whereas directory updating only depends on the content of the 
communication, information allocation and retrieval coordination depend on both 
communication content and communication flow. In PLATT, both communication 
content and communication flow are automatically recorded in the log files. As a 
result, to generate the behavioral indicators of a TMS, only communication content 
has to be coded. Subsequently, these codes can be inserted in the log file and the 
data analysis tool can calculate the percentage of e-mails in which information was 
allocated to or retrieved from the team member with the relevant area of expertise. 
These measures then constitute the behavioral indicators of information allocation 
and retrieval coordination (cf. Ellis, 2006).  
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Online Embedded Questionnaires 
The experimenter has the possibility to integrate hyperlinks to online questionnaires 
in the scenario. When the scenario reaches the specified time, these questionnaires 
are sent to the participants and opened automatically, forcing them to fill out the 
questionnaire before they can continue with the task. Because the questionnaires 
are embedded, it is possible to get measures from different team members and 
measures across teams at precisely the same time. The timing and content of these 
questionnaires can be tuned to the events in the scenario.  
This facility poses numerous possibilities. For example, to assess the team 
members’ situation awareness (SA), one could use the embedded questionnaires to 
administer SAGAT (situation awareness global assessment technique; Endsley, 
1995) type measures. In the military evacuation scenario, this could be realized by 
asking participants about their awareness of, for example, enemy activities, road 
conditions, and positions of the units, and about the ways in which this influences 
different evacuation routes. Depending on the scenario, it is also possible to take 
implicit measures of SA, by querying the participants at different moments during 
the scenario which solution would be best at that moment. To answer this question 
correctly, participants need to be aware of the relevant elements in the situation, 
comprehend how they affect different solutions, and how they will to develop over 
time. With this kind of measures, the accuracy of individual SA can be assessed, 
but also the degree to which team members are in agreement with regard to the 
relevant aspects of the situation (Shared Situation Awareness).  
Other applications would include workload measurements, mental model 
measurements, and mood measurements, for example. Of course, this functionality 
of PLATT can also be used to administer questionnaires after teams have 
completed the scenario, to measure more static constructs and team outcomes like 
satisfaction and cohesion. 
Outcome Measures 
The outcome measures are scenario-specific. The experimenter has to develop a 
method to measure team performance objectively. In addition, the performance 
measures should logically relate to the assignment the team received and the 
processes the experimenter is interested in (e.g., Smith-Jentsch et al., 1998).  
As an example, consider the performance measures in the military 
evacuation scenario. These measures consist of the quality of the route the team 
has chosen and the number of errors the team has made in planning the route. In 
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order to arrive at these measures, the experimenter has to score a standardized 
form that the team has to fill out at the end of the scenario. On this form, teams 
have to (a) indicate via which route they plan to evacuate the group of people; (b) 
mark on three separate timelines how they plan to make use of their infantry, 
engineer, and transportation units; and (c) specify how much time the evacuation 
will take, considering the chosen route and the planned employment of units.  
The scenario has been constructed in such a way, that all possible routes can 
be put in order from fastest to slowest, to make objective comparison of routes in 
line with the assignment of the team possible. Due to events in the scenario the 
most obvious routes eventually turn out to be the slowest ones and the less obvious 
routes turn out to be the fastest. As a result, the better teams process the events, 
the better the routes they will choose. The events are distributed in such a way that 
independent of the route teams choose, they always need to employ all their units. 
This guarantees a similar possibility of making errors across different routes.  
Experiments Using PLATT 
To date, PLATT has been used in four different research programs, to investigate 
(a) the effects of threat on the performance of teams during complex problem-
solving tasks, (b) self-synchronization in teams, (c) the effects of a serious gaming 
intervention on the performance of ad hoc teams, and (d) the effects of team 
structure on team decision making. Below, we briefly describe the scenarios that 
have been developed for these studies, and the results that have been obtained. 
The results of these studies are described in more detail elsewhere (i.e., Kamphuis, 
Gaillard, & Vogelaar, 2008, 2009c; Van Bezooijen, Vogelaar, & Essens, 2009a, 
2009b; Langelaan & Keeris, 2008; Schraagen, Huis in ’t Veld, & Koning, 2009). 
Team Performance under Threat 
The above described military evacuation scenario has been developed to 
investigate the effects of threat on the performance of teams during complex 
problem-solving tasks. In this research, special attention was paid to effects on 
information processing, communication, supporting behavior, leadership, and 
transactive memory. Two studies were conducted. In the first study, threat was 
manipulated external to the task, as a between teams variable (Kamphuis et al., 
2008). The second study used a 2 × 2 between-teams design, and investigated to 
what extent a brief transactive memory training intervention prior to task 
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performance could mitigate the effects of threat on team performance (Kamphuis et 
al., 2009c). Results of these studies showed that in complex problem-solving 
environments, threat leads to a restriction in information processing and more 
controlling leadership. In addition, threat leads team members to shift from a team 
perspective to an individualistic focus, affecting transactive memory and teamwork 
processes. A brief transactive memory training intervention has the ability to 
moderate the negative effects of threat on team perspective, eventually resulting in 
better team performance (Kamphuis et al., 2008, 2009c). 
Self-synchronization in Teams 
Different military evacuation scenarios have been developed for research on self-
synchronization (the undirected alignment of team members’ actions with those of 
others in a network in light of overall objectives). Two studies were conducted in this 
line of research. The first study investigated the effects of leadership style on team 
situation models, self-synchronization, and coordination processes in teams (Van 
Bezooijen et al., 2009b). Results indicated that participative leadership resulted in 
higher similarity of the team situation model when task complexity was low, whereas 
directive leadership resulted in higher similarity when task complexity was high. The 
second experiment investigated the effects of the presence or absence of 
synchronous groupware (i.e., the shared workspace) on self-synchronization in 
teams. Preliminary results of this study indicated that the use of synchronous 
groupware in teams not necessarily improves synchronization and coordination 
processes (Van Bezooijen et al., 2009a). 
Preparation of Ad Hoc Teams 
For research on the preparation of ad hoc expert teams, a crisis management 
scenario has been developed. The goal of this research was to develop and test a 
game environment that can be used to enhance collaboration of professional ad hoc 
teams, in a short amount of time. For this purpose, an alternate reality game-like 
scenario has been developed in PLATT, in which participants are confronted with a 
breakdown in the water supply, and have to find out via all kinds of media what 
caused this breakdown and solve the problem. In a pilot study, ad hoc teams who 
had participated in this scenario were compared to ad hoc teams who had played 
different board games (e.g., Trivial Pursuit) together for the same length of time, on 
their performance on a second, unrelated team task (Langelaan & Keeris, 2008). 
Results of this study indicated that the scenario approach, in which participants are 
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forced to work together, seems to be a promising method to improve collaboration in 
ad hoc teams and enhance the building of trust between team members, in a short 
amount of time.  
Team Structure and Team Decision Making 
For research on the differences in decision making between hierarchical teams and 
networked teams, a scenario was created about an explosion in a tunnel were a 
group of high-ranking politicians was about to pass through. Teams had to decide 
as quickly and as accurately as possible what the likely cause of the incident was: 
an attack by Al Qaeda, an attack by anti-globalists, or an accident. In order to do 
this, each team member had received role-specific training in one of these areas, to 
be able to identify incidents linked to their area of expertise. The experimental 
manipulation aimed to simulate the differences between hierarchical and networked 
teams and consisted of differences in team composition and task division, different 
decision rights, different communication media, and different information sharing 
facilities (Schraagen et al., 2009). The results showed that networked teams were 
overall faster and more accurate in their decisions than hierarchical teams. 
Networked teams also shared more knowledge with each other.  
Conclusion 
As the complexity of the workplace continually grows, teams increasingly will be 
confronted with complex cognitive tasks. More and more, they will have to perform 
these tasks as virtual teams in networked structures in close collaboration with other 
teams. Theories of teamwork and methods of measurement must keep pace with 
these developments to meet the demands from organizations for guidance on 
management and structuring of teamwork (cf. Salas et al., 2008). In response to 
these developments, we created a flexible software platform for research on team 
performance in complex environments, called PLATT.  
PLATT should enable controlled experimental research into team planning, 
problem-solving and decision-making behavior in a complex, networked world. The 
development was guided by a set of six requirements we thought were pertinent to 
be able to conduct such research. The application of PLATT in a broad range of 
experiments in different research programs has shown that PLATT has the ability to 
meet each of these requirements. Because of the chosen approach of creating a 
scenario-independent, flexible software architecture in which different research-
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specific scenarios can be run, some requirements are met in the software 
architecture, and others are met in the specific scenarios. In all cases, however, the 
PLATT software architecture offers the possibility to fulfill the specified 
requirements. 
First of all, PLATT allows researchers to investigate real team behavior. The 
formulated research model that guides the development of the scenarios for PLATT 
delineates that the experimenter has to create task and goal interdependence in the 
scenario. This can be done by creating different roles with different responsibilities, 
expertise, and tasks, for each of the team’s members, and making the team’s 
performance dependent upon input from every team member. The software platform 
is flexible to such an extent, that no matter how interdependence has been created 
in the scenarios, it can be run in PLATT.  
Second, PLATT is suited to investigate planning, problem-solving and 
decision-making processes of teams in complex environments. The scenario-driven 
nature of PLATT makes it possible to create dynamism by constantly changing the 
existing situation through letting new information become available. It is also 
possible to overload participants with information. In addition, the modular set-up 
allows the use of different media as sources of information (i.e., e-mails, audio 
messages, video messages, and web sites), to add to the complexity. Again, the 
specific design of this complexity and the nature of the task depend on the scenario. 
In the scenario, the different roles are defined, the problem is created, wrong tracks 
are set out, and the clues for solving the problem are concealed.  
Third, PLATT offers a good degree of experimental control. All circumstances 
and events can be held constant, and the experimenter has the possibility to 
manipulate the variables of interest. Because scenarios do not change in response 
to participants’ actions, all teams have to deal with exactly the same circumstances, 
as a result of which measures across teams can easily be compared. PLATT also 
offers excellent ways of controlled measurement. Behavioral measures are 
automatically collected by logging all participants’ actions. This precludes 
measurement errors due to observer failures. In addition, PLATT allows the 
administering of embedded, online questionnaires. This possibility assures that 
questions can be asked at the right moment and that the questionnaires can be 
administered at precisely the same time across team members. 
Fourth, PLATT allows relatively convenient data collection. All scenarios that 
have been developed thus far, could be played by participants without specific 
foreknowledge and without extensive training. Typically, teams would receive an 
instruction of about 30 minutes (partly by video). This instruction would contain 
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information concerning the use of the participant interface and information 
pertaining to the specific task they had to perform. The scenarios that have been 
developed for experimental data collection on average take about half an hour to 
three quarters of an hour to play. Evidently, it would also be possible to create 
longer or shorter scenarios. Overall, a complete experimental run including 
reception of participants, instruction, actual task performance, questionnaires and 
debriefing would take, on average, two hours. In addition, it is possible to construct 
multiple comparable scenarios to enable within team designs. This could further 
reduce the time spent on data collection. For a complete experimental run, only one 
experimenter is necessary. There is no need for observers because all relevant 
behaviors are collected automatically and there is no need for supporting players in 
the scenario, because all events are scripted in advance.  
Fifth, PLATT offers a broad range of team process measurement possibilities. 
As we elaborated above, the scenario-player in PLATT creates a log file with all 
actions participants performed. On basis of this log file, the experimenter can 
construct real-time behavioral measures with help of the data analysis tool. In 
addition, the experimenter has the possibility to use online, embedded 
questionnaires to measure processes of interest. As outlined above, both types of 
measures can also be used to measure team cognition (either as an externalized 
process, or as self-reported knowledge).  
Finally, the PLATT software allows a high degree of flexibility. This flexibility 
stems from the fact that (a) the software architecture is scenario-independent, (b) 
the software itself has a modular set-up, and (c) different configurations can be 
defined regarding communication possibilities and access rights. Because the 
software architecture is scenario-independent, every experimenter can develop his 
or her own scenario that is ideally suited to investigate a specific research question. 
Because the software-architecture has a modular set-up, experimenters can choose 
which parts of the software they want to use for their own research. For example, 
one could choose to use only the e-mail application, because the web-server and 
the shared workspace do not have to be used in a scenario. In addition, due to this 
set-up it is relatively convenient to add other components to the software, for 
example, to allow for video-conferencing or to test different shared workspaces 
against each other. Because of the possibilities to define who can communicate with 
whom and who has access to what, PLATT also has the flexibility to configure for 
multiple teams and multiple hierarchical levels.  
There are some considerations for researchers intending to use PLATT. First, 
development of a scenario takes time. The development of a basic scenario, for a 
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research question that does not necessitate much complexity, could be a matter of 
hours. Researchers who want to make use of the full array of possibilities PLATT 
has to offer, on the other hand, should expect a greater time investment. This is an 
inherent consequence of the complexity that can be incorporated in PLATT and the 
flexibility it allows for. Writing a 4-hour scenario for multiple teams, with lower-level 
and higher-level goals, using text-, audio-, and video-events, dynamic web sites, 
and different kinds of shared workspaces, will be more a matter of weeks than days. 
However, different scenarios have already been developed, and as the use of 
PLATT as a team research platform grows, more and more scenarios will be added 
to this collection. Researchers could draw existing scenarios from this pool, and 
adapt these scenarios to their specific wishes. 
Another issue, which surfaced during the first studies that used PLATT, is the 
process-outcome relationship. It proved to be difficult to establish a strong 
relationship between team processes and team performance. In organizational 
settings, this problem is not uncommon, because team performance may for a large 
part be determined by external circumstances and coincidence (cf. Smith-Jentsch, 
et al., 1998). In controlled, experimental studies, establishing this relationship is 
normally less complicated. Because PLATT scenarios can be quite complex, 
however, the first studies using PLATT suffered from the same problems as studies 
in applied settings. To overcome these problems we developed the research model 
described above, which stimulates researchers to think of the scenario in terms of 
team processes. This model stipulates that a scenario should be constructed in 
such a way that it elicits the processes the researcher is interested in. For the team, 
engaging in these processes should be relevant in view of their overall goal. The 
performance measure chosen, in turn, should be an appropriate operationalization 
of this goal. This operationalization should be proximal to the teams’ processes 
rather than distal to it. When researchers approach scenario development in this 
way, the process-outcome relationship will be established more easily (see, for 
example, Kamphuis et al., 2009c). 
Finally, as described, the log files make it possible to construct a variety of 
measures of participants’ behaviors. Although this possibility has a number of 
advantages, as we described above, it should be used heedfully. Researchers 
constructing measures on the basis of the log files are likely to regard these 
measures as behavioral indicators of some latent construct. However, it might be 
difficult to determine the validity of such a measure, when it has not been used 
before. In such cases, it might be advisable to combine these behavioral measures 
with other (validated) measures, to determine the validity of the behavioral measure.  
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All things considered, PLATT has already proven to be a flexible platform that 
facilitates research into a wide array of team related research questions. It provides 
researchers with an environment to investigate the complex issues present-day 
teams face and has the ability to meet the demands of the future of team research.  
Hardware/ Software Requirements and Availability 
To be able to run PLATT, one PC for the scenario server and separate PCs or 
laptops for each participant are necessary. The PLATT software runs on computers 
with the Microsoft Windows XP operating system. Other software required is 
Windows XP Service pack 2, the Microsoft .NET 3 framework, and the Visual J# 
redistributable package. The computers must be connected by a network 
connection. Although the hardware demands of the software are not particularly 
high, it is recommended to use systems that smoothly run the Windows XP 
operating system and standard applications like Microsoft Office. The software is 
expected to run on Microsoft Vista and newer versions of the .NET framework. 
PLATT is available to interested researchers. Requests should be addressed to the 








The Effects of Physical Threat on Team Processes 
During Complex Task Performance1 
 
 
Teams have become the norm for operating in dangerous and complex 
situations. To investigate how physical threat affects team performance, 27 
three-person teams engaged in a complex planning and problem-solving 
task, either under threat or under normal conditions. Threat consisted of the 
possibility that during task performance the oxygen level would be reduced 
(which, in reality, did not occur). Team processes were measured by 
automated behavior recordings and questionnaires. Results confirmed that 
threat caused restrictions in information management, more controlling 
leadership, less group discussions, and a reduction in coordination and 
supporting behavior. These results support the propositions of the threat-
rigidity thesis and extend previous research by establishing these results for 
physical threat and demonstrating effects on coordination and supporting 
behavior as well. 
 
The use of teams in dangerous and complex environments poses a paradox. On the 
one hand, teams seem to be perfectly suited to deal with these situations, because 
of the wide variety of capabilities individual team members may have. This makes a 
team a highly flexible, adaptable, and resilient system. On the other hand, teams 
can be vulnerable in these situations, because the interdependency between team 
                                                 
1 This chapter is based on Kamphuis, Gaillard, & Vogelaar (2009d). 
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members results in a need for information exchange, coordination, and 
communication. Even a small weakness somewhere along the line may have 
disastrous consequences. Despite this vulnerability, teams are often the preferred 
choice when it comes to dealing with complicated problems in hazardous settings.  
It is essential to understand in what way threats affect the processes in teams 
during these complex tasks. Only then will organizations be able to develop 
adequate measures to arm their teams against the potentially negative effects of 
these threats. Several researchers have noted that we are only beginning to 
understand how threat affects the performance of teams (e.g., Burke et al., 2004; 
Turner & Horvitz, 2001). For a more thorough understanding, research is necessary 
that adequately addresses the kinds of threats these teams face, takes into account 
the complexity of the tasks they have to perform, and objectively captures the 
relevant processes. As far as we know, up till now no research has experimentally 
investigated the effects of physical threat on team processes during complex tasks. 
Previous research either did not manipulate physical threats, or investigated team 
performance on less complex tasks, or both (e.g., Argote, Turner, & Fichman, 1989; 
Cannon-Bowers & Salas, 1998b; Driskell, Salas, & Johnston, 1999; Driskell & 
Salas, 1991; Ellis, 2006; Gladstein & Reilly, 1985; Harrington, Lemak, & Kendall, 
2002).  
Therefore, we conducted an experiment to gain more insight into the effects 
of physical threat on complex team processes. Three-person teams were examined 
while working on a planning and problem-solving task under physical threat. We 
focused on the processes of information management, leadership, communication, 
coordination, and supporting behavior (e.g., Smith-Jentsch, Johnston, & Payne, 
1998). We measured these constructs in two ways: objectively at the behavioral 
level and with self-report data. Here, we will demonstrate how a physical threat 
affects the manner in which teams search for and share information, how leadership 
is exercised, and how the team members coordinate their actions and support each 
other while performing a complex task. 
Theory and Hypotheses 
Team Performance in Demanding Environments 
In the past decades, organizations have shifted from individual-based to team-
based work structures. Nowadays, organizations rely on teams to operate 
equipment, to produce goods, to solve problems, to manage projects, and to make 
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decisions. Teams have also become the norm to operate in complex and potentially 
dangerous environments, where small mistakes may have disastrous 
consequences. Consider, for example, flight crews, military teams, and teams in 
high hazard industries. Numerous incidents with these teams have shown that they 
can not always cope with the demands placed on them. Researchers therefore have 
started to study team performance in demanding environments (e.g., Cannon-
Bowers & Salas, 1998b; Driskell & Salas, 1991; Driskell et al., 1999; Ellis, 2006). 
The focus of these studies has been the question of how stress influences the 
performance of teams and how the problems stress poses can be mitigated. 
Most of the above mentioned studies manipulated task-related stressors like 
time pressure and workload to create stress (e.g., Cannon-Bowers & Salas, 1998a; 
Gladstein & Reilly, 1985). Some studies also used threat (either social or material) 
as an additional stressor (e.g., Argote et al., 1989, Ellis, 2006). According to 
Lazarus and Folkman (1984), threat is one of the major determinants of stressful 
appraisals. Threat can be defined as a possible impending event perceived by a 
person or group of persons as potentially causing material or immaterial loss to, or 
the obstruction of goals of that person or group of persons (cf. Argote et al., 1989; 
Lazarus, 1966; Staw, Sandelands, & Dutton, 1981; Turner & Horvitz, 2001). Turner 
and Horvitz (2001) stated that our understanding of the performance of teams under 
threat is still in its infancy. They attributed this to the difficulties of manipulating 
threat in experimental settings. This applies a fortiori to physical threat. Physical 
threat, however, is an integral part of the environments in which, for example, fire 
fighting, police and military teams have to operate. In addition, in many other 
professions too, teams increasingly have to deal with physical threat and violence 
(e.g., ambulance crews, emergency response teams, and security personnel). 
Moreover, the effects of physical threat on team performance may be 
different from stressors like time pressure and workload, because these latter 
stressors are dependent on performance of the task (cf. Driskell & Salas, 1991; 
Turner & Horvitz, 2001). Time pressure, for example, demands speed of response. 
As such, it causes team members to attend to a more restricted range of cues and 
engage in more heuristic information processing (cf. the Attentional Focus Model, 
Karau & Kelly, 1992; Kelly, Jackson, & Hutson-Comeaux, 1997; Kelly & Karau, 
1999). A physical threat per se has no implications for the manner in which one has 
to perform his or her job, and therefore might have other effects than task-related 
stressors. Often, the physical threats these teams encounter may not be 
controllable. As such, they are likely to cause severe effects on performance (see, 
for a review of the effects of the controllability of threat: Thompson, 1981; also see 
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Blascovich & Tomaka, 1996). Since threat plays an important role in stressful 
appraisals, and because physical threat is a daily reality for teams that have to 
operate in hazardous settings, in this study we investigated the effects of an 
uncontrollable, physical threat on team performance. Specifically, we examined how 
a physical threat affected five important team processes.  
Threat-Rigidity in Teams 
Important team processes that have been identified in most models of team 
performance are information management, leadership, communication, 
coordination, and supporting behavior (e.g., Cannon-Bowers & Salas, 1997; Essens 
et al., 2005; Smith-Jentsch et al., 1998). In the present study, we investigated these 
five critical team processes. Previous research indicates that team processes under 
threat are characterized by rigidity. The most comprehensive theory addressing 
these effects is the threat-rigidity thesis (Staw et al., 1981).  
The threat-rigidity thesis states that a system reacts to a threat with two types 
of rigidity: a restriction in information processing and a constriction in control. 
Restriction in information processing may manifest itself in a narrowed field of 
attention (attention to dominant cues and away from peripheral cues), reduction in 
the number of alternatives considered, and reliance upon internal hypotheses and 
prior expectations. Constriction in control is demonstrated by authority becoming 
more centralized, with fewer people making the decisions. Together these effects 
cause a system to emit its most well learned or dominant response (Zajonc, 1966). 
This dominant response may either be adaptive or maladaptive, depending on the 
environment in which it is produced. In an unchanged, stable and predictable 
environment, a dominant response that was previously successful can be 
successful again. Conversely, in a changing, ambiguous, and unpredictable 
environment, a dominant response can be maladaptive, because in this 
environment the dominant response may no longer be appropriate and flexibility 
rather than rigidity is necessary to survive (Staw et al., 1981).  
On the basis of the threat-rigidity thesis, propositions can be formulated 
directly for the team processes of information management, leadership, and 
communication, and indirectly for coordination and supporting behavior. It appears 
that only four studies have explicitly tested the threat-rigidity thesis at the team level 
(Argote et al., 1989; Driskell & Salas, 1991; Gladstein & Reilly, 1985; Harrington et 




Information management concerns the process of scanning the environment in 
search for relevant information, gathering this information and employing it for 
specific purposes, such as planning or decision-making. Staw et al. (1981) 
proposed that under threat teams react with a restriction in information processing, 
for example by ignoring new or peripheral information and deviating opinions (cf. 
Janis’s, 1972, concept of groupthink). Two studies addressed this proposition at the 
team level and supported it. Gladstein and Reilly (1985) found that team members 
participating in a management simulation reported having used less information to 
make a decision when they were faced with a financial threat. Furthermore, 
Harrington et al. (2002), investigating rigidity in decision making in a student team 
project found that teams under high threat (assessed on the basis of the relative 
weight of the project on the students’ grades, the level of competition, time 
pressure, and the complexity of the project) reported to have used a more rigid 
approach to the decision making process. However, they measured rigidity with a 
single measure, consisting of both restrictions in information processing and 
constrictions in control, as a result of which conclusions for each of the concepts 
separately should be drawn with caution. 
Both these studies showed that under non-physical threats, team members 
restricted their information processing. To investigate how a physical threat affects 
the manner in which teams manage information, we assessed the way teams dealt 
with peripheral information and the extent to which they were able to keep an 
overview of the situation. We hypothesized that in teams performing a complex task, 
physical threat leads to a restriction in information processing such that: 
 
Hypothesis 1a. Teams under threat will show less attention to peripheral 
information than teams under normal conditions. 
Hypothesis 1b. Teams under threat will experience more problems in 
maintaining an overview of the situation than teams under normal conditions. 
 
Leadership and communication 
The threat-rigidity thesis states that under threat there will be a constriction in 
control. When teams face a threat situation, power will become centralized and 
leaders will become more likely to make decisions on their own, without consulting 
their teammates (Staw et al., 1981). This component of the threat rigidity thesis has 
implications for both leadership (i.e., directing, controlling, setting priorities, and 
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keeping track of the team’s progress) and the structure and content of 
communication (i.e., providing and requesting information, and discussing strategies 
and decisions) within the team. Results of studies explicitly testing this proposition 
from the threat-rigidity thesis are equivocal. Two studies found evidence for its 
occurrence. Argote et al. (1989), in an experimental study using a simple laboratory 
team task, found that higher levels of perceived (material) threat were associated 
with more centralized communication structures, which is an indication of a 
constriction in control. Furthermore, Harrington et al. (2002) found a general rigidity 
effect in teams experiencing high levels of threat. This effect encompassed the 
notion of a constriction in control. Though, as was mentioned above, they only 
obtained a single measure for restriction in information processing and constriction 
in control. 
However, two other studies failed to find evidence for a constriction in control. 
Gladstein and Reilly (1985) did not find an increase in centralization of authority 
under a high level of threat in their management simulation study. Moreover, 
Driskell and Salas (1991) found that both low and high status participants in a 
laboratory study on decision making in dyads became more receptive to information 
provided by their partner when under physical threat of tear gas. This result 
indicates a loosening of control rather than a constriction in control under threat.  
To summarize, these four studies provide no clear answer as to whether 
threat leads to a constriction in control. In fact, other studies not explicitly 
addressing the propositions from the threat-rigidity thesis, also found apparently 
contradictory results. For example, Brown and Miller (2000) found no effects for time 
pressure on the degree of centralization of communication in decision-making 
groups. Similarly, Lanzetta (1955) found that stress resulted in more collaborative, 
mediating and cooperating behaviors and a more democratic approach to problem-
solving in groups. On the other hand, Foushee and Helmreich (1988) observed that 
crew members of airline flight crews depended more on their crew captain under 
high stress conditions, providing less task information and placing responsibility for 
decisions in the hands of their captain. Also, Klein (1976) found that team members 
saw their leaders as more competent as stress increased, and attributed more 
responsibility to them if they acted in a leader-like fashion in a stress situation. 
Similarly, Janis (1954) and Hamblin (1958) found that members of groups were 
more likely to accept directions from their leaders in situations of stress. In addition, 
Halverson, Murphy, and Riggio (2004) showed that leaders in three-person groups 
behaved more charismatically under stress, which in turn enhances the likelihood of 
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team members becoming more susceptible to their influence (e.g., Shamir, House, 
& Arthur, 1993). 
The above mentioned findings for the effects of threat and stress on 
leadership in teams seem irreconcilable. However, one important factor could 
probably explain these mixed results: the presence (or absence) of formal 
leadership in the teams investigated. It seems that in all the studies that failed to 
find evidence for a centralization of authority under stress, no formal leader was 
present from the start (i.e., Brown & Miller, 2000; Driskell & Salas, 1991; Gladstein 
& Reilly, 1985; Lanzetta, 1955). Group members in these studies all had similar 
roles or, at the most, differed in status (i.e., Driskell & Salas, 1991). However, every 
study that did have formal leaders from the start reported results in line with the idea 
of a centralization of authority (i.e., Foushee & Helmreich, 1988; Halverson et al., 
2004; Hamblin, 1958; Janis; 1954; Klein; 1976). Therefore, it might be that only 
when a team has a formal leader who has been assigned the final responsibility for 
the team’s performance, constriction in control under threat and stress emerges.  
The present study contributes to the debate by investigating the effects of a 
physical threat on leadership style in teams with an assigned, formal leader. In 
addition, we examined how much team members deliberated, since in strictly 
controlled teams the members are less frequently consulted and participate less in 
the decision-making process (e.g., Borkowski, 2005; Hermann, 1963). On the basis 
of the above line of reasoning, we proposed that in teams with formal leadership, 
physical threat leads to a constriction in control such that: 
 
Hypothesis 2a. Leaders under threat will exert more control than leaders 
under normal conditions. 
Hypothesis 2b. Leaders under threat will be less participative than leaders 
under normal conditions. 
Hypothesis 3. Teams under threat will engage in less deliberation than teams 
under normal conditions.  
 
Coordination and supporting behavior 
The threat-rigidity thesis makes no explicit predictions regarding the critical team 
processes of coordination and supporting behavior. In addition, to our knowledge 
there is no research to date that explicitly addressed the effects of threat on 
coordination and supporting behavior in teams. However, two recent studies into the 
effects of stress on the performance of teams in tactical decision-making tasks 
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suggest that a restriction in information processing (as proposed by the threat-
rigidity thesis) may have consequences for these interpersonal activities as well 
(i.e., Driskell et al., 1999; Ellis, 2006). Driskell et al. (1999) proposed that group 
members under stress might become more self-focused and less group-focused. 
They found that stress indeed resulted in a narrowing of team perspective as 
measured by the extent to which members felt like a team and were oriented at 
team versus individual activities during the task. These results may have 
consequences for supporting behavior, because supporting behavior requires team 
members to have a broad team perspective. Team members with a narrow, 
individualistic focus will be less inclined to monitor the performance of their fellow 
team members and provide them with assistance when needed.  
Furthering this line of research, Ellis (2006) proposed that a narrowing of the 
team members’ breadth of attention under acute stress would disrupt information 
encoding, storage, and retrieval capabilities, which in turn would negatively affect 
the team’s transactive memory system (TMS; Wegner, 1987). A TMS is a set of 
distributed, individual memory systems for encoding, storing and retrieving 
information that combines the knowledge possessed by particular members with a 
shared awareness of who knows what (Wegner, 1995). Due to an effective TMS, 
team members with different expertise can retrieve knowledge from each other and 
anticipate each other’s actions and needs (e.g., Moreland, 1999). Hence, a TMS is 
an important antecedent of coordination in teams. Ellis (2006) did indeed find that 
the narrowing of the team member’s attention under acute stress negatively affected 
TMSs. He measured TMS by investigating to what extent team members engaged 
in directory updating, information allocation, and retrieval coordination, which are 
considered behavioral indicators of a TMS (Ellis, 2006). These actions respectively 
refer to learning what others are likely to know, and communication of information to 
and requesting of information from team members with relevant areas of expertise 
(Wegner, 1995). As coordination refers to activities carried out by team members 
when managing dependencies (e.g., Espinosa, Lerch, & Kraut, 2004), these 
behavioral indicators can be considered coordinating activities that result from a 
well-functioning TMS.  
The present study investigated to what extent a physical threat affects 
coordination and supporting behavior, by investigating communication content and 
communication flow. Building on Driskell et al. (1999) and Ellis (2006), who found 
that a restriction in information processing resulting from stress negatively affected 
team perspective and TMSs, we expected that a physical threat would lead to 
problems in the coordination of activities and the mutual supporting behavior of 
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team members. Specifically, we expected that in teams performing a complex task, 
physical threat leads to a narrowed team perspective such that: 
 
Hypothesis 4. Teams under threat will coordinate their actions less well than 
teams under normal conditions. 
Hypothesis 5. Teams under threat will engage less in supporting behavior 
than teams under normal conditions. 
Present Study 
Previous research on teams in demanding environments has resulted in valuable 
knowledge of the possibly debilitating effects of these environments on the 
performance of teams. In the present study, we aimed to get a deeper 
understanding of complex team processes under physical threat. We used a 
planning and problem-solving task characterized by high complexity and measured 
dynamic team processes real-time by means of automated behavior recording. The 
contributions of this study to the domain are threefold. First, few studies have used 
complex tasks. Instead, simple laboratory tasks (e.g., Argote et al., 1989; Driskell & 
Salas, 1991), or tactical decision-making tasks (e.g., Driskell et al., 1999; Ellis, 
2006) were used. In these tasks, role differentiation was either lacking, or the 
different roles were so well-defined that they ruled out the possibility of engaging in 
important team processes such as supporting behavior (cf. Weaver, Bowers, Salas, 
& Cannon-Bowers, 1995). Moreover, actions required from team members in 
tactical decision-making tasks are repetitive and rule-based as a result of which 
complex processes such as problem-solving cannot be investigated (Weaver et al., 
1995). Second, most of these studies, including the two studies that did use more 
complex tasks (i.e., Gladstein & Reilly, 1985; Harrington et al., 2002) measured 
team processes collecting only self-report measures following task performance, 
and did not measure the processes directly, like in the present study. Third, to our 
knowledge, no study has investigated the effects of physical threat on team 
performance during complex tasks. Results from studies using other kinds of threats 
(e.g., social or material), however, can not automatically be generalized to these 
physical threat situations, since Klein (1976) found that physical threats lead to 
different processes in teams than material threats do.  
In this study, we measured the effects of an uncontrollable, physical threat on 
five critical team processes: information management, leadership, communication, 
coordination, and supporting behavior. We expected the physical threat to cause a 
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restriction in the team’s information processing abilities, a constriction in control, and 
a reduction of activities aimed at coordination and mutual support.  
Method 
Participants and Design 
Participants were 81 individuals (34 women and 47 men; mean age = 23.2 years), 
recruited from a pool of volunteers of the research institute. They volunteered to 
participate in a four-hour long ‘Team performance at high altitudes’-study. They 
were paid 40 Euro for their participation. The participants were divided into 27 three-
person teams, which were randomly assigned to either the threat condition (n = 14) 
or the no-threat condition (n = 13).2 
Physical Threat Manipulation  
The physical threat manipulation consisted of letting participants believe that they 
were possibly (going to be) subjected to reduced oxygen levels during task 
execution.3 At various points during recruitment and the actual experiment 
participants were confronted with information designed to reinforce this idea. No 
reduction of oxygen level actually occurred. The potential event of a reduction of 
oxygen level during task execution causing the risk of physical side effects made up 
the threat manipulation. The exact procedure containing the different parts of the 
manipulation is described below. 
Procedure 
All participants signed in to take part in a study called ‘Team performance at high 
altitudes’, investigating the effects of thin air on team performance. After having 
signed in, participants received information about the study by mail. This information 
gave a description of the study, the climatic chamber in which the study would take 
place and the possible side effects (i.e., dizziness, tiredness, tightness of the chest, 
and headache) of the experimental manipulation. The participants were divided into 
triads, based on their scheduling preferences. Participants who knew each other 
                                                 
2 One team was excluded from all the analyses. Members of this team accidentally overheard the 
physician talking about the instructions she just gave them, wondering whether they had believed her, as a 
result of which these team members did not believe the threat manipulation. 
3 This manipulation was approved by the institute’s ethical review board. 
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where assigned to different teams. Hereafter, we describe the procedure for the two 
conditions separately. 
Threat condition 
Teams in the threat condition were told upon arrival that they could not be informed 
to which condition they were assigned. This was meant to create ambiguity and 
uncertainty as to under what circumstances they would have to work, since 
ambiguity reduces controllability and accordingly intensifies the stress response 
(e.g., Lazarus & Folkman, 1984). In addition, in case they eventually would 
conclude that there was no reduction in oxygen levels, this would not be problematic 
because of the possibility that they were assigned to the control condition. They first 
had to fill out an anamnesis form, which was checked by a physician, as they were 
told to make sure that they were healthy enough to take part in this study. For the 
sake of credibility, the physician spoke separately to those participants who had 
mentioned health issues that could cause problems in an environment with reduced 
oxygen levels, and decided in every case that the mentioned health issues would 
not cause problems in this study. This decision was communicated to the participant 
in question. 
Following this, the three participants were randomly assigned to the three 
different roles for the team task (one of which was the leadership role) and received 
a 45-minute instruction for this task. Next, teams were taken to the climatic chamber 
in which the experiment would take place. The experimenter again told the 
participants that they could not be informed which condition they were assigned to, 
and that in the experimental condition a mixed gas would be introduced into the 
chamber, which would reduce the oxygen level. At different stages during the task, 
the mixed gas would contain different levels of oxygen, to simulate different heights, 
varying between 2000 meters and 6000 meters above sea level.  
After this, the physician instructed the participants about the possible side 
effects of the reduced oxygen levels. Participants were told that they could 
experience tingling feelings in their fingers and toes, respiratory problems, 
headaches, heart palpitations and in about 5% of the cases fainting. The physician 
also told them that all the effects would quickly disappear once the door of the 
climatic chamber was opened, as the oxygen level would stabilize rapidly. The 
participants were asked to continue with the task as long as possible. In case they 
wanted to stop, they were instructed to give a signal to the experimenter (which 
never occurred during the actual experiment), who would then open the door. After 
these instructions, the door of the climatic chamber was closed and locked from the 
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outside. Participants then performed a 45-minute experimental task (see below). 
After the task, the experimenter opened the door of the climatic chamber. No 
comments were made about the oxygen manipulation at this moment. Participants 
were asked to fill out a final questionnaire. 
After this, teams were told that no reduction of oxygen level had taken place 
during their participation. In case they had experienced any of the symptoms 
described by the physician, the experimenter explained that this was a perfectly 
normal reaction in this situation, due to suggestion, tension, and effort. All 
participants were fully debriefed after the experiment about the true nature of the 
experiment, and offered the possibility to withdraw their data from the study. None 
of the participants withdrew their data. 
No-threat condition 
In the no-threat condition the procedure was the same as in the threat condition, 
with the exception of some critical points. Upon their arrival, teams in the no-threat 
condition were told that they had been assigned to the control condition and that 
they would perform the tasks under normal conditions. Participants did not have to 
fill out an anamnesis form. After having been taken to the climatic chamber, 
participants were told that they had to perform the task in the same environment as 
teams in the experimental condition, so as to maximize experimental control and be 
able to attribute any differences in performance between the conditions to the 
oxygen manipulation only. The physician did not instruct these participants about 
possible side effects. Moreover, participants in the no-threat condition were assured 
that nothing would happen while inside the climatic chamber. Just as in the threat 
condition, the door of the climatic chamber was closed and teams worked for 45 
minutes on the experimental task, after which they were debriefed and thanked for 
their participation. 
Task  
All teams engaged in a complex planning and problem-solving scenario in the 
Planning Task for Teams (PLATT, see for a detailed description: Kamphuis & 
Houttuin, 2007). PLATT is a platform for experimental research on team behavior. It 
consists of two components: a software architecture and research-specific 
scenarios. In the present study, teams engaged in a scenario in which they had to 
develop a plan to evacuate a group of people from a hostile area to a safer place. 




PLATT was chosen as a research platform because it makes controlled 
experimental research on complex team processes possible. In addition, PLATT is 
capable of generating automated behavioral measures, which contributes to a 
deeper understanding of the team processes. All actions participants perform are 
logged by the server. Afterwards, the log-file delivers detailed information about the 
processes during the task. The specific PLATT-scenario used in this study, was 
designed to create a high level of task complexity. According to Brown and Miller 
(2000) the following attributes determine the complexity of a task: information load; 
number of subtasks; unfamiliarity with the task (referring to the absence of well-
learned procedures or repetitive actions for performing the task), task uncertainty 
(pertaining to the ambiguity of information in the task and the lack of knowledge 
concerning the outcome of potential solution alternatives); and the number of goals 
or pathways to goals. The scenario used in this study scored high on each of these 
characteristics, and was highly dynamic as well. Below, we describe the scenario in 
more detail.  
Teams in this evacuation scenario consisted of three roles, each of which had 
unique responsibilities, expertise, and prior knowledge. One team member 
(‘Operations’) was assigned the leadership role. This team member was responsible 
for directing the activities of the other team members and had the final responsibility 
for the team’s outcome. Another team member (‘Intelligence’) was responsible for 
determining the credibility of information and checking the safety of the roads. The 
last team member (‘Logistics’) was responsible for personnel and material, and 
information concerning the condition of the roads. Each team member was trained 
with role-specific knowledge and instructions, so that during task performance 
information within a certain role’s area of expertise could only be dealt with 
appropriately by the team member who occupied that role. This created 
interdependency between team members. Only when all team members combined 
their knowledge and information, they were able to deliver an optimal evacuation 
plan. To evacuate the group of people teams could make use of three different 
types of units: transportation units, infantry units, and engineer units. Many different 
routes were possible, but teams had to determine which route was the fastest. After 
45 minutes, teams had to deliver an evacuation plan on a standardized form. In this 
plan, they had to describe via which route they planned to evacuate the group of 
people and in what way they planned to make use of their units.  
In this scenario, in real-time, a large number of scenario-driven messages 
differing in relevance and coming from an abundance of sources differing in 
reliability were sent to the three participants. Team members, for example, could 
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receive highly relevant messages from their units in the field, which are reliable 
sources of information. But they could also receive messages from a local radio 
station which is less reliable, or irrelevant messages from their home front. Some 
information contradicted other information, causing ambiguity. In addition, 
information was selectively made available to Intelligence and Logistics on distinct 
websites. On these websites, they could search for missing information, concerning, 
for example, the safety of roads, or the capacity of transportation vehicles. 
Information on these sites also changed as a result of changes in the scenario. 
Participants communicated with each other by e-mail. Additionally, they all had 
access to a shared digital map of the area in which the evacuation had to take 
place. This shared map could be edited by the leader of the team to assimilate new 
information in it, which in turn could be viewed and checked by the other team 
members.  
Measures  
Most of the team processes of interest in this study were measured behaviorally (on 
the basis of the log files). In addition, we used some self-report measures. All 
questions in these self-report measures were scored on 7-point Likert scales; a 
score of 1 indicated complete absence of the construct and a score of 7 complete 
presence. All process measures were collected at the individual level and then 
aggregated to the mean team score and analyzed at the team level. The reason for 
aggregation to the team level was that the individual data were not independent 
from each other since team members worked interdependently on the same task. 
Therefore, the individual measures within a team could not be analyzed as distinct 
cases. Aggregation was not done on the basis of within-group agreement or 
reliability.  
Information management 
One variable at the behavioral level and one questionnaire scale measured to what 
extent teams restricted their information processing. The behavioral indicator was 
attention to peripheral information. During the scenario, team members received 
messages differing in relevance. Some sources usually provided irrelevant 
information. Now and then, however, these sources sent useful messages. We 
calculated the average number of times the three team members read these 
messages as a behavioral indicator of how much attention they gave to relevant 
peripheral information. The questionnaire concerning information management 
consisted of a scale of three items (Cronbach’s alpha = .59) measuring the 
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participant’s lack of overview (e.g., “I found it hard to inspect all available 
information”).  
Leadership 
We used two scales (based on Syroit, 1997) to assess how threat affected the way 
leadership was exercised. The scales measured the degree of leadership control 
and participative leadership. The first scale measured the degree of control exerted 
by the leader as judged by the other two team members (two items, Cronbach’s 
alpha = .67, e.g., “The leader determined to a large extent how I had to do my job”). 
A high score on leadership control indicates a high degree of control within the 
team. The second scale of four items (Cronbach’s alpha = .76) measured the 
degree of participation in decision making allowed by the leader as judged by the 
other two team members (e.g., “In case of important decisions, the leader took my 
opinion into consideration”). A high score on participation in decision making 
indicates a low degree of control. 
Communication 
We measured the amount of deliberation that took place in the team as a behavioral 
indicator of the degree of control. Two judges coded all communication that took 
place on the basis of the e-mail messages in the log files. They grouped every e-
mail message team members sent to each other into one of four categories of a 
collectively exhaustive and mutually exclusive categorization. The judges coded 5 
(18.5%) of the 27 teams together. The interrater reliability for these five teams was 
.76 (Cohen’s Kappa). Because this indicates a good level of agreement, the 
remaining 22 teams were coded by just one of the judges. The categories were 
labeled ‘request information’, ‘reply to information request’, ‘allocate information’, 
and ‘deliberation’. In this study, we focused on deliberation. Deliberation consisted 
of all messages participants sent to each other to deliberate (communicate on a 
higher level) about the task, the planning or their team roles. Whereas messages in 
the other categories could be sent more or less automatically, deliberation 
messages required more cognitive effort, as they aimed to integrate information and 
make sense of it. Typical messages in this category contained information about the 
strategy, potential routes, and decisions to be made. The total number of e-mail 
messages in this category constituted the variable amount of deliberation.  
Coordination 
To determine the extent to which team members collaborated in a coordinated 
manner, we combined communication content and communication flow on the basis 
of the log files. We measured coordination by investigating the manner in which 
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team members distributed information within the team. Specifically, we determined 
to what extent they allocated role-specific information based on team members’ 
specific areas of expertise. The resulting variable, coordinated information 
allocation, consisted of the percentage of e-mails in which team members allocated 
role-specific information (information that could only be adequately dealt with by one 
specific team member; e.g., information concerning the status of one of the 
transportation vehicles) to the team member with the relevant area of expertise (in 
this case Logistics), instead of allocating it to the other team member, or to both 
team members at the same time (which would be inefficient and could lead to 
errors, as the other team member would not have the expertise to deal with this 
information correctly).  
Supporting behavior 
Supporting behavior consisted of the percentage of times participants forwarded 
‘wrongly delivered’ e-mail messages to the right role. Normally, e-mail messages 
team members received were meant for them. But sometimes, information meant 
for one role, was programmed to be delivered to a team member with another role, 
to investigate how this team member would handle this information. Sending this 
information to the teammate possessing the relevant area of expertise is an act of 
supporting behavior, and would require a focus on the team. In the log file we 
counted the number of times participants sent these ‘wrongly delivered’ messages 
to the right teammate, and divided this by the total number of ‘wrongly delivered’ 
emails, to get the percentage of times participants engaged in this kind of 
supporting behavior. 
Team performance 
At the end of the task, the leader had to fill out a form to describe via which route 
the team had planned to evacuate the group of people, how much time the 
evacuation would take with this route, and in what way they had planned to make 
use of their infantry, engineer, and transportation units. As a measure of team 
performance we took the total number of objective errors the team had made in their 
evacuation plan. Errors could be made in the selection of the roads they planned to 
make use of in the evacuation (some roads were one-way roads for example), the 
planned deployment of their engineer and infantry squads, the planned use of 
vehicles for transportation of the group, and the calculated travel times. A team 





To check whether the threat manipulation succeeded, participants filled out a 
psychosomatic symptom experience checklist based on Wientjes and Grossman 
(1994) just before they started with the experimental task, and just after the ‘threat 
condition’ had received the information of the physician about the possible side-
effects of the oxygen manipulation. This questionnaire consisted of three scales. 
The first scale of three items (Cronbach’s alpha = .89) measured on a scale ranging 
from 1 (not at all) to 7 (very strongly) to what extent participants expected to 
experience anxiety symptoms, (e.g., “feeling anxious”). The second scale measured 
to what extent participants expected to experience respiratory symptoms (three 
items, Cronbach’s alpha = .95, e.g., “unable to breath deeply enough”). The third 
scale measured to what extent participants expected to experience cardiac 
symptoms (three items, Cronbach’s alpha = .90, e.g., “rapid heart rate”). Results 
indicated that participants in the threat condition expected to experience more 
anxiety symptoms (M = 3.81, SD = 1.17) than participants in the no-threat condition 
(M = 2.09, SD = 0.99; t(76) = 7.03, p < .001), more respiratory symptoms (M = 4.21, 
SD = 1.10) than participants in the no-threat condition (M = 1.21, SD = 0.31; t(76) = 
16.74, p < .001), and also more cardiac symptoms (M = 4.12, SD = 1.16) than 
participants in the no-threat condition (M = 2.17, SD = 1.29; t(76) = 7.00, p < .001). 
After the task, participants completed a threat questionnaire (four items, 
Cronbach’s alpha = .85, ranging from 1 [strongly disagree] to 7 [strongly agree], 
e.g., “During the task, I felt threatened by the circumstances”). Participants in the 
threat condition reported feeling more threatened (M = 3.48, SD = 1.33) than those 
in the no-threat condition, M = 1.90, SD = 1.15; t(76) = 5.59, p < .001.  
Tests of Hypotheses 
Table 3.1 presents means, standard deviations and intercorrelations at the team 
level for all variables. To assess the effects of the physical threat manipulation, we 
conducted three one-way multivariate analyses of variance (MANOVAs) on the 
three groups of process measures (relating to information processing, exercise of 
control, and team perspective) and a t test on the performance measure. Below we 
present the results of each overall MANOVA followed by t tests for each process 
measure and the team performance measure (see Table 3.2). 
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Table 3.1 
Descriptive Statistics and Intercorrelations at the Team Level of Analysis (N = 26) 
Variable M SD  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  
1. Peripheral attention  2.52 1.45 –       
2. Lack of overview 3.88 0.61 .07 –        
3. Leadership control 2.47 0.79 -.10 .38† –      
4. Participative leadership 5.62 0.73 .11 -.53** -.53** –    
5. Amount of deliberation 26.42 11.54 -.14 -.38† -.42* .45* –     
6. Coordinated allocation 65.10 21.91 .29 -.09 .06 -.04 .31 –   
7. Supporting behavior 50.00 29.15 .04 -.19 -.24 .37† -.05  -.22 –  
8. Errors 3.08 1.26 -.20 .18 .10 -.08 -.34† -.43* -.19 
†p < .10. *p < .05. **p < .01. 
 
Information management 
Hypothesis 1 proposed that physical threat would lead to a restriction in information 
processing such that teams under threat would show less attention for peripheral 
information (H1a), and experience more problems in maintaining an overview of the 
situation (H1b) than teams under normal conditions. We conducted a MANOVA with 
threat as the between-groups variable and the behavioral and self-report measures 
concerning information management as dependent variables. Results showed a 
significant multivariate effect for the threat manipulation, Wilks’ Λ = .65, F(2, 23) = 
6.12, p < .01, partial η2 = .35. Follow-up t tests revealed that threat negatively 
affected both measures. Teams in the threat condition paid less attention to 
peripheral information than teams in the no-threat condition, t(24) = 1.77, p = .04. 
They also suffered more from a lack of overview than teams in the no-threat 
condition, t(24) = -2.52, p = .01. Both results are indicative of a restriction in 
information processing in teams under threat and provide support for Hypothesis 1. 
Leadership and communication 
Hypotheses 2 and 3 proposed that physical threat would lead to a constriction in 
control such that in teams under threat, team leaders would exert more control 
(H2a) and act in a less participative way (H2b), and team members would deliberate 
less with each other (H3) than under normal conditions. We conducted a MANOVA 
with threat as the between-groups variable and the leadership and deliberation 
measures as dependent variables. Results showed a significant multivariate effect 




Mean Scores, Standard Deviations, and t test Results 
 
No threat 
(n = 13) 
 
Threat 
(n = 13) 
   
Variable        M         SD         M         SD t(24) Cohen’s d 
1. Peripheral attention  3.00 1.82 2.03 0.74 1.77* 0.72 
2. Lack of overview 3.61 0.57 4.15 0.54 -2.52** 1.03 
3. Leadership control 2.08 0.52 2.87 0.84 -2.87** 1.17 
4. Participative leadership 5.93 0.51 5.48 0.71 1.87* 0.76 
5. Amount of deliberation 31.69 11.03 21.15 9.78 2.58** 1.05 
6. Coordinated allocation 73.90 22.56 56.29 17.98 2.20* 0.90 
7. Supporting behavior 59.62 31.52 40.38 24.02 1.75* 0.71 
8. Errors 2.76 1.73 5.85 1.38 -5.04* 2.06 
Note. t-values, except for the test on differences in errors, were tested one-sided because of directional 
hypotheses. 
*p < .05. **p < .01. 
 
Follow-up t tests revealed that threat produced differences on all three univariate 
measures. Team leaders in the threat condition exerted more control than leaders in 
the no-threat condition, t(24) = -2.87, p < .01, and they allowed less participation of 
their teammates in decision making, t(24) = 1.87, p = .04. In addition, team 
members in the threat condition deliberated less with each other than team 
members in the no-threat condition, t(24) = 2.58, p < .01. Note that the total amount 
of communication did not differ between conditions (M = 73.54, SD = 19.57 in the 
threat condition and M = 78.77, SD = 14.74 in the no-threat condition; t(24) = 0.77, p 
= .45). These results are indicative of a constriction in control and provide support 
for Hypotheses 2 and 3. 
Coordination and supporting behavior 
Hypotheses 4 and 5 proposed that physical threat would lead to a narrowed team 
perspective such that team members would coordinate their actions less well (H4), 
and engage less in supporting behavior (H5) than under normal conditions. We 
conducted a MANOVA with threat as the between-groups variable and the 
behavioral measures of coordinated information allocation and supporting behavior 
as dependent variables. Results showed a significant multivariate effect for the 
threat manipulation, Wilks’ Λ = .64, F(2, 23) = 6.43, p < .01, partial η2 = .36. Follow-
up t tests revealed that threat negatively affected both measures. Team members in 
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the threat condition allocated a smaller percentage of their e-mail messages with 
role-specific information to the team member with the relevant area of expertise, 
t(24) = 2.20, p = .02, indicating worse coordination in teams under threat. In 
addition, team members in the threat condition forwarded only 40% of the ‘wrongly 
delivered’ e-mails to their teammates, while team members in the no-threat 
condition did so in almost 60% of the cases, t(24) = 1.75, p = .05, indicating a 
decrease in supporting behavior in teams under threat. These results are indicative 
of a narrowed team perspective and provide support for Hypotheses 4 and 5. 
Team performance 
Finally, we also investigated whether there was a difference in the performance of 
the teams in the two conditions. An independent samples t test comparing the 
amount of errors in the threat and no-threat conditions yielded a significant result. 
Teams in the threat condition made more than twice as many errors as team in the 
no-threat condition t(24) = -5.04, p < .01. This result indicates that teams in the 
threat condition performed worse than teams in the no-threat condition. 
Discussion 
This study experimentally investigated the effects of physical threat on team 
processes during a complex planning and problem-solving task. Three-person 
teams had to develop an evacuation plan on the basis of a multitude of complex 
information either under threat of experiencing a reduction of oxygen level, or under 
normal conditions. We measured five critical team processes using automated 
behavioral logging and self-report scales. We expected that threat would cause 
problems in the team’s information management, result in more controlling 
leadership and less group discussions, and lead to a reduction in coordination and 
supporting behavior. Our results provide support for these hypotheses. We will 
discuss the results and theoretical implications for each of the processes separately.  
As expected, teams in the threat condition showed a restriction in information 
processing compared to teams working in the no-threat condition. Specifically, 
teams under physical threat paid less attention to information provided by sources 
that appeared to provide merely irrelevant information. As a result they also 
overlooked or ignored the relevant and useful information provided by these 
sources. In addition, they reported to have had more problems keeping an overview 
of all the information during the task. These effects found for information 
management under physical threat bear resemblance to the so-called need for 
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closure effects (Kruglanski & Webster, 1996). Need for closure has been defined as 
a desire for definite knowledge on some issue, and can be evoked by conditions 
that make information processing difficult, such as time pressure (e.g., Kruglanski & 
Webster, 1991). Need for closure, however, has a motivational nature, while the 
effects proposed by the threat-rigidity thesis do not necessarily presuppose 
motivational aspects. It would be interesting to investigate whether the effects of 
threat also have motivational aspects or that they occur more or less automatically, 
without conscious control of the persons being threatened.  
Furthermore, as hypothesized, the results indicated a constriction in control in 
teams under threat. Team members under threat described their leaders as more 
controlling than did team members in the no-threat condition. In addition, team 
members’ ratings of the degree of participation in decision making allowed by their 
leader were lower for teams under threat, indicating that team leaders under threat 
were less receptive to the opinions of their team members. These results contribute 
to the debate concerning the effects of threat and stress on the degree of control in 
teams. Past research found evidence for both a constriction in control and a 
loosening of control under threat. We proposed that these mixed findings could be 
explained by the presence (or absence) of formal leadership in a team. In this study, 
teams had an assigned, formal leader. Although we did not manipulate emergent 
versus assigned leadership, the results provide support for the notion that in teams 
with existing leadership, authority will become more centralized under threat. Two 
processes may cause this. Firstly, threat may make team members feel uncertain 
and insecure (e.g., Lanzetta, 1955) and pass full responsibility to the team leader, 
who, after all, has the final responsibility (e.g., Foushee & Helmreich, 1988). 
Secondly, under threat, the leader may feel even more responsible and tighten the 
reins as a result. In contrast, in teams without formal leadership, threat may cause 
the same feelings of uncertainty and insecurity among team members, but in this 
case there is no one they can depend on. The resulting situation may be 
characterized by group-oriented behaviors as described by Lanzetta (e.g., 
cooperativeness, group discussion), since these behaviors are indicative of the 
group members’ needs to find security in the group in the absence of the possibility 
to put themselves in the hands of a leader. Eventually, leadership may emerge as a 
result of which the same processes may surface as in teams with an assigned 
leader (e.g., Argote et al., 1989; Harrington et al., 2002).  
Another result supporting the idea of a constriction in control under threat 
concerned the content of the communication in the e-mails team members sent to 
each other. As we expected, teams in the physical threat condition deliberated less 
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with each other than teams in the no-threat condition. Fewer messages contained 
communication about strategies, potential routes, decisions to be made, or meta-
communication about information they received and the roles they occupied. There 
was no difference, however, in the total amount of communication between the 
teams in the two conditions. Only the nature of the communication differed. In the 
no-threat condition, team members exchanged information and at the same time 
collectively tried to make sense of it. On the contrary, in the threat condition, team 
members mainly exchanged information, and made fewer efforts to integrate it, or 
make sense of it. This was apparently for the larger part solitarily done by the leader 
of team. Again, this may have been caused by team members feeling insecure and 
passing responsibility to the one who should ‘know best’. It may also have been 
caused by team leaders feeling a greater need to exert control under threat, by 
discouraging team members to make sense of the information they received or think 
collectively about the implications of it, and instead requiring them to send all 
information to the leader (e.g., Borkowski, 2005).  
Results also indicated that physical threat led to a reduction in coordination, 
as hypothesized. Specifically, team members under physical threat allocated a 
smaller percentage of their e-mail messages with role-specific information 
(information that could only be adequately dealt with by one specific team member) 
to the team member with the relevant area of expertise. Instead, they sent role-
specific information to the wrong team member or to both other team members at 
the same time. Hence, the coordinated allocation of information suffered under 
physical threat. As with the results for information processing, it is unclear to what 
extent this result reflects a lack of awareness of the roles and responsibilities of 
other team members (i.e., a less effective transactive memory system), or a lack of 
motivation to act upon this knowledge, or a combination of both. Research by Ellis 
(2006) indicates that under acute stress the former might be the case. He measured 
team interaction mental models after task performance, and found these models to 
be less similar and less accurate in team members that had performed under acute 
stress. It is unclear, however, whether these less accurate models developed as a 
result of automatic processes, or as a result of a motivated individualistic focus. In 
other words, it is the question whether team members under threat are less able or 
less willing to focus on the team. Future research is necessary to address this 
question. 
As expected, the effects for supporting behavior also indicated a narrowing of 
team perspective. Team members under threat showed less supporting behavior 
than team members in the no-threat condition. They forwarded information that was 
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meant for one of their teammates, only in 40% of the cases to that particular 
teammate as opposed to 60% by team members in the no-threat condition. To our 
knowledge, no previous research has experimentally investigated the effects of 
threat or stress on supporting behavior in teams. Especially in complex task 
environments, however, team members supporting each other can make the 
difference between success and failure. Previous research (Driskell et al., 1999; 
Ellis, 2006) showed that stress causes team members to be less focused on the 
team, and negatively affects their team mental models and transactive memory 
systems. The present study extends these results, by showing that this narrowed 
team perspective also reveals itself in degraded supporting behavior. Again, it is not 
clear whether this result indicates a lack of willingness or a lack of ability in team 
members to support their teammates.  
Finally, results also pointed out that threat negatively affected team 
performance on the planning and problem-solving task. Teams under threat 
delivered evacuation plans containing more than twice as many errors as teams in 
the no-threat condition. As can be seen in Table 3.1, the amount of deliberation and 
the extent to which information was allocated in a coordinated manner displayed 
moderate correlations with the amount of errors. The other process measures had 
smaller correlations with performance on this task. Distraction may have been an 
extra factor that influenced the amount of errors teams made. Threat not only 
initiates the processes described by the threat-rigidity thesis (Staw et al., 1981), and 
measured in the present study, but may also affect concentration. Threat captures 
and holds attention (Gaillard, 2008; Turner & Horvitz, 2001). Since the threat in this 
study was not task-related, it did not draw team members’ attention to specific 
aspects of the task, but instead it distracted them from the task. This distraction may 
have had a unique effect on the amount of errors teams made in their evacuation 
plan.  
Implications, Strengths, Limitations, and Future Research 
The results of this study support the propositions of the threat-rigidity thesis 
concerning information processing and the exercise of control, and they extend 
previous research by demonstrating effects on coordination and supporting behavior 
as well. Moreover, to our knowledge for the first time, we were able to demonstrate 
the effects of a physical threat on teams executing a complex planning and 
problem-solving task.  
Organizations that employ teams to carry out dangerous and complex 
operations can benefit from the results of this study, because it demonstrates in a 
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clear manner how team processes are affected by physical threat. Although at this 
time no definite answer exists as to how to mitigate these effects, organizations 
could attempt to use each of these processes as a starting point to prevent the 
detrimental effects of threat from occurring. The effects we found for information 
management could, for example, be countered with interfaces that support 
operators to divide their attention in a better way or software agents that 
dynamically take over those tasks that the operator neglects (Bosse, Van Doesburg, 
Van Maanen, & Treur, 2007). The effects on leadership and the amount of 
deliberation could be responded to by specific participative leadership trainings or 
by flattening team structures. The effects on coordination and supporting behavior 
could be averted by specific trainings, for example cross-training, wherein team 
members are not only trained for their own tasks, but also for the tasks of their 
teammates (e.g., Marks, Sabella, Burke, & Zaccaro, 2002). Other recent research 
has shown positive effects of a generic team-skills training program on transactive 
memory in teams performing a complex task (Prichard & Ashleigh, 2007). When 
such training programs are not possible, teams could probably benefit from 
assigning one team member a specific role aimed at facilitating cooperation 
between team members and integrating the knowledge and expertise possessed by 
his or her team mates.  
Methodologically, the strength of this experiment lies in the fact that we used 
a complex planning and problem-solving team task, characterized by a high 
information load, high task-ambiguity, absence of well-learned procedures or 
repetitive actions, multiple subtasks, and numerous pathways to goals. As a result 
of this, we were able to investigate a level of complexity that can not be attained 
with the more executive, tactical team tasks often used in this kind of research (e.g., 
TANDEM, Weaver et al., 1995; DDD, Kleinman, Serfaty, & Luh, 1984; TIDE2, 
Hollenbeck, Sego, Ilgen, & Major, 1991). This complexity is an integral part of the 
reality in which, for example, teams in high hazard industries, military teams and 
crisis management teams have to operate. In addition, the three team members 
occupied different roles, knowledge, and expertise. As a result of this, real 
interdependency existed between team members. In team research, this crucial 
characteristic is frequently highly artificial or even absent due to the simplicity of the 
task used.  
In addition, we managed to successfully manipulate a realistic, physical 
threat, something that is hard to realize in an experimental setting. For teams that 
have to operate in dangerous environments, like crisis management and military 
teams, physical threats are part of their daily reality. Since Klein (1976) found that 
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physical threats lead to different processes than material threats do, it is necessary 
for researchers to adequately address the threats these teams face, in order to be 
able to generalize research findings to the reality of these teams. We are convinced 
that the present manipulation constitutes a threat that causes effects that can be 
generalized to these situations, albeit to a less severe extent. In addition, as 
opposed to many stress manipulations, the manipulation in the present study was 
not task-related. As a result of this, the threat had an uncontrollable nature, had no 
implications for the manner in which teams had to perform their tasks, and was 
similar for all teams no matter how well they performed.  
Finally, the use of PLATT as research platform enabled us to collect 
objective, behavioral data to measure the relevant team processes. We did not have 
to fully rely on subjective questionnaire measures, but supplemented these with 
behavioral data from the log files. In this way, we were able to objectively measure 
processes that up till now, in this research domain, had mainly been measured 
using subjective self-report scales (i.e., peripheral attention, amount of deliberation, 
supporting behavior). Obtaining the data in this way supports the validity of our 
results.  
We should also note some limitations. Although the task environment 
ensured a high degree of realism, the findings were obtained in an experimental 
setting, with short-lived teams and an artificial task. Future research should also be 
directed toward investigating whether these results hold in a more natural setting. 
Furthermore, two of the employed questionnaire scales (lack of overview and 
leadership control) had rather low reliabilities (Cronbach’s alphas respectively .59 
and .67). This was due to the fact that they consisted of only a small number of 
items (respectively three and two). Finally, only a relatively small number of teams 
could participate in this study. More studies should be conducted to establish the 
reliability of the results. 
It is further recommended that future research investigate methods to protect 
the team processes found to be vulnerable to the effects of threat. Some research 
has been done in this domain (e.g., Serfaty, Entin, & Johnston, 1998), but more 
research is necessary to develop methods to mitigate the negative effects of threat, 
especially on coordination and supporting behavior in teams. Future research might 
also examine more closely the role of leadership in teams under threat, consistent 
with our earlier discussion relating to the presence or absence of formal leadership. 
We proposed that in teams with existing leadership, threat would lead to a 
constriction in control. Although our results support this proposition, we did not 
manipulate the existence of leadership. Future studies manipulating this could test 
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our proposition that threat interacts with the existence of leadership in such a way 
that it leads to a constriction in control in teams with existing leadership, while this 
effect would not occur, or might even be reversed (i.e., a loosening of control), in 
teams without existing leadership. 
Much research remains to be done in the domain of team performance in 
threatening environments. A picture starts to emerge of the detrimental effects of threat 
on crucial team processes, but it is still unclear in what way the negative effects of threat 
can be mitigated. The present study enhances our understanding of how teams react to 
physical threat, and we hope that mere awareness of these effects may already improve 







Team Performance under Threat: 
The Mediating Role of Threat-Rigidity Processes1 
 
 
This study examined how team reactions to threat mediate the relationship 
between threat and team performance during complex tasks. Fifty-eight 
three-person teams engaged in a complex planning and problem-solving 
task, either under high or low manipulated social threat. It was expected that 
threat would cause rigidity in team processes, which in turn would lead to a 
deterioration of team performance. Team processes were measured by 
automated behavior recordings and questionnaires. Findings confirmed that 
threat caused a restriction in information processing, a constriction in control, 
and a narrowing of team perspective, and negatively affected team 
performance. Results of a multiple mediation analysis showed that the set of 
processes as a whole mediated the negative effect of threat on team 
performance. These results provide support for the threat-rigidity thesis, and 
extend previous research by capturing the full array of mediating processes in 
a single design. 
 
Suppose you are walking through the woods, listening to the beautiful songs of 
birds. Suddenly, you are face to face with a huge bear. In a moment, your body 
prepares itself to fight or flight. Adrenaline is released into your bloodstream, your 
heart starts pumping like a madman, your breathing becomes deeper and faster, 
                                                 
1 This chapter is based on Kamphuis, Gaillard, & Vogelaar (2009b). 
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your pupils dilate, and you don’t notice the bird songs anymore. All these automatic 
reactions contribute to your chances of survival in this situation (cf. Cannon, 1915).  
But now suppose you are in a different situation. You are the pilot of a large 
commercial airliner approaching for landing. Suddenly, all kinds of warning signals 
indicate serious problems. It is not clear what is causing the problems, but if you 
and your crew don’t solve them, the plane will go down with all its passengers. This 
threat will also cause a fight or flight response, but there is nothing to fight or to flee 
from. Rather than physical activation, you will need all your cognitive abilities to 
solve this complex problem. In addition, you will need your social abilities to 
collaborate with your crew. What reactions would you and your team show in this 
situation, and would these reactions contribute to your chances of survival? 
Many tragedies in aviation, the military, emergency medicine, and other 
safety-critical industries suggest that the responses of teams in these situations may 
not contribute to their chances of survival (e.g., Cannon-Bowers & Salas, 1998b; 
Flin, Slaven, & Stewart, 1996; Helmreich & Schaefer, 1994; Kanki, 1996). Teams in 
less safety-critical organizations may suffer performance decrements caused by 
threats too (e.g., potential financial loss, negative publicity, hostile take-over, etc.). 
Results from experimental research have confirmed that threat and stress 
negatively affect team performance (e.g., Cannon-Bowers & Salas, 1998b; Driskell, 
Salas, & Johnson, 1999; Ellis, 2006). But a clear understanding of how threat 
affects team performance is only beginning to develop (e.g., Burke et al., 2004; 
Turner & Horvitz, 2001). Precise knowledge of the pathways through which threat 
affects team performance is of great concern, because organizations can use such 
knowledge to determine what processes should be targeted in interventions aimed 
at mitigating the effects of threat. The present study aimed to contribute to this 
knowledge by investigating team reactions to threat and examining how these 
reactions mediated the effects of threat on team performance during a complex 
task.  
Theory and Hypotheses 
The Effects of Threat on Teams 
Threat can be defined as a possible impending event perceived by a person or 
group of persons as potentially causing material or immaterial loss to, or the 
obstruction of goals of that person or group of persons (cf. Argote, Tuner, & 
Fichman, 1989; Lazarus, 1966; Staw, Sandelands, & Dutton, 1981; Turner & 
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Horvitz, 2001). Staw et al. (1981) suggested that there is a general tendency for 
individuals, teams, and organizations to behave rigidly in threatening situations. This 
threat-rigidity thesis describes two types of rigidity. First, threat may cause a 
restriction in information processing. This may be demonstrated by a narrowed field 
of attention, a reduction in the amount of information used for decisions, and 
reliance upon prior expectations. Second, threat may cause a constriction in control. 
This may be demonstrated by authority becoming more centralized and fewer 
people making the decisions. Together, these effects cause a system’s behavior to 
become less diverse and flexible. In stable and predictable environments, this 
rigidity may be adaptive. In dynamic, ambiguous, and unpredictable environments, 
however, this rigidity is likely to be maladaptive, leading to performance decrements 
(Staw et al., 1981; Weick, 1979).  
The limited research investigating team performance under threat, has 
generally confirmed the occurrence of a restriction in information processing and a 
constriction in control. For example, Gladstein and Reilly (1985) found that teams 
facing a potential financial loss in a management simulation had less group 
discussions and used less information to make decisions. In addition, Argote et al. 
(1989) found that higher levels of threat were associated with more centralized 
communication structures in a laboratory team experiment. Similarly, Harrington, 
Lemak, and Kendall (2002) found that teams participating in a student team project 
reported to have used a more rigid approach to their decision making process when 
under high threat. Moreover, Driskell et al. (1999) and Ellis (2006) showed that 
restricted information processing under threat extended to team perspective as well, 
leading team members to shift from a broader, team orientation, to a more narrow, 
individualistic focus. Finally, Kamphuis, Gaillard, and Vogelaar (2009d) showed that 
teams performing a complex planning and problem-solving task reacted to physical 
threat with restriction in information processing, more controlling leadership, less 
group discussion, and a reduction in coordination and supporting behavior. 
Together, these studies provide support at the team level for the proposed rigidity-
processes by the threat-rigidity thesis. 
Mediational Role of Threat-Rigidity Processes 
However, hardly any research investigated how the processes caused by threat 
relate to the performance of teams. The only two studies examining the mediational 
role of the rigidity-processes, focused on team members’ shift in attention from the 
team to the self (Driskell et al., 1999; Ellis, 2006). These studies showed that a 
narrowing of team perspective (Driskell et al., 1999) and a deterioration of team 
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mental models and transactive memory (Ellis, 2006) under threat, mediated the 
negative relationship between threat and team performance in a command-and-
control simulation task. The mediational role of other team reactions to threat, such 
as task information processing becoming more restricted, leadership becoming 
more controlling, and group discussions becoming less frequent, has not received 
any research attention yet. Knowledge concerning the mediational properties of 
these processes is relevant, however, since some of these processes might be far 
more important in causing deterioration of team performance than other processes. 
Interventions aimed at mitigating the effects of threat on team performance should 
target those processes that are responsible for the performance deterioration. 
Therefore, in this study, we investigated how threat affected these processes, and 
whether changes in these processes were adaptive or maladaptive for team 
performance on a complex task.  
Present Study 
We modeled our study after the Kamphuis et al. (2009d) study and investigated how 
threat affected information processing, exercise of control, and team perspective in 
teams during a complex planning and problem-solving task. In line with the threat-
rigidity thesis (Staw et al., 1981) and the earlier study (Kamphuis et al., 2009d), we 
expected that threat would cause: a restriction in information processing, such that 
teams under threat would show less attention for peripheral information and would 
experience more problems in maintaining an overview of the situation than teams 
under normal conditions; a constriction in control, such that team leaders would 
become less participative and more controlling, and team members would engage 
in less deliberation than under normal conditions; a narrowed team perspective, 
such that teams under threat would coordinate their actions less well and engage in 
less supporting behavior than under normal conditions. 
Extending previous research, we simultaneously investigated the mediational 
role of all these expected threat reactions in the relationship between threat and 
team performance. As described above, the threat-rigidity thesis states that rigidity 
in reactions may be adaptive in stable and predictable environments, whereas in 
dynamic, unpredictable, and novel environments, flexibility rather than rigidity may 
be necessary to perform well (Staw et al., 1981). Because teams performed a 
complex problem-solving task, which was novel for them, we expected that rigidity 
in reactions caused by threat, would negatively affect team performance. In other 
words, we expected that restricted information processing, constricted control, and a 
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narrowed team perspective would mediate the relationship between threat and team 
performance.  
In sum, this chapter addresses the following hypotheses: teams performing a 
complex task under threat will show a restriction in information processing 
(Hypothesis 1); a constriction in control (Hypothesis 2); a narrowing of team 
perspective (Hypothesis 3); and a deterioration of team performance (Hypothesis 4). 
The effects of threat on team performance will be mediated by information 
processing, exercise of control, and team perspective (Hypothesis 5). 
Method 
Participants and Design 
Participants were 174 officer cadets of the Netherlands Defence Academy (31 
women and 143 men; mean age = 21.2 years) who were arrayed into 58 three-
person teams. In exchange for their participation, teams could win cash prizes 
depending upon the team’s performance (150 Euro for the best performing team 
within each cohort). Teams were randomly assigned to either the high threat (n = 
29) or the low threat condition (n = 29).2 
Task 
PLATT 
Participants engaged in a complex planning and problem-solving scenario in the 
Planning Task for Teams (PLATT; see Kamphuis, Essens, Houttuin, & Gaillard, 
2009; Kamphuis & Houttuin, 2007). PLATT is a software platform for controlled 
experimental research on team performance in complex environments. It has been 
used in other studies investigating different aspects of team performance (e.g., 
Kamphuis, Gaillard, & Vogelaar, 2008, 2009c; Van Bezooijen, Vogelaar, & Essens, 
2009a, 2009b; Langelaan & Keeris, 2008). It consists of a generic software 
architecture and research-specific scenarios. Participants playing a scenario are 
seated behind computers connected via a network. They receive scenario-
messages via e-mail and can search for additional information on web sites. 
Participants communicate with each other via e-mail and have access to a digital 
                                                 
2 This study actually used a 2 (threat: high vs. low) × 2 (training vs. no training) factorial design. In this 
chapter we only address the effects of the threat manipulation. The other factor did not interact with any of 
the measures reported in this chapter. In Chapter 5 we report results for the full design on a different set of 
measures. 
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shared workspace in which they can work jointly on certain team tasks. All 
participants’ actions are automatically recorded in a log file. Based on this log file, 
different behavioral measures can be constructed. 
Scenario 
In the present study, teams engaged in a highly complex military evacuation 
scenario. In this scenario, teams have to develop a plan to extract a group of people 
from a hostile area to a safer place. They have to determine the fastest route and 
plan how they will employ their transportation, engineer, and infantry units, to realize 
the extraction. There are eighteen possible routes to use for the evacuation, ranging 
from very slow to very fast. Whether a route is fast not only depends on the length 
of the roads, but also on the condition of these roads, and whether there are enemy 
activities on these roads.  
During the scenario, in real-time, a large number of scenario-driven 
messages are sent to the three participants. These messages pertain to road 
conditions, enemy activities, delays due to different causes, the position of the units, 
personnel and materiel problems, weather conditions, unrelated events, et cetera. 
This information varies in relevance and is sent by many sources differing in 
reliability (e.g., headquarters, local civilians, the enemy). The scenario also controls 
changes in information on the websites participants can access. The events in the 
scenario are constructed in such a way that at different moments in time, different 
routes are optimal. Teams accordingly have to adjust plans and adapt to 
circumstances. The shared workspace in this scenario consists of a digital map of 
the evacuation area. This map can be used to integrate the most recent information, 
using symbols indicating, for example, enemy activities, locations of units, road 
conditions. 
After 45 minutes, the scenario ends and teams have to deliver an evacuation 
plan using a standardized form. In this plan, they have to describe via which route 
they plan to extract the group of people and how they will employ their units. 
Roles 
Team members were randomly assigned to one of three roles: Operations, 
Logistics, or Intelligence. Each role had unique responsibilities, expertise, and tasks. 
In addition, each role received unique information (via e-mail or websites) during the 
scenario. Operations was the leader of the team and responsible for directing the 
activities of the other team members. Operations was the only team member who 
could edit the shared map of the area in which the evacuation had to take place. 
Intelligence was responsible for all information concerning the safety of the roads, 
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and had unique expertise concerning determining the reliability of the information 
sources in the scenario. Logistics was responsible for personnel and materiel, and 
for information concerning the condition of the roads. Logistics had unique expertise 
concerning calculating the duration of the various routes. The distribution of 
expertise and information created interdependence between team members. Only 
when all three team members combined their knowledge and information, they were 
able to deliver an optimal evacuation plan. 
Procedure 
Participants arrived at the location of the experiment in groups of three. The 
experimenter seated the participants according to the roles they had randomly been 
assigned to and explained that the purpose of the experiment was to gain a better 
understanding of team problem-solving and team decision-making processes. He 
further explained that they would perform a team task, in which an evacuation had 
to be planned. Following this, participants watched a video instruction containing 
information about the team task. After having watched this video, participants had 
the opportunity to ask the experimenter questions about these instructions. The 
experimenter answered these questions and then handed out three different 
packets containing information about the roles participants would occupy during the 
scenario. After participants had studied this information, the experimenter 
announced the next phase of the experiment. 
Threat manipulation 
The experimenter informed all participants that, prior to engaging in the team task, 
they had to perform a brief individual task, the Synwork task (Elsmore, 1994). 
Synwork requires participants to execute four different subtasks at the same time. 
Participants were told that performance on this individual task was a good predictor 
of performance on complex planning tasks like the one they were about to engage 
in. The experimenter further told them that their mean team score would be 
compared to the mean score of a civilian population that had been tested before, to 
estimate how well they could perform on the team task. After this, all participants 
received instructions for the Synwork task, and subsequently performed this task for 
2 minutes.  
At the end of the individual task, participants in the low threat condition 
received false positive feedback. The experimenter told them that they had 
performed well and had scored above the average of the civilian population. He 
further told them that he expected them to perform well on the team task as well, 
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and reminded them of the prize of 150 Euro for the best performing team within 
each cohort.  
Participants in the high threat condition, on the other hand, received false 
negative feedback at the end of the individual task. The experimenter told them that 
they had performed rather poorly and that their score was below the average of the 
civilian population. He further told them that he expected them to have difficulty with 
the team task as well, and explained that both the researchers and their own 
commanders were particularly interested in teams that had difficulties with these 
kinds of task. Therefore, to gain better insight into what happens in ill-performing 
teams, their performance would be recorded using a video camera, which was set 
up prominently in front of the team, and webcams, which were fixed on top of the 
participants’ monitors. Moreover, the experimenter told them that they ran the risk of 
having to come back for an evaluation with their commanders and the researchers if 
their team would be one of the five lowest performing teams. Finally he told them 
that the videotape could be used as course material. 
Consistent with previous research, this manipulation aimed to create an 
evaluative situation with potentially negative consequences in case of poor 
performance (e.g., Blanchette, Richards, & Cross, 2007; Ellis, 2006; Turner, 
Pratkanis, Probasco, & Leve, 1992). When persons expect to perform poorly, such 
a situation is likely to be perceived as threatening (e.g., Thompson, 1981; 
Blascovich & Tomaka, 1996). We manipulated the expectation of poor performance 
by giving negative feedback on an unrelated task said to be predictive of 
performance on the task of interest (cf. Mogg, Mathews, Bird, & Macgregor-Morris, 
1990). We deliberately chose not to provide false negative feedback on the task of 
interest because teams might have used this feedback as an indication that they 
had to alter their strategies. This would have been an unwanted effect, as it might 
have obscured the effects of threat.  
Task execution and conclusion 
Following the feedback on the individual task, the experimenter asked the 
participants to fill out a short electronic questionnaire (which constituted the 
manipulation check for the threat manipulation), after which the scenario for the 
team task was started. Teams then performed the 45-minute military evacuation 
scenario. After this, participants were asked to respond to a final questionnaire (with 
dependent measures described below). After the experiment, all participants were 
fully debriefed about the true nature of the experiment, and offered the possibility to 




The central processes, information processing, exercise of control, and team 
perspective were measured behaviorally (on the basis of the log files) and by means 
of questionnaires. All questions were scored on 7-point Likert scales; a score of 1 
indicated complete absence of the construct and a score of 7 complete presence. 
All measures, except the team performance measure, were collected at the 
individual level. Because the unit of analysis was the team level, and variance in 
team members’ behavior or reports was of no concern, individual scores were 
aggregated to the mean team score.  
Information processing 
One variable at the behavioral level and one questionnaire scale measured to what 
extent teams restricted their information processing. The behavioral indicator was 
attention to peripheral information. During the scenario, team members received 
messages differing in relevance. Some sources usually provided irrelevant 
information. Now and then, however, these sources sent useful messages. We 
calculated the percentage of these relevant messages that was read by team 
members as a behavioral indicator of how much attention teams gave to peripheral 
information. The questionnaire concerning information processing (adapted from 
Kamphuis, et al., 2009d) consisted of a scale of three items (Cronbach’s alpha = 
.76) measuring the participant’s lack of overview (e.g., “I found it hard to inspect all 
available information”).  
Exercise of control 
To investigate to what extent a constriction in control took place, we investigated 
how the leaders behaved and what kind of communication took place. The 
leadership scales (adapted from Kamphuis, et al., 2009d) measured the degree of 
leadership control and participative leadership. The first scale measured the degree 
of control exerted by the leader as judged by the other two team members (three 
items, Cronbach’s alpha = .68, e.g., “The leader determined to a large extent how I 
had to do my job”). A high score on leadership control indicated a high degree of 
control exercise within the team. The second scale of four items (Cronbach’s alpha 
= .78) measured the degree of participation in decision making allowed by the 
leader as judged by the other two team members (e.g., “In case of important 
decisions, the leader took my opinion into consideration”). A high score on 
participation in decision making indicated a low degree of control exercise. 
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We measured the amount of deliberation that took place in the team as a 
behavioral indicator of the degree of control, with a low amount of deliberation being 
indicative of a high degree of control (e.g., Borkowski, 2005). To construct this 
measure, two judges coded all e-mail messages in the log files. They grouped every 
e-mail message into one of seven categories of a collectively exhaustive and 
mutually exclusive categorization (Kamphuis et al., 2009c). The judges coded 10 
(17.2%) of the 58 teams together. The interrater reliability for these 10 teams was 
.95 (Cohen’s Kappa). Because this indicates almost perfect agreement, the 
remaining 48 teams were coded by just one of the judges. One of the categories, 
deliberation, consisted of all messages participants sent to each other to deliberate 
(communicate on a higher level) about the task, the planning or their team roles. 
Typical messages in this category contained information about the strategy, 
potential routes, and decisions to be made. The total number of e-mail messages in 
this category constituted the variable amount of deliberation.  
Team perspective 
Team perspective was measured by investigating to what extent team members 
engaged in coordination and supporting behavior. Both kinds of activities indicate 
that team members maintain a broad team perspective, rather than having a narrow 
focus on their own tasks. To determine the extent to which team members 
collaborated in a coordinated manner, we investigated the manner in which team 
members handled role-specific information (i.e., information that could only be 
adequately dealt with by one specific team member). One of the categories of the 
above described categorization of e-mail messages pertained to the allocation of 
role-specific information. We determined who received the e-mails in this category. 
The resulting variable, coordinated information allocation, consisted of the 
percentage of e-mails in this category that was sent to the team member with the 
relevant area of expertise, instead of to the other team member, or to both team 
members at the same time (which would be inefficient and could lead to errors, as 
the other team member would not have the expertise to deal with this information 
correctly). An example of an e-mail message in the category ‘allocation of role-
specific information’ would be: “I received a report from local civilians of sniper 
shootings between Iskra and Golesh”. When a team member would send this 
information to Intelligence, the team member with the relevant area of expertise 
(safety), that would be an example of coordinated information allocation.  
Supporting behavior consisted of the percentage of times participants 
forwarded ‘wrongly delivered’ e-mail messages to the team member with the 
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relevant area of expertise. Normally, team members only received scenario e-mail 
messages that were meant for them, and not for one of their teammates. But 
sometimes, information meant for one role, was deliberately sent to a team member 
with another role, to investigate how this team member would handle this 
information. We considered sending this information to the teammate with the 
relevant area of expertise to be an act of supporting behavior. On the basis of the 
log files, we calculated the percentage of the total number of ‘wrongly delivered’ e-
mail messages, in which team members sent these messages to the team member 
with the relevant area of expertise.  
Team performance 
The team performance measure consisted of a single score, ranging from 0 (very 
poor) to 10 (excellent). This score was composed of a score for the quality of the 
route they had chosen minus the total number of errors the team had made in their 
evacuation plan. The score for the quality of the route ranged from 5 (slowest 
routes) to 10 (fastest routes). Errors could be made in the way teams planned to 
deploy their infantry, engineer, and transportation units (e.g., no deployment of a 
unit whereas it should have been deployed, deployment on the wrong part of a 
route, deployment from a wrong starting point, etc.), and in calculating the travel 
times for the roads they planned to use. The scenario was constructed in such a 
way that in each of the eighteen routes, teams could make a maximum of five 
errors, resulting in an overall minimum score of 0 and a maximum score of 10.  
Results 
Prior to data analysis, seven teams had to be removed from the data set. Four 
teams had to be removed, because one of their members had indicated to have 
dyslexia. Because all information and communication during task performance was 
textual, dyslexia would have large effects on team processes and team 
performance. In addition, two teams had to be removed because of technical 
problems. Finally, one team in the high threat condition had to be removed, because 
members of this team had been informed about the threat manipulation by other 
participants.  




To examine the effects of the threat manipulation, participants first completed two 
items that measured participants’ appraisal of the situation, immediately after the 
feedback on the individual task and just before engaging in the team task. These 
items did not explicitly ask participants how threatened they felt, because that would 
have hinted them about the true nature of the experiment, but instead indirectly 
measured how participants appraised the situation. The first item (“How important is 
it for you to perform well on this task?”) measured on a scale ranging from 1 (not 
important at all) to 7 (very important) the extent to which participants judged that 
something was at stake, because having a stake in the outcome is a necessary 
condition for threat (cf. primary appraisal, e.g., Folkman & Lazarus, 1985; Lazarus & 
Folkman, 1984). The second item (“How well, do you think, are you going to perform 
as a team on this task?”) measured on a scale ranging from 1 (very poorly) to 7 
(very well) to what extent participants anticipated to be able to deal with this 
situation, because believing to have power to control the outcome of an encounter 
involving potential harm or loss, diminishes the degree of threat (cf. secondary 
appraisal, e.g., Folkman & Lazarus, 1985; Lazarus & Folkman, 1984). Both 
appraisal-items were combined to yield a single index of threat appraisal. This index 
was computed as a ratio of the first to the second item and reflected the extent to 
which a situation is appraised as potentially causing the obstruction of goals (i.e., as 
threatening). This method of measuring appraisal was adapted from research on 
challenge and threat (e.g., Blascovich & Tomaka, 1996; Tomaka, Blascovich, Kibler, 
& Ernst, 1997) and is consistent with the transactional theory of stress (Lazarus & 
Folkman, 1984).  
An independent samples t test was performed comparing the mean threat 
appraisal ratios in high and low threat conditions. Results indicated that the mean 
threat appraisal ratio was larger in the high threat condition (M = 1.11, SD = 0.26) – 
indicating higher stakes than coping ability – than in the low threat condition, M = 
0.99, SD = 0.20; t(151) = 3.26, p < .01, Cohen’s d = 0.53. This indicates that 
instructions in the high threat condition caused participants to appraise the situation 
as more threatening than in the low threat condition. 
Threat emotions and state anxiety 
After task performance, participants completed the Folkman and Lazarus (1985) 
threat emotions scale (three items, Cronbach’s alpha = .72). They indicated on a 




Descriptive Statistics and Intercorrelations at the Team Level of Analysis (N = 51) 
Variable M SD  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  
1. Peripheral attention  50.98 25.26 –       
2. Lack of overview 3.18 0.73 -.26† –       
3. Leadership control 2.77 0.77 -.14 .10 –     
4. Participative leadership 5.22 0.84 .23† -.27† -.31* –   
5. Amount of deliberation 29.90 9.85 .13 .05 -.36* .12 –    
6. Coordinated allocation 62.40 33.19 .03 -.07 .07 .39** .05 –  
7. Supporting behavior 31.37 25.42 -.16 .14 -.23† -.02 .23  .49** – 
8. Team performance 4.66 1.81 .07 -.20 -.08 .29* .34* .29* .47** 
†p < .10. *p < .05. **p < .01. 
 
fearful, and anxious. Results from an independent samples t test comparing the 
mean threat score for the high and low threat condition indicated that participants in 
the high threat condition reported having felt stronger threat emotions (M = 2.44, SD 
= 0.92) than participants in the low threat condition (M = 2.01, SD = 0.83), t(151) = 
3.04, p < .01, Cohen’s d = 0.49. In addition, participants completed the six-item 
short-form of the state scale of the Spielberger State-Trait Anxiety Inventory 
(Marteau & Bekker, 1992). They indicated on a scale ranging from 1 (not at all) to 7 
(a great deal) to what extent they had felt anxiety emotions during task 
performance. Cronbach’s alpha reached .79 in this study. Results from an 
independent samples t test comparing the mean anxiety score for the high and low 
threat condition indicated that participants in the high threat condition reported 
having felt stronger anxiety emotions (M = 3.37, SD = 0.87) than participants in the 
low threat condition (M = 2.79, SD = 0.85), t(151) = 4.12, p < .01, Cohen’s d = 0.67. 
These manipulation checks indicate that the threat manipulation was successful.  
Test of Hypotheses 
Table 4.1 presents means, standard deviations, and intercorrelations at the team 
level for all variables. Our hypotheses predicted that threat would affect information 
processing, exercise of control, team perspective, and team performance. In 
addition, we expected that the effects of threat on team performance would be 
mediated by the seven process variables. To evaluate the effects of threat, we 
conducted three one-way multivariate analyses of variance (MANOVAs) on the 
three groups of process measures, and a t test on the performance measure.
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Table 4.2 
Mean Scores, Standard Deviations, and t test Results 
 
No threat 
(n = 25) 
 
Threat 
(n = 26) 
   
Variable        M          SD         M          SD t(49) Cohen’s d 
1. Peripheral attention  57.33 24.57 44.87 24.84 1.80* 0.51 
2. Lack of overview 2.95 0.74 3.41 0.67 -2.38* 0.68 
3. Leadership control 2.42 0.61 3.11 0.76 -3.57** 1.02 
4. Participative leadership 5.49 0.88 4.97 0.74 2.26* 0.65 
5. Amount of deliberation 33.32 7.97 26.62 10.49 2.56** 0.73 
6. Coordinated allocation 60.93 33.61 63.81 33.37 -0.31 0.09 
7. Supporting behavior 37.67 27.76 25.32 21.79 1.77* 0.51 
8. Team performance 5.26 1.60 4.08 1.85 2.45** 0.70 
Note. All t-values were tested one-sided because of directional hypotheses. 
*p < .05. **p < .01. 
 
Second, to test our multiple-mediation model, we conducted bootstrapping analyses 
to simultaneously estimate the indirect effects of our proposed mediators (Preacher 
& Hayes, 2008). Below, we present the results of each overall MANOVA followed by 
t tests for each process measure and the team performance measure (see Table 
4.2). Then, we describe the analyses we used to test our multiple-mediation model 
and present the results from these analyses.  
Information processing 
Hypothesis 1 proposed that threat would negatively affect information processing. 
We conducted a MANOVA with threat as the between-groups variable and 
peripheral attention and lack of overview as dependent variables. Results showed a 
significant multivariate effect for the threat manipulation, Wilks’ Λ = .87, F(2, 48) = 
3.67, p = .03, partial η2 = .13. Follow-up t tests revealed that threat negatively 
affected both measures. Teams in the high threat condition paid significantly less 
attention to peripheral information than teams in the low threat condition, t(49) = 
1.80, p = .04. They also suffered more from a lack of overview than teams in the low 
threat condition, t(49) = -2.38, p = .01. These results provide support for Hypothesis 
1.  
Exercise of control 
Hypothesis 2 stated that threat would cause a constriction in control. We conducted 
a MANOVA with threat as the between-groups variable and the leadership and 
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deliberation measures as dependent variables. Results showed a significant 
multivariate effect for the threat manipulation, Wilks’ Λ = .73, F(3, 47) = 5.91, p < 
.01, partial η2 = .27. Follow-up t tests revealed that threat produced differences on 
all three univariate measures. Team leaders in the high threat condition exerted 
more control than their counterparts in the low threat condition, t(49) = -3.57, p < 
.01, and they allowed less participation of their teammates in decision making, t(49) 
= 2.26, p = .01. In addition, teams in the high threat condition deliberated less with 
each other than teams in the low threat condition, t(49) = 2.56, p < .01. These 
results provide support for Hypothesis 2. 
Team perspective 
Hypothesis 3 posited that teams under threat would exhibit a narrowing of team 
perspective. We conducted a MANOVA with threat as the between-groups variable 
and coordinated information allocation and supporting behavior as dependent 
variables. Results showed a marginally significant multivariate effect for the threat 
manipulation, Wilks’ Λ = .91, F(2, 48) = 2.52, p = .09, partial η2 = .10. Follow-up t 
tests revealed that threat did affect supporting behavior but not coordinated 
information allocation. Team members in the high threat condition engaged less in 
supporting behavior than team members in the low threat condition, t(49) = 1.77, p = 
.04. However, teams in both conditions did not differ in the way they allocated role-
specific information, t(49) = -0.31, p = .38. These results provide partial support for 
Hypothesis 3.  
Team performance 
Hypothesis 4 proposed that threat would negatively affect team performance. An 
independent samples t test was performed comparing the mean performance score 
in high and low threat conditions. Results indicated that teams in the high threat 
condition performed worse than teams in the low threat condition, t(49) = 2.45, p < 
.01. This result provides support for Hypothesis 4. 
Multiple-mediation model 
Finally, one of the purposes of this study was to determine how threat affects team 
performance. Hypothesis 5 proposed that information processing, exercise of 
control, and team perspective would mediate the link between threat and team 
performance. We tested this multiple-mediation model by conducting bootstrapping 
analyses using the approach described by Preacher and Hayes (2008) for 
estimating indirect effects with multiple simultaneous mediators (also see Preacher 
& Hayes, 2004; Shrout & Bolger, 2002). The use of this approach has two important 
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advantages over the most widely used causal steps approach advocated by Baron 
and Kenny (1986). First, using the bootstrapping approach allowed us to formally 
test the null hypothesis of no difference between the total effect and the direct 
effect, rather than having to infer mediation from a series of regression analyses 
(Preacher & Hayes, 2004, 2008). Second, bootstrapping has higher power than the 
causal steps approach while maintaining reasonable control over the Type 1 error 
rate (MacKinnon, Lockwood, Hoffman, West, & Sheets, 2002). In addition, in 
comparison with a commonly used formal test of mediation, the Sobel (1982) test, 
bootstrapping has the advantage that it does not rely on the assumption of a normal 
sampling distribution of the indirect effect, making it more suitable for small to 
moderate sample sizes (e.g., Preacher & Hayes, 2008, Shrout & Bolger, 2002). 
Furthermore, the bootstrapping method described by Preacher and Hayes (2008) 
allowed us to enter all seven proposed mediators into the model simultaneously and 
to test the indirect effect of each mediator while controlling for all other variables in 
the model.  
We used the SPSS macro created by Preacher and Hayes and entered 
threat as the independent variable, team performance as the dependent variable, 
and the seven process measures as proposed mediators. The results presented 
here are based on 10,000 bootstrap resamples and bias corrected and accelerated 
(BCa) intervals, following the recommendations by Preacher and Hayes (2008). See 
Figure 4.1 for the model. 
The total effect of threat on team performance was -1.18, p < .01. This effect 
became non-significant when the proposed mediators were included in the model 
(direct effect = -0.09, p = 0.43). Bootstrap results revealed that the difference 
between the total and the direct effect (the total indirect effect) was significant, with 
a point estimate of -1.09 and a 95% BCa bootstrap confidence interval (CI) of -2.37 
to -0.22. Therefore, we can claim that the difference between the total and the direct 
effect of threat on team performance is different from zero, and conclude that the 
seven proposed mediators, taken as a set, did indeed mediate the effect of threat 
on team performance. This result provides support for Hypothesis 5. 
The specific indirect effects for each mediator were calculated by multiplying the 
path from the independent variable to the mediator by the path from the mediator to 
the dependent variable. The directions of these specific indirect effects were 
consistent with our hypotheses that threat leads to a restriction in information 
processing, a constriction in control, and a narrowed team perspective, which in turn 
leads to a deterioration of team performance. The only specific indirect effect 
deviating from this pattern was leadership control, which showed a positive indirect
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effect, indicating that threat had a positive effect on team performance through 
leadership control.  
An examination of the size of the specific indirect effects revealed that lack of 
overview (point estimate of -0.26 and 95% BCa CI of -0.77 to -0.02), leadership 
control (point estimate of 0.55 and 95% BCa CI of 0.13 to 1.26), participative 
leadership (point estimate of -0.41 and 95% BCa CI of -1.10 to -0.07), amount of 
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deliberation (point estimate of -0.35 and 95 % BCa CI of -0.90 to -0.07), and 
supporting behavior (point estimate of -0.55 and 95% BCa CI of -1.34 to -0.02) were 
all unique mediators. Peripheral attention (point estimate of -0.03 and 95% BCa CI 
of -0.36 to 0.19), and coordinated allocation (point estimate of -0.03 and 95% BCa 
CI of -0.53 to 0.16) did not contribute significantly to the overall model.  
Discussion 
The goal of this study was to investigate team reactions to threat and to determine 
how these reactions affected team performance on a complex task. We expected 
that threat reactions would be characterized by rigidity. In addition, we expected that 
this rigidity would be maladaptive for team performance because complex tasks 
require flexibility rather than rigidity. The results of this study largely support these 
assumptions. We will discuss the findings for the processes and the outcomes 
below.  
Threat-Rigidity Processes 
The results of this study clearly showed that teams reacted rigidly to threat. They 
exhibited a restriction in information processing, a constriction in control, and a 
narrowed team perspective. These results support the threat-rigidity thesis (Staw et 
al., 1981), and replicate the findings of Kamphuis et al. (2009d). The only team 
behavior not affected by threat was coordinated information allocation. Team 
members under threat allocated role-specific information in the same way team 
members under normal conditions did. It is not clear why threat did not affect this 
behavior, particularly because previous studies employing similar measures (Ellis, 
2006; Kamphuis et al., 2009d) did report effects of threat.  
The results found for the effects of threat on control are particularly 
interesting. Previous research investigating control in teams under adverse 
circumstances did not always find evidence for a constriction in control (e.g., Brown 
& Miller, 2000; Gladstein & Reilly, 1985; Lanzetta, 1955), whereas other studies did 
(e.g., Argote et al., 1989; Foushee & Helmreich, 1988; Janis, 1954; Kamphuis et al., 
2009d; Klein, 1976). It has been proposed that these mixed findings could be 
explained by the presence (or absence) of formal leadership in a team (Kamphuis et 
al., 2009d). Kamphuis et al. (2009d) suggested that when a team has a formal 
leader, who has been assigned the final responsibility for the team’s performance, a 
constriction in control will be far more likely to emerge under threat than when no 
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formal leader is present from the start. Because in the present study, teams had a 
formal leader, the results of this study provide support for this proposition. However, 
we could not formally test it. Future research should examine this subject more 
closely by systematically varying presence and absence of formal leadership in 
teams under threat (cf. Kamphuis et al., 2009d). 
Team Performance 
A major purpose of this study was to examine how rigidity in team processes affects 
team performance during a complex task. The results of the present study showed 
that threat negatively affected team performance. To be able to trace the pathways 
by which threat exerted its harmful effects, we employed a multiple-mediation 
model. The results of our multiple mediation analysis showed that the total set of 
processes measured, mediated the effect of threat on team performance, as 
expected. Examination of the specific indirect effects showed that threat negatively 
affected team performance through increasing lack of overview, and reducing 
participative leadership, deliberation, and supporting behavior in teams. Thus, the 
rigidity caused by threat proved to be maladaptive for team performance on the task 
used in this study. This task was characterized by high complexity due to its 
dynamic nature, the information load, the number of subtasks, the unfamiliarity with 
the task, the task uncertainty, and the number of possible solutions (cf. Brown & 
Miller, 2000). Therefore, these findings provide empirical support for the notion that 
rigidity in reactions is maladaptive in dynamic and complex environments (Staw et 
al., 1981; Weick, 1979). 
However, not all rigidity-effects had a negative impact on team performance. 
An unexpected, but interesting result was that threat had a positive effect on team 
performance through leadership control. The direct effects show that threat caused 
team leaders to become more controlling, as expected, but that this in turn 
unexpectedly improved team performance. Hence, it seems that amongst all 
negative effects, threat also exerted positive effects on team performance, by 
causing team leaders to exert more control over the way their team members 
performed their tasks. As can be seen in Figure 4.1, the positive direct effect of 
leadership control on team performance is nearly as large as the positive direct 
effect of participative leadership on team performance. So given this set of 
processes, the effects of both, participative and controlling leadership contribute 
positively to the performance of teams.  
The finding that threat may have positive effects on team performance as 
well, through leadership control, is not entirely implausible. After all, in certain 
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situations, there can be merit in a leader who tells you clearly what to do, and how 
to do it. Under threat, when team members may have lost overview themselves, and 
rely on their leader for directions and decisions (e.g., Foushee & Helmreich, 1988; 
Hamblin, 1958; Janis, 1954), a strong, directive leader could be very effective.  
However, this result should be interpreted with caution. As can be seen in 
Table 4.1, the zero-order correlation of leadership control and team performance is 
non-significant. Only when all other process variables are held constant, the 
relationship between leadership control and team performance becomes positive. 
Therefore, it is questionable whether in practice this relationship is meaningful. It is 
very well imaginable that parts of the relationship between leadership control and 
the other process variables are causal in nature. In other words, when leaders 
become more controlling, they might, for example, cause a reduction in the amount 
of deliberation within the team, which in turn has a negative effect on team 
performance. Similar effects might surface for the other variables. Thus, although 
the unique effect of leadership control may be positive, employing this kind of 
leadership might cause changes in other processes that negatively affect team 
performance, undoing the positive effects of leadership control and rendering its 
total effect insignificant.  
Based on the present study, we cannot draw definite conclusions about the 
role of a directive leadership style in the relationship between threat and team 
performance. Future research should examine this issue more closely by 
manipulating different leadership styles, and investigating their interactive effects 
with threat on team performance. 
Two of the processes measured, peripheral attention and coordinated 
allocation, did not contribute uniquely to the overall mediation model. As was 
discussed above, coordinated allocation was not affected by threat in the present 
study and as a result could not transmit the effect of threat to team performance. 
Peripheral attention, in turn, had no relationship with team performance, as a result 
of which the effects of threat on peripheral attention were not passed on to team 
performance. 
Apart from that, the difference between the total effect and the direct effect of 
threat shows that the set of mediators we chose almost fully mediated the negative 
effect of threat on team performance. The processes proposed by the threat-rigidity 
thesis supplemented with team perspective processes thus seem to capture the full 
array of negative threat effects. This finding has practical relevance, because it 
shows which processes should be targeted to effectively prevent threat from 




The results of this study have implications for all organizations that make use of 
teams to perform complex tasks. At some point, most of these teams will be 
confronted with threat, whether it be physical (e.g., plane-crash), material (e.g., 
financial loss), or social (e.g., negative evaluation) in nature. Although at this time 
no definite answer exists as to how to mitigate the effects of threat on teams, 
organizations could use the results of this study in different ways to prepare their 
teams. Firstly, merely creating awareness of the specific effects of threat on teams 
may contribute to their performance in threatening situations. If team members 
maintain awareness of their reactions during exposure to threat, they may be able to 
adjust their behavior and prevent threat from influencing team performance through 
the rigidity reactions. Creating knowledge of typical reactions to stressors is an 
important component of many effective individual stress training programs (e.g., 
Stress Exposure Training, Johnston & Cannon-Bowers, 1996) and might be 
beneficial in a team context as well. 
Secondly, each of the affected processes could be used as leverage points to 
prevent the effects of threat from occurring. Pertaining to information processing, 
teams could, for example, be trained to keep a broad focus under all circumstances, 
or they could be provided with information systems that support operators to divide 
their attention in an optimal way. It might even be feasible to use software agents 
that dynamically take over those tasks team members neglect (Bosse, Van 
Doesburg, Van Maanen, & Treur, 2007). Such interventions could prevent threat 
from affecting team performance through restricting the team’s information 
processing. Similarly, teams could be trained to maintain a broad team perspective 
under all circumstances, to prevent threat from causing team members to develop 
an individualistic focus, resulting in worse team performance. Cross-training, a 
strategy in which team members are trained in the tasks and duties of their fellow 
team members (Volpe, Cannon-Bowers, Salas, & Spector, 1996), has been 
suggested as a potentially promising way of realizing this (e.g., Ellis, 2006; Marks, 
Sabella, Burke, & Zaccaro, 2002). Methods aimed at facilitating the development of 
transactive memory (i.e., knowledge of who knows what) may also contribute to the 
maintenance of team perspective under threat (e.g., Ellis, 2006). Finally, the results 
concerning the mediating role of leadership under threat warrant caution. Clearly, 
threat negatively affected team performance through causing a reduction in 
participative leadership and the amount of group deliberation. This would suggest 
that leaders should be trained to maintain a leadership style that actively 
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encourages team members to participate in decision making processes. However, 
at the same time, the results of the present study indicate that leadership control 
(i.e., instructing team members what to do, and how to do it) positively affected 
team performance under threat. Although it might be possible for leaders to be both, 
participative and controlling, during the same task, more research is needed to 
examine how leaders can contribute to effectiveness in a threat situation.  
Limitations and Directions for Future Research 
The findings of the present study were obtained in an experimental setting, with an 
artificial task environment. Given the nature of our research question, we believe 
that the choice for such a context was appropriate (cf. Driskell & Salas, 1992). 
Moreover, the task environment used ensured a high degree of realism. However, 
future research should investigate whether the findings of this study can be 
replicated in more natural settings. Furthermore, this study used ad hoc teams 
which were assembled for the sole purpose of participating in the experiment. As 
such, these teams bore close resemblance to action teams, whose members 
occupy distinct areas of expertise and have been brought together for a short period 
of time, often to respond to emergency situations. Generalizing the findings of this 
study directly to teams with a more permanent nature and less within-team 
specialization, might prove problematic. One could, for example, imagine that team 
members in more permanent teams are at smaller risk of loosing their team 
perspective than team members in ad hoc teams. The extent to which threat affects 
more permanent teams in similar ways should be the subject of future investigation. 
Finally, it is recommended that future research investigate methods to strengthen 
the processes found to be vulnerable to transmit the negative effects of threat on 
team performance. Researchers have begun to investigate training methods to 
enhance team performance in stressful environments (e.g., Serfaty, Entin, & 
Johnston, 1998; Cannon-Bowers, Salas, Blickensderfer, & Bowers, 1998). The 
results of the present study can help refine these training methods to exactly target 
the relevant processes.  
Conclusion 
The results of this study provide a comprehensive model of the effects of threat on 
team performance. By simultaneously investigating the effects of threat on 
information processing, exercise of control, and team perspective we were able to 
capture the central mediating processes in the relationship between threat and team 
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performance. As such, this study enhances our understanding of the effects of 
threat on teams.  
Returning to our example in the introduction, where you were the pilot of a 
large commercial airliner about to go down, we may now predict your reactions. At 
the moment the warning signals start flashing and sounding, your attention is likely 
to be drawn to these signals and away from other indicators and meters. With all 
these signals going off, you will feel like you can not maintain an overview of the 
situation. You will start giving your co-pilot orders to check out some potential 
causes, without asking his or her opinion about the problem. Both of you will 
become completely absorbed by your own ideas about what causes the problems, 
and you will fail to discuss your views with each other. As a result, when the cause 
of these problems can only be found by combining alarm signal information with 
less central information, or by comparing your information with that of your co-pilot, 
you will be highly unlikely to solve the problems. Thus it seems safe to say that your 
reactions, rigid as they would be, would not contribute to your chances of survival in 
a complex team situation. It is our hope, however, that the results of the present 









The Mitigating Effects of Transactive 
Memory Training on Teams under Threat1 
 
 
Teams are dangerously vulnerable to the effects of threat. Little is known 
about how to protect them. In this study, a transactive memory training 
intervention (TM-training), which aimed to mitigate the effects of threat on 
teams, was designed and tested in an experiment with 58 three-person 
teams performing a complex task. TM-training combined principles of cross-
training with ideas of transactive memory theory. The study employed a 2 
(threat: high vs. low) × 2 (TM-training: training vs. no training) factorial design. 
Team processes were measured by automated behavior recordings and 
questionnaires. Results showed that TM-training enhanced transactive 
memory, teamwork processes, and team performance. Moreover, significant 
interactive effects showed that TM-training had the ability to protect the 
performance of teams under threat by reducing the negative effects of threat. 
 
Despite their widespread use in dangerous and complex circumstances, teams 
frequently appear to be vulnerable to the effects of threat. Many tragedies in 
                                                 
1 This chapter is based on Kamphuis, Gaillard, & Vogelaar (2009a). The data were collected during the 
same study as reported in Chapter 4. In this chapter, however, we focus on a different set of measures 
and describe the full 2 (threat: high vs. low) × 2 (training vs. no training) factorial design. 
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aviation, the military, emergency medicine, and other safety critical industries have 
been attributed to teams giving way under pressure (e.g., Cannon-Bowers & Salas, 
1998b; Flin, Slaven, & Stewart, 1996; Helmreich & Schaefer, 1994; Kanki, 1996). 
Indeed, a number of studies have confirmed that threat and stress negatively affect 
team performance (e.g., Cannon-Bowers & Salas, 1998b; Driskell, Salas, & 
Johnston, 1999; Ellis, 2006).  
Threat not only affects individual task work in teams, but also undermines 
team processes and team cognition. Under threat, team members are in danger of 
losing their sense of being part of a team (Driskell, et al., 1999). This may negatively 
affect a team’s transactive memory system (TMS), which combines the knowledge 
possessed by individual team members with a shared awareness of who knows 
what (Wegner, 1995). This negative effect of threat on TMSs may result in inferior 
team performance (Ellis, 2006).  
Although our understanding of the processes through which threat negatively 
affects team performance has developed over the last years, our knowledge of how 
to mitigate these effects is still in its infancy. Organizations could greatly benefit 
from interventions that would help reduce the negative effects of threat on teams. 
Therefore, the purpose of the present study was to develop and test an intervention 
aimed at reducing these negative effects. We thereby built on the knowledge that 
has been developed regarding the effects of threat on team processes and 
investigated the effects of an intervention designed to reinforce the processes that 
are negatively affected by threat. Specifically, we designed a brief training method, 
which combined principles of cross-training (Volpe, Cannon-Bowers, Salas, & 
Spector, 1996) with ideas of transactive memory theory (Wegner, 1987, 1995), and 
aimed to enhance transactive memory in teams. We investigated this ‘transactive 
memory training’ (TM-training) as a potential moderator of the relationship between 
threat and team performance. We conducted an experiment to examine the effects 
of TM-training on team performance under threat and expected the training to have 
a positive effect on team performance through its effects on transactive memory, 
performance monitoring, and supporting behavior. We expected this effect to be 




Theory and Hypotheses 
The Effects of Threat on Teams 
Threat can be defined as a possible impending event perceived by a person or 
group of persons as potentially causing material or immaterial loss to, or the 
obstruction of goals of that person or group of persons (cf. Argote, Turner, & 
Fichman, 1989; Lazarus, 1966; Staw, Sandelands, & Dutton, 1981; Turner & 
Horvitz, 2001). According to the transactional theory of stress (e.g., Lazarus, 1966; 
Lazarus & Folkman, 1984), threat is one of the major determinants of stress. The 
most comprehensive theory addressing the effects of threat on performance is the 
threat-rigidity thesis (Staw et al., 1981). The threat-rigidity thesis states that there is 
a general tendency for individuals, groups, and organizations to behave rigidly in 
threatening situations. Staw et al. (1981) distinguish two categories of effects. First, 
threat may cause a restriction in information processing. This may manifest itself in 
a narrowed field of attention, a reduction in the number of alternatives considered, 
and reliance upon internal hypotheses and prior expectations. Second, under threat, 
there may be a constriction in control, demonstrated by power and influence 
becoming concentrated in higher levels of a hierarchy. Together these effects in 
information and control processes cause a system’s behavior to become less 
diverse and flexible. In changing, ambiguous, and unpredictable environments, this 
reaction is likely to be maladaptive, because in these environments flexibility, rather 
than rigidity, is necessary to survive (Staw et al., 1981; Weick, 1979).  
The limited research that has investigated team performance under threat 
has generally supported the propositions of the threat-rigidity thesis (e.g., Argote et 
al., 1989; Gladstein & Reilly, 1985). More recent research has highlighted that a 
narrowing of attention under threat does not merely affect individual task 
performance in teams, but also leads team members to shift from a broader, team 
perspective to a more narrow, individualistic focus (Driskell et al., 1999; Ellis 2006). 
This attentional shift may lead to impaired team performance because of the 
interdependent nature of team tasks. Team tasks after all do not only require 
taskwork processes, defined as a team’s interactions with tasks, tools, machines, 
and systems (Bowers, Braun, & Morgan, 1997), but also teamwork processes 
(McIntyre & Salas, 1995). Teamwork refers to those behaviors, cognitions, and 
emotions that are needed to function as a team (e.g., Goodwin, Burke, Wildman, & 
Salas, 2009; Marks, Mathieu, & Zaccaro, 2001), and includes processes such as 
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coordination, communication, performance monitoring, and supporting behavior 
(e.g., McIntyre & Salas, 1995). 
Driskell et al. (1999) examined to what extent a narrowing of attention under 
stress affected teamwork processes. They found that stress indeed resulted in a 
narrowing of team perspective as measured by the extent to which members felt like 
a team and were oriented at team versus individual activities during the task. This 
shift of attention from the team to the self led to impaired team performance. Ellis 
(2006) reasoned that this shift in attention might negatively affect TMSs and team 
mental models. A TMS is a set of distributed, individual memory systems for 
encoding, storing, and retrieving information that combines the knowledge 
possessed by particular members with a shared awareness of who knows what 
(Wegner, 1995). Team mental models are defined as emergent cognitive states, 
containing a shared understanding and mental representation of knowledge 
concerning key elements of the task, the task environment, and the other team 
members (Cannon-Bowers, Salas, & Converse, 1993; Klimoski & Mohammed, 
1994). Ellis did indeed find that the narrowing of the team member’s attention under 
threat negatively affected TMSs and team mental models, which mediated the 
relationship between threat and team performance.  
In sum, in line with the propositions of the threat-rigidity thesis, past research 
has shown that threat affects information processing and exercise of control in 
teams. Threat not only affects individual task work processes, but also causes team 
members to shift their attention away from the team, to the self. This shift in 
attention leads to a deterioration of teamwork processes, eventually resulting in 
poorer team performance. The central question is how to prevent these threat 
effects from occurring. Several researchers have suggested that one potentially 
promising way of realizing this is through team training, particularly cross-training 
(Ellis, 2006; McCann, Baranski, Thompson, & Pigeau, 2000; Volpe et al., 1996). 
Cross-Training 
Cross-training has been defined as “a strategy in which each team member is 
trained on the tasks, duties, and responsibilities of his or her fellow team members” 
(Volpe et al., 1996, p. 87). The goal of cross-training is to enhance team members’ 
interpositional knowledge: information that each team member holds regarding the 
roles, responsibilities, and appropriate task behaviors of their teammates (e.g., 
Marks, Sabella, Burke, & Zaccaro, 2002; Volpe et al., 1996). This knowledge helps 
team members to understand the activities of their fellow team members and thus 
contributes to anticipation of their needs, improved communication, and increased 
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coordination (Blickensderfer, Cannon-Bowers, & Salas, 1998). Especially in highly 
interdependent teams, these effects of cross-training are expected to contribute 
significantly to team performance (e.g., Marks et al., 2002). 
Blickensderfer et al. (1998) specified three types of cross-training which differ 
with respect to the depth of the information provided and the method in which the 
information is taught. Positional clarification is the least in-depth form of cross-
training and is aimed at providing team members with general knowledge of each 
member’s roles and responsibilities through lecture or discussion methods. 
Positional modeling provides details beyond what is learned in positional 
clarification, because team members’ roles are not only discussed, but also 
observed. Finally, positional rotation provides team members with a working 
knowledge of each member’s specific tasks through active participation and first-
hand experience in each member’s role. 
Research has found positive effects of cross-training on various aspects of 
team functioning, including interpositional knowledge, communication, coordination, 
and team effectiveness (Cannon-Bowers, Salas, Blickensderfer, & Bowers, 1998; 
Volpe et al., 1996). Cannon-Bowers et al. (1998) found that cross-training interacted 
with workload, such that under high-workload conditions, teams having received 
cross-training exhibited significantly better team performance than teams that were 
not cross-trained, whereas under low-workload conditions, there was no difference 
between trained and untrained teams. In addition, McCann et al. (2000) showed that 
cross-trained teams withstood the negative effects of team member reconfiguration. 
Furthermore, Marks et al. (2002) showed in two studies that the three types of 
cross-training all enhanced the development of team-interaction mental model 
similarity among team members participating in a military computer simulation. 
These shared mental models in turn were positively associated with backup and 
coordination processes, which mediated the relationship between shared mental 
models and team performance.  
These results all support the use of cross-training as a strategy to enhance 
team performance in interdependent settings. Cross-training helps to develop 
interpositional knowledge and enhances team mental model similarity in that way. 
As such, cross-training might reduce the negative effects of threat: while threat 
leads team members to shift their attention away from the team and negatively 
affects team mental models, cross-training is likely to have the exact opposite effect. 
Thus, it seems sensible to cross-train teams that have to operate under threatening 
circumstances.  
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However, in some settings, it might not be feasible to cross-train team 
members to develop interchangeable expertise. Consider, for example, surgical 
teams. It is not very practical to try to train nurses in the tasks, duties and 
responsibilities of the surgeons. Moreover, in many settings, training each member 
in the roles of all other members may not be time-efficient (Marks et al., 2002). In 
fact, McCann et al. (2000) showed that although cross-training may lead to better 
team mental models, this may come at the expense of poorer individual task mental 
models, resulting in worse performance. Therefore, instead of entirely focusing on 
the development of shared mental models through cross-training, it might be more 
effective to accentuate the distribution of knowledge within the team and learn team 
members how they can access the knowledge of their team mates (cf. Gorman et 
al., 2007). 
Transactive Memory Theory 
In essence, the above argument pertains to the distinction between shared mental 
models and transactive memory. Both refer to cognitive structures that enable team 
members to adequately process information in a team context, but whereas shared 
mental models refer to knowledge structures held in common, transactive memory 
refers to knowledge of information distribution within a team and to how this 
distributed knowledge is combined (e.g., Ellis, 2006; Kozlowski & Ilgen, 2006). 
According to transactive memory theory (Wegner, 1987, 1995), team members 
divide the cognitive labor for their tasks, and rely on one another to be responsible 
for specific expertise. In this way, an individual member can develop highly specific 
expertise while still being able to use other team members’ knowledge. The whole 
team can only benefit from the specific expertise distributed across members of the 
collective, when each team member knows in general what others know in detail. 
This transactive memory can be used to distribute and retrieve information based on 
team members’ specific areas of expertise (Hinsz, Tindale, & Vollrath, 1997). 
Because of the distribution of specialized knowledge across team members, TMSs 
should be cognitively efficient. TMSs should reduce the cognitive load of team 
members, expand their pool of expertise, and reduce redundancy (Hollingshead, 
1998). In addition, TMSs should allow teams to plan their work more sensibly, 
assigning tasks to team members with the relevant area of expertise, and improve 
coordination, since team members are better able to anticipate each other’s 
behavior (e.g., Moreland, 1999). Findings of both field and laboratory research show 
that TMSs indeed enhance team performance (e.g., Ellis, 2006; Lewis 2003, 2004; 
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Liang, Moreland, & Argote, 1995; Moreland & Myaskovsky, 2000; Prichard & 
Ashleigh, 2007; Zhang, Hempel, Han, & Tjosvold, 2007). 
To sum up, transactive memory theory draws attention to the distribution of 
unique knowledge and expertise in teams, and to the mechanisms that are 
necessary to make use of that distributed knowledge. As such, it complements the 
focus on shared knowledge in team mental model research. Given that cross-
training team members to develop interchangeable expertise may not be very time-
efficient, may not always be feasible (e.g., Marks et al., 2002), and may come at the 
expense of individual task performance (McCann et al., 2000), a similar broadening 
of cross-training may be useful. Such training would not merely be aimed at 
enhancing shared knowledge in teams, but also at increasing knowledge of who 
knows what and developing strategies to utilize this distribution of knowledge in the 
best possible way. Particularly when considering ways of mitigating the detrimental 
effects of threat on teams, the focus on transactive memory could be effective, 
given that Ellis (2006) showed that threat not only affects team mental models, but 
also transactive memory and coordination processes in teams (cf. Liang et al., 
1995; Rulke & Rau, 2000). Mitigation strategies therefore should not mainly focus 
on creating similarity, overlapping knowledge, and interchangeable expertise, but 
rather aim to create awareness of who knows what and learn how to draw on this 
distributed expertise. Although at this moment knowledge concerning techniques to 
develop TMSs in teams is scarce, previous research does provide some 
suggestions.  
Early research on the development of TMSs in teams showed that training 
together as a team provides opportunities to learn about other members’ expertise 
and facilitates the development of TMSs (e.g., Liang et al., 1995). More recent 
research showed that training together as a team is not a necessary precondition for 
the development of a TMS. Merely providing individually trained team members with 
information about other team members’ skills also facilitated development of TMSs 
(Moreland & Myaskovsky, 2000). Other research supports the idea that early 
development of knowledge concerning who knows what is critical for subsequent 
TMS maturation (Lewis, 2004; Rulke & Rau, 2000). Furthermore, it has been 
suggested that accompanying this knowledge with strategic considerations about 
how to take advantage of the expertise of others could probably lead to even better 
TMSs (cf. Moreland & Myaskovsky, 2000). 
Previous research thus provides some useful initial notions that could be 
used in training interventions aimed at developing TMSs in teams. Creating 
knowledge of who knows what in an early stage may be essential, and combining 
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this knowledge with techniques that facilitate the employment of the distributed 
knowledge may be beneficial as well. These insights coincide with two of the three 
key processes of a TMS, namely directory updating and retrieval coordination 
(Wegner, 1995). Through directory updating, team members learn about each 
other’s areas of expertise and through retrieval coordination, team members plan 
how to retrieve information known to be within other team members’ areas of 
expertise. The third key process, information allocation, pertains to the allocation of 
new information to team members with the relevant area of expertise. A training 
intervention for the purpose of TMS development in teams thus should aim to 
facilitate the two processes of directory updating and retrieval coordination. The 
directory updating component of such a training intervention would correspond to 
low-intensity cross-training, whereas the coordinated retrieval component would 
augment the focus on sharedness with a focus on distribution and coordination. 
When these two components have been used to help a TMS emerge in an early 
phase of a project, it is expected that this TMS will improve teamwork processes, as 
it helps team members to better anticipate how other members will behave (Lewis, 
2004).  
Present Study 
In the present study we investigated the effects of an intervention designed to 
mitigate the negative effects of threat on team performance. Previous research 
suggested that cross-training might be a promising method to overcome these 
negative effects. Based on studies showing some potential shortcomings of cross-
training, and guided by research showing that threat not only negatively affects 
team mental models, but also transactive memory and coordination processes in 
teams (Driskell et al., 1999; Ellis 2006) we developed a training intervention aimed 
at developing TMSs in teams in order to resist the negative effects of threat. This 
transactive memory training (TM-training) was founded on the principles of cross-
training, but rather than entirely laying the emphasis on developing interpositional 
knowledge, this intervention highlighted the distribution of expertise within the team 
and addressed strategies to combine this expertise effectively. It combined the least 
in-depth form of cross-training, positional clarification (Blickensderfer et al., 1998), 
with a brief guided group discussion (cf. Moreland & Myaskovsky, 2000), which 
aimed to facilitate the distribution and communication of knowledge within the team.  
We expected that this TM-training intervention would enhance transactive 
memory and teamwork processes (performance monitoring and supporting 
behavior), which in turn would positively influence team effectiveness. Because 
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threat negatively affects the same cognitions and processes this intervention aimed 
to enhance, we expected an interaction with threat, such that the negative effects of 
threat would be smaller for teams receiving TM-training, than for teams not 
receiving TM-training. Specifically, this study addressed the following hypotheses:  
 
Hypothesis 1. Threat will negatively affect transactive memory, teamwork 
processes, and team performance. 
Hypothesis 2. Transactive memory training will positively affect transactive 
memory, teamwork processes, and team performance. 
Hypothesis 3. The negative effects of threat on transactive memory, 
teamwork processes, and team performance will be smaller for teams that 
received transactive memory training, than for teams that did not receive 
transactive memory training. 
Method 
Participants and Design 
Participants were 174 officer cadets of the Netherlands Defence Academy (31 
women and 143 men; mean age = 21.2 years) who were arrayed into 58 three-
person teams. In exchange for their participation, teams could win cash prizes 
depending upon the team’s performance (150 Euro for the best performing team 
within each cohort). We used a 2 (threat: high vs. low) × 2 (TM-training: training vs. 




Participants engaged in a complex planning and problem-solving scenario in the 
Planning Task for Teams (PLATT; Kamphuis, Essens, Houttuin, & Gaillard, 2009; 
Kamphuis & Houttuin, 2007). PLATT is a software platform for controlled 
experimental research on team performance in complex environments. It has been 
used in other studies investigating different aspects of team performance (e.g., 
Kamphuis, Gaillard, & Vogelaar, 2008; Van Bezooijen, Vogelaar, & Essens, 2009a, 
2009b; Langelaan & Keeris, 2008). It consists of a generic software architecture and 
research-specific scenarios. Participants playing a scenario are seated behind 
computers connected via a network. They receive scenario-messages via e-mail 
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and can search for additional information on web sites. Participants communicate 
with each other via e-mail and have access to a digital shared workspace in which 
they can work jointly on certain team tasks. All participants’ actions are 
automatically recorded in a log file. Based on this log file, different behavioral 
measures can be constructed. 
Scenario 
In the present study, teams engaged in a highly complex military evacuation 
scenario. In this scenario, teams have to develop a plan to extract a group of people 
from a hostile area to a safer place. They have to determine the fastest route and 
plan how they will employ their transportation, engineer, and infantry units, to realize 
the extraction. There are eighteen possible routes to use for the evacuation, ranging 
from very slow to very fast. Whether a route is fast not only depends on the length 
of the roads, but also on the condition of these roads, and whether there are enemy 
activities on these roads.  
During the scenario, in real-time, a large number of scenario-driven 
messages are sent to the three participants. These messages pertain to road 
conditions, enemy activities, delays due to different causes, the position of the units, 
personnel and materiel problems, weather conditions, unrelated events, et cetera. 
This information varies in relevance and is sent by many sources differing in 
reliability (e.g., headquarters, local civilians, the enemy). The scenario also controls 
changes in information on the websites participants can access. The events in the 
scenario are constructed in such a way that at different moments in time, different 
routes are optimal. Teams accordingly have to adjust plans and adapt to 
circumstances. The shared workspace in this scenario consists of a digital map of 
the evacuation area. This map can be used to integrate the most recent information, 
using symbols indicating, for example, enemy activities, locations of units, and road 
conditions. 
After 45 minutes, the scenario ends and teams have to deliver an evacuation 
plan using a standardized form. In this plan, they have to describe via which route 
they plan to extract the group of people and how they will employ their units. 
Roles 
Team members were randomly assigned to one of three roles: Operations, 
Logistics, or Intelligence. Each role had unique responsibilities, expertise, and tasks. 
In addition, each role received unique information (via e-mail or websites) during the 
scenario. Operations was the leader of the team and responsible for directing the 
activities of the other team members. Operations was the only team member who 
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could edit the shared map of the area in which the evacuation had to take place. 
Intelligence was responsible for all information concerning the safety of the roads, 
and had unique expertise concerning determining the reliability of the information 
sources in the scenario. Logistics was responsible for personnel and materiel, and 
the information concerning the condition of the roads. Logistics had unique 
expertise concerning calculating the duration of the various routes. The distribution 
of expertise and information created interdependence between team members. 
Only when all three team members combined their knowledge and information, they 
were able to deliver an optimal evacuation plan. 
Procedure 
Participants arrived at the location of the experiment in groups of three. The 
experimenter seated the participants according to the roles they had randomly been 
assigned to and explained that the purpose of the experiment was to gain a better 
understanding of team problem-solving and team decision-making processes. He 
further explained that they would perform a team task, in which an evacuation had 
to be planned. The experimenter then informed the participants which role they 
would occupy during the task, without going into any details. Due to their education 
as officer cadets, participants knew in general what kind of responsibilities and 
duties would be associated with these roles. They did not know, however, what 
specific responsibilities and duties in this task were associated with these roles.  
Instruction 
Following this, participants watched a 20-minute video instruction containing 
information about the team task. The information in this video was relevant for all 
roles in the task. After having watched this video, participants had the opportunity to 
ask the experimenter questions about these generic instructions. The experimenter 
answered these questions and then handed out three different packets containing 
role specific information to the participants, one packet for Operations, one for 
Intelligence, and one for Logistics. Participants studied the information concerning 
their own roles individually for 10 minutes, after which the experimenter announced 
the next phase of the experiment. After this instruction phase, each team member 
had general knowledge about the task and the task environment and specific 
knowledge of his or her own area of expertise and not of the areas of expertise of 
one of the other team members. 
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TM-training 
Participants in the TM-training condition watched an extended version of the same 
video instruction, which was about 4 minutes longer. In these four additional 
minutes, detailed information was given about the areas of expertise of the different 
roles in the team task. In addition, in the packets the experimenter handed out after 
the video instruction, besides role specific information concerning their own roles, a 
short description of the areas of expertise of the other team members was included 
as well. Participants in this condition were given 5 minutes to study this information. 
After this, the experimenter instructed team members in this condition to use an 
additional 5 minutes to discuss each other’s responsibilities, expertise, and tasks, 
and to determine who could process which information, and how information should 
be allocated and retrieved within the team. The experimenter guided this discussion, 
to make sure that all relevant aspects were addressed, and that no other topics 
were discussed. All in all, team members in the training condition had 10 minutes of 
preparation time after having watched the video instruction, just as team members 
in the no-training condition.  
This training intervention aimed to create awareness of the distribution of 
unique knowledge and expertise within the team. It combined the least in-depth 
form of cross-training, positional clarification (Blickensderfer et al., 1998), with a 
brief guided group discussion that aimed to facilitate the use of the distributed 
knowledge. These two components (the positional clarification and the group 
discussion) targeted the TMS-processes of directory updating and retrieval 
coordination (Wegner, 1995). Directory updating was jump-started through the 
positional clarification (and continued in the guided group discussion). Retrieval 
coordination could take place in the guided group discussion. The third TMS-
process, information allocation, was measured as a dependent behavioral variable 
during task execution, together with information retrieval. 
Threat manipulation 
After these instructions, the experimenter informed all participants that, prior to 
engaging in the team task, they had to perform a brief individual task, the Synwork 
task (Elsmore, 1994). Synwork requires participants to execute four different 
subtasks at the same time. Participants were told that performance on this individual 
task was a good predictor of performance on complex planning tasks like the one 
they were about to engage in. The experimenter further told them that their mean 
team score would be compared to the mean score of a civilian population that had 
been tested before, to estimate how well they could perform on the team task. After 
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this, all participants received instructions for the Synwork task, and subsequently 
performed this task for 2 minutes.  
At the end of the individual task, participants in the low threat condition 
received false positive feedback. The experimenter told them that they had 
performed well and had scored above the average of the civilian population. He 
further told them that he expected them to perform well on the team task as well, 
and reminded them of the prize of 150 Euro for the best performing team within 
each cohort.  
Participants in the high threat condition, on the other hand, received false 
negative feedback at the end of the individual task. The experimenter told them that 
they had performed rather poorly and that their score was below the average of the 
civilian population. He further told them that he expected them to have difficulty with 
the team task as well, and explained that both the researchers and their own 
commanders were particularly interested in teams that had difficulties with these 
kinds of tasks. Therefore, to gain better insight into what happens in ill-performing 
teams, their performance would be recorded using a video camera, which was set 
up prominently in front of the team, and webcams, which were fixed on top of the 
participants’ monitors. Moreover, the experimenter told them that they ran the risk of 
having to come back for an evaluation with their commanders and the researchers if 
their team would be one of the five lowest performing teams. Finally he told them 
that the videotape could be used as course material. 
Consistent with previous research, this manipulation aimed to create an 
evaluative situation with potentially negative consequences in case of poor 
performance (e.g., Blanchette, Richards, & Cross, 2007; Ellis, 2006; Turner, 
Pratkanis, Probasco, & Leve, 1992). When persons expect to perform poorly, such 
a situation is likely to be perceived as threatening (e.g., Thompson, 1981; 
Blascovich & Tomaka, 1996). Therefore, we manipulated the expectation of poor 
performance by giving negative feedback on an unrelated task said to be predictive 
of performance on the task of interest (cf. Mogg, Mathews, Bird, & Macgregor-
Morris, 1990). We deliberately chose not to provide false negative feedback on the 
task of interest because teams might have used this feedback as an indication that 
they had to alter their strategies. This would have been an unwanted effect, as it 
might have obscured the effects of threat.  
Task execution and conclusion 
Following the feedback on the individual task, the experimenter asked the 
participants to fill out a short electronic questionnaire (which constituted the 
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manipulation check for the threat manipulation), after which the scenario for the 
team task was started. Teams then performed the 45-minute military evacuation 
scenario. After this, participants were asked to respond to a final questionnaire (with 
dependent measures described below). After the experiment, all participants were 
fully debriefed about the true nature of the experiment, and offered the possibility to 
withdraw their data from the study. None of the participants withdrew their data. 
Measures 
Most of the variables of interest in this study were measured behaviorally (on the 
basis of the log files). In addition, two self-report measures were used. All 
measures, except the team performance measure, were collected at the individual 
level. Because the unit of analysis was the team level, and variance in team 
members’ behavior or reports was of no concern, individual scores were aggregated 
to the mean team score.  
Transactive memory 
In this study, we used both self-report and behavioral measures to assess 
transactive memory and transactive memory systems in teams. At the self-report 
level, we measured team members’ evaluation of their own and others’ knowledge 
concerning other members’ expertise with a transactive memory scale adapted from 
previous research (Kamphuis et al., 2008). Cronbach’s alpha for this scale reached 
.75. The formulation of the items of this scale was as follows: “During task 
performance, I was well informed about the possibilities of my team members”, 
“During task performance, my team members were well informed about my 
possibilities”, “I knew exactly which team member had what kind of information”, 
“The other team members knew exactly what kind of information I had”. Team 
members scored each item on a 7-point Likert-type scale ranging from 1 (strongly 
disagree) to 7 (strongly agree).  
In addition, we measured the transactive memory system by using a Dutch 
translation of Lewis’s (2003) 15-item scale measuring the three dimensions 
(specialization, credibility, and coordination) of TMSs. The original scale was 
modified according to the recommendation made by Lewis to make the 4 reverse-
worded items consistent with the other scale items (i.e., not reversed). Team 
members scored each item on a 7-point Likert-type scale ranging from 1 (strongly 
disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). The Cronbach’s alpha reliabilities for the 
specialization, credibility, and coordination subscales were .74, .62, and .86 
respectively. The data across the three subscales were aggregated to form a single 
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TMS measure (see Lewis, 2003; 2004). The Cronbach’s alpha for the entire scale 
reached .84. 
At the behavioral level, a TMS is indicated by directory updating, retrieval 
coordination, and information allocation (Wegner, 1995). As described above, we let 
teams in the TM-training condition engage in the processes of directory updating 
and retrieval coordination before task execution to stimulate the development of a 
TMS. During task execution, we measured information allocation and information 
retrieval as behavioral indicators of a TMS (cf. Ellis, 2006). Differentiated 
information allocation and differentiated information retrieval occurred when team 
members respectively sent role-specific information (i.e., information that could only 
be adequately dealt with by one specific team member) to, or asked role-specific 
information from, the teammate with the relevant area of expertise. To construct this 
measure, two judges coded all e-mail messages in the log files. They grouped every 
e-mail message into one of seven categories of a collectively exhaustive and 
mutually exclusive categorization (Kamphuis et al., 2009c). The judges coded 10 
(17.2%) of the 58 teams together. The interrater reliability for these 10 teams was 
.95 (Cohen’s Kappa). Because this indicates almost perfect agreement, the 
remaining 48 teams were coded by just one of the judges. One of the categories 
pertained to the allocation of role-specific information, another to the retrieval of this 
information. The measures reported here consist of the percentage of e-mails in 
these categories that were sent to the team member with the relevant area of 
expertise, instead of to the other team member or to both team members at the 
same time (which would be inefficient and could lead to errors, as the other team 
member would not have the expertise to deal with this information correctly, or 
answer the question). An example of an e-mail message in the category ‘allocation 
of role-specific information’ would be: “I received a report from local civilians of 
sniper shootings between Iskra and Golesh”. When a team member would send this 
information to Intelligence, in this case the team member with the relevant area of 
expertise (safety), that would be an example of differentiated information allocation. 
An example of an e-mail message in the category ‘retrieval of role-specific 
information’ would be: “How long does it take to travel from Iskra to Golesh?”. When 
this question would be posed to Logistics, in this case the team member with the 
relevant area of expertise (calculating the duration of the various routes), that would 
be an example of differentiated information retrieval. 
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Teamwork processes 
We measured two important teamwork processes, relevant in the present task: 
performance monitoring and supporting behavior. To measure the degree to which 
teams engaged in performance monitoring, we investigated their communication. As 
described above, all e-mail messages were coded. One of the categories pertained 
to performance monitoring, which consisted of team members keeping track of each 
other’s work to ensure that everything is done the way it should be (e.g., McIntyre & 
Salas, 1995). The measure for performance monitoring consisted of the percentage 
of e-mail messages in this category out of the total number of e-mails team 
members sent to each other. An example of an e-mail message in this category 
would be: “Operations, I just sent you information about rebels between Iskra and 
Golesh, but I do not see them yet on the map. Could you put them on the map, 
please?”. 
Supporting behavior consisted of the percentage of times participants 
forwarded ‘wrongly delivered’ e-mail messages to the team member with the 
relevant area of expertise. Normally, team members only received scenario e-mail 
messages that were meant for them, and not for one of their teammates. But 
sometimes, information meant for one role, was deliberately sent to a team member 
with another role, to investigate how this team member would handle this 
information. We considered sending this information to the teammate with the 
relevant area of expertise to be an act of supporting behavior. On the basis of the 
log files, we calculated the percentage of these messages that was sent to the 
teammate with the relevant area of expertise, out of the total number of ‘wrongly 
delivered’ e-mail messages.  
Team performance 
Teams received a single performance score, ranging from 0 (very poor) to 10 
(excellent), for their performance. This score consisted of a score for the quality of 
the route they had chosen minus the total number of errors the team had made in 
their evacuation plan. The score for the quality of the route ranged from 5 (slowest 
routes) to 10 (fastest routes). Errors could be made in the way teams planned to 
deploy their infantry, engineer, and transportation units (e.g., no deployment of a 
unit whereas it should have been deployed, deployment on the wrong part of a 
route, deployment from a wrong starting point, etc.), and in calculating the travel 
times for the roads they planned to use. The scenario was constructed in such a 
way that in each of the eighteen routes, teams could make a maximum of five 




Prior to data analysis, seven teams had to be removed from the data set. Four 
teams had to be removed, because one of their members had indicated to have 
dyslexia. Because all information and communication during task performance was 
textual, dyslexia would have large effects on team processes and team 
performance. In addition, two teams had to be removed because of technical 
problems. Finally, one team in the high threat condition had to be removed, because 




To examine the effects of the threat manipulation, participants first completed two 
items that measured participants’ appraisal of the situation, immediately after the 
feedback on the individual task and just before engaging in the team task. These 
items did not explicitly ask participants how threatened they felt, because that would 
have hinted them about the true nature of the experiment, but instead indirectly 
measured how participants appraised the situation. The first item (“How important is 
it for you to perform well on this task?”) measured on a scale ranging from 1 (not 
important at all) to 7 (very important) the extent to which participants judged that 
something was at stake, because having a stake in the outcome is a necessary 
condition for threat (cf. primary appraisal, e.g., Folkman & Lazarus, 1985; Lazarus & 
Folkman, 1984). The second item (“How well, do you think, are you going to perform 
as a team on this task?”) measured on a scale ranging from 1 (very poorly) to 7 
(very well) to what extent participants anticipated to be able to deal with this 
situation, because believing to have power to control the outcome of an encounter 
involving potential harm or loss, diminishes the degree of threat (cf. secondary 
appraisal, e.g., Folkman & Lazarus, 1985; Lazarus & Folkman, 1984). Both 
appraisal-items were combined to yield a single index of threat appraisal. This index 
was computed as a ratio of the first to the second item and reflected the extent to 
which a situation is appraised as potentially causing the obstruction of goals (i.e., as 
threatening). This method of measuring appraisal was adapted from research on 
challenge and threat (Blascovich & Tomaka, 1996; Tomaka, Blascovich, Kibler, & 
Ernst, 1997) and is consistent with the transactional theory of stress (Lazarus & 
Folkman, 1984). 
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An independent samples t test was performed comparing the mean threat 
appraisal ratios in high and low threat conditions. Results indicated that the mean 
threat appraisal ratio was larger in the high threat condition (M = 1.11, SD = 0.26) – 
indicating higher stakes than coping ability – than in the low threat condition, M = 
0.99, SD = 0.20; t(151) = 3.26, p < .01, Cohen’s d = 0.53. This indicates that 
instructions in the high threat condition caused participants to appraise the situation 
as more threatening than in the low threat condition. 
Threat emotions and state anxiety 
After task performance, participants completed the Folkman and Lazarus (1985) 
threat emotions scale (three items, Cronbach’s alpha = .72). They indicated on a 
scale ranging from 1 (not at all) to 7 (a great deal) to what extent they felt worried, 
fearful, and anxious. Results from an independent samples t test comparing the 
mean threat score for the high and low threat condition indicated that participants in 
the high threat condition reported having felt stronger threat emotions (M = 2.44, SD 
= 0.92) than participants in the low threat condition (M = 2.01, SD = 0.83), t(151) = 
3.04, p < .01, Cohen’s d = 0.49. In addition, participants completed the six-item 
short-form of the state scale of the Spielberger State-Trait Anxiety Inventory 
(Marteau & Bekker, 1992). They indicated on a scale ranging from 1 (not at all) to 7 
(a great deal) to what extent they had felt anxiety emotions during task 
performance. Cronbach’s alpha reached .79 in this study. Results from an 
independent samples t test comparing the mean anxiety score for the high and low 
threat condition indicated that participants in the high threat condition reported 
having felt stronger anxiety emotions (M = 3.37, SD = 0.87) than participants in the 
low threat condition (M = 2.79, SD = 0.85), t(151) = 4.12, p < .01, Cohen’s d = 0.67. 
These manipulation checks indicate that the threat manipulation was successful.  
Test of Hypotheses 
Our hypotheses predicted that threat would negatively (H1) and transactive memory 
would positively (H2) affect transactive memory, teamwork processes, and team 
performance. In addition, we expected that the negative effects of threat would be 
smaller for teams that received TM-training (H3). A two-way between-groups 
multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) was conducted to evaluate the effects 
of threat and TM-training. The between-groups factors were threat, with two levels 
(high vs. low) and TM-training (training vs. no training). Table 5.1 presents means, 





Descriptive Statistics and Intercorrelations at the Team Level of Analysis (N = 51) 
Variable M SD  1 2  3 4 5  6 7
1. Transactive memory  4.71 0.78 –    
2. TMS 5.57 0.45 .59** –    
3. Differentiated allocation 62.40 33.19 .53** .25 –  
4. Differentiated retrieval 73.53 31.28 .42** .16 .45** –   
5. Performance monitoring 4.41 3.12 .27 .02 .15 .42** – 
6. Supporting behavior 31.37 25.42 .48** .10 .49** .46** .39** –   
7. Team performance 4.66 1.81 .44** .32* .29* .35* .58** .47** –
*p < .05. **p < .01. 
 
Significant multivariate effects emerged for the threat manipulation (Wilks’ Λ = .52, 
F(7, 41) = 5.41, p < .01, partial η2 = .48), the TM-training intervention (Wilks’ Λ = .23, 
F(7, 41) = 19.85, p < .01, partial η2 = .77), and their interaction (Wilks’ Λ = .62, F(7, 
41) = 3.55, p < .01, partial η2 = .38). The analysis shows that, overall, threat and 
TM-training had effects on the dependent measures, and that the effects of threat 
differed depending on whether teams received TM-training or not. Univariate follow-
up two-way analyses of variance (ANOVAs) with threat and training as the 
independent variables were used to investigate the effects for the separate 
dependent measures (see Table 5.2 for cell means and significant relations for each 
dependent measure). 
Transactive memory 
Results of the follow-up ANOVA on transactive memory revealed a significant main 
effect of threat (F(1, 47) = 12.81, p < .01, η2 = .14), indicating that teams under high 
threat reported having worse transactive memory than teams under low threat. The 
main effect of TM-training was also significant (F(1, 47) = 27.60, p < .01, η2 = .30), 
indicating that teams that received TM-training reported having better transactive 
memory than teams that received no training. The effects were qualified by a 
significant threat × TM-training interaction (F(1, 47) = 4.44, p = .04, η2 = .05; see 
Figure 5.1). Simple slopes analyses revealed that only when teams did not receive 
TM-training, threat negatively affected transactive memory (F(1, 23) = 12.23, p < 
.01, η2 = .35). In contrast, when teams did receive TM-training, threat had no effect 
on transactive memory (F(1, 24) = 1.54, p = .22). These results provide support for 
all three hypotheses. 
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Table 5.2 
Mean Scores, Standard Deviations, and Significant Effects 
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Note. a = main effect of Threat; b = main effect of TM-training; c = Threat × TM-training interaction. 
*p < .05. **p < .01. 
 
Results of the follow-up ANOVA on teams’ transactive memory systems revealed a 
significant main effect of threat (F(1, 47) = 16.74, p < .01, η2 = .26), indicating that 
teams under high threat reported having less well developed TMSs than teams 
under low threat. There was no main effect of TM-training (F(1, 47) = 0.12, p = .73), 
and no interaction effect (F(1, 47) = 0.10, p = .75).2 These results provide support 
for Hypothesis 1, but not for Hypotheses 2 and 3. 
                                                 
2 A series of additional two-way ANOVAs with threat and training as the independent variables was 
conducted to explore the results for the three separate subscales: specialization, credibility, and 
coordination. Results of the ANOVA on the specialization subscale revealed a significant main effect of 
threat (F(1, 47) = 15.16, p < .01, η2 = .24), indicating that teams under high threat reported less 
specialization (M = 5.65, SD = 0.42) than teams under low threat (M = 6.10, SD = 0.42). The main effect of 
TM-training was also significant (F(1, 47) = 4.99, p = .03, η2 = .10), indicating that teams that received TM-
training reported more specialization (M = 6.00, SD = 0.44) than teams that received no training (M = 5.74, 
SD = 0.47). There was no interaction effect (F(1, 47) = 0.14, p = .71). Results of the ANOVA on the 
credibility subscale revealed no significant effects (main effect of threat: F(1, 47) = 0.95, p = .34; main 
effect of TM-training: F(1, 47) = 1.81, p = .19; interaction effect: F(1, 47) = 2.91, p = .10). Results of the 
ANOVA on coordination revealed a significant main effect of threat (F(1, 47) = 17.15, p < .01, η2 = .27), 



































The Interactive Effects of Threat and Training on Transactive Memory 
 
Results of the follow-up ANOVA on differentiated information allocation 
revealed no main effect of threat (F(1, 47) = 0.30, p = .59). The main effect of TM-
training did reach significance (F(1, 47) = 39.30, p < .01, η2 = .45) indicating that 
team members that received TM-training allocated a higher percentage of role-
specific information to teammates with the relevant area of expertise than team 
members that received no training. There was no interaction effect (F(1, 47) = 0.47, 
p = .50). These results provide support for Hypothesis 2, but not for Hypotheses 1 
and 3.  
Results of the follow-up ANOVA on differentiated information retrieval 
revealed a significant main effect of threat (F(1, 47) = 5.42, p = .02, η2 = .06), 
indicating that team members under high threat retrieved a higher percentage of 
role-specific information from teammates with the relevant area of expertise than 
team members under low threat. The main effect of TM-training was also significant 
(F(1, 47) = 32.03, p < .01, η2 = .36), indicating that team members that received TM-
training retrieved a higher percentage of role-specific information from teammates 
with the relevant area of expertise than team members that received no training.
                                                                                                                       
low threat (M = 5.24, SD = 0.63). There was no main effect of TM-training (F(1, 47) = 0.00, p = .95), and 
no interaction effect (F(1, 47) = 0.04, p = .85). 





































The Interactive Effects of Threat and Training on Differentiated Information Retrieval 
 
The effects were qualified by a significant threat × TM-training interaction (F(1, 47) = 
4.69, p = .04, η2 = .05; see Figure 5.2). Simple slopes analyses revealed that only 
when teams did not receive TM-training, threat negatively affected differentiated 
information retrieval (F(1, 23) = 6.41, p = .02, η2 = .22). In contrast, when teams did 
receive TM-training, threat had no effect on differentiated information retrieval (F(1, 
24) = 0.03, p = .87). These results provide support for all three hypotheses. 
Teamwork processes 
Results of the follow-up ANOVA on performance monitoring revealed no main effect 
of threat (F(1, 47) = 0.23, p = .63). The main effect of TM-training did reach 
significance (F(1, 47) = 10.14, p < .01, η2 = .16), indicating that teams that received 
TM-training monitored each other’s performance more than teams that received no 
training. This effect was qualified by a significant threat × TM-training interaction 
(F(1, 47) = 5.94, p = .02, η2 = .09; see Figure 5.3). Simple slopes analyses revealed 
that only when teams did not receive TM-training, threat negatively affected 
performance monitoring (F(1, 23) = 5.14, p = .03, η2 = .18). In contrast, when teams 
did receive TM-training, threat had no effect on performance monitoring (F(1, 24) = 
1.65, p = .21). These results provide support for Hypotheses 2 and 3. Hypothesis 1 


































Figure 5.3  
The Interactive Effects of Threat and Training on Performance Monitoring 
 
engaged in more performance monitoring under high threat (although this effect did 
not reach significance), as a result of which there was no main effect of threat. 
Results of the follow-up ANOVA on supporting behavior revealed a significant 
main effect of threat (F(1, 47) = 5.39, p = .03, η2 = .05), indicating that teams under 
high threat showed less supporting behavior than teams under low threat. The main 
effect of TM-training was also significant (F(1, 47) = 48.54, p < .01, η2 = .47), 
indicating that teams that received TM-training showed more supporting behavior 
than teams that received no training. There was no interaction effect (F(1, 47) = 
1.35, p = .25). These results provide support for Hypotheses 1 and 2, but not for 
Hypothesis 3. 
Team performance 
Results of the follow-up ANOVA on supporting behavior revealed a significant main 
effect of threat (F(1, 47) = 6.22, p = .02, η2 = .11), indicating that teams under high 
threat performed worse than teams under low threat. The main effect of TM-training 
was also significant (F(1, 47) = 4.38, p = .04, η2 = .08), indicating that teams that 
received TM-training performed better that teams that received no training. There 
was no interaction effect (F(1, 47) = 0.64, p = .43). These results provide support for 
Hypotheses 1 and 2, but not for Hypothesis 3. 
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Discussion 
The purpose of this study was to investigate transactive memory training as an 
intervention to reduce the negative effects of threat on teams. TM-training sought to 
enhance team members’ transactive memory by combining aspects of cross-
training with key processes of transactive memory systems. Prior to performing a 
complex planning and problem-solving task, team members either received TM-
training or standard instructions. Threat was manipulated by creating an evaluative 
situation with potentially negative consequences, and expected to negatively affect 
transactive memory, teamwork processes and team performance. We expected that 
TM-training would positively affect these variables, especially in teams under threat. 
Overall, our results supported these hypotheses, although the expected interaction 
was found only for some of the measures. We will discuss the findings for each of 
the hypotheses below. 
Threat and Team Performance 
The results of this study showed that threat negatively affected transactive memory, 
teamwork processes, and team performance. Teams under threat reported having 
worse transactive memories and less well developed TMSs, showed less 
performance monitoring and supporting behavior, and performed worse than teams 
under normal conditions.  
These results are in line with the proposition of the threat-rigidity thesis that 
groups restrict their information processing under threat (Staw et al., 1981). These 
findings also support more recent research showing that this restriction in 
information processing may cause team members to adopt an individualistic instead 
of a team focus (Driskell et al., 1999), and may result in less effective TMSs (Ellis 
2006). In addition, the results of the present study extend our knowledge by 
showing that threat affects two key teamwork processes as well: performance 
monitoring and supporting behavior. The only team behavior not affected by threat 
was information allocation. It is not clear why threat did not affect this behavior, 
particularly because it did affect information retrieval, a quite comparable measure.  
TM-training and Team Performance 
Our TM-training intervention had large positive effects on transactive memory, 
teamwork processes, and team performance. Trained teams reported having better 
transactive memories, exhibited more differentiation in their information allocation 
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and retrieval behavior, showed more performance monitoring and supporting 
behavior, and outperformed teams that had not been trained. By itself, the TM-
training intervention explained on average 26% of the variance in the dependent 
measures.  
This finding has relevance in light of the question how intensive cross-training 
should be, in order to enhance team performance (e.g., Marks et al., 2002). 
Although more intensive forms of cross-training (i.e., positional modeling and 
positional rotation) have been argued to have larger effects, previous research has 
shown that these forms do not necessarily lead to better team results than simply 
providing members with information about their teammates’ roles and 
responsibilities (i.e., positional clarification; e.g., Marks et al., 2002; McCann et al., 
2000). In addition, in many settings, training members of a team intensively in the 
tasks and duties of other team members may not be very practical and time-efficient 
(cf. Marks et al., 2002). The TM-training intervention used in the present study 
provided team members with detailed information about the distribution of expertise 
within the team, and subsequently gave team members the possibility to discuss 
each other’s expertise and to determine how information should be allocated and 
retrieved within the team. As such it combined the least in-depth form of cross-
training, positional clarification (Blickensderfer et al., 1998), with a method, based 
on transactive memory theory (e.g., Wegner, 1995), to enhance the teams’ 
strategies to combine their distributed expertise effectively. The dual focus on both 
interpositional knowledge and coordination appears to have been very effective. 
Results of the present study therefore suggest that combining low-intensity cross-
training with a method to enhance coordination, rather than simply intensifying the 
development of interpositional knowledge, significantly improves team performance. 
This finding is in line with recent research that suggests that the development of 
interpositional knowledge alone may not be the optimal strategy for teams to 
improve their performance, and that attention to coordination needs may be a 
critical component of a successful team training intervention (Gorman et al., 2007; 
Salas, Nichols, & Driskell, 2007). 
Furthermore, the effects of our TM-training support theory and research 
concerning the role of directory updating and retrieval coordination in the 
development of TMSs. Wegner (1995) argued that team members must have 
knowledge of the distribution of expertise to be able to effectively allocate 
information, and also need a retrieval strategy to be able to get information back 
from the team. Previous research has supported this notion, by showing that 
uncovering one another’s expertise (cf. directory updating) prior to the task or in an 
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early phase of a project facilitates the development of effective TMSs later on 
(Lewis, 2004; Moreland & Myaskovsky, 2000; Rulke & Rau, 2000). Moreover, 
research by Prichard & Ashleigh (2007) showed that additionally paying explicit 
attention to team skills such as coordination and role allocation (cf. retrieval 
coordination) has added benefits in the development of TMSs. The results of the 
present study support and extend this research by showing that a fairly brief training 
intervention attempting to jump-start directory updating and retrieval coordination is 
potent enough to exert large positive effects on transactive memory and transactive 
memory processes in later phases of task performance. In addition, findings of this 
study show that the effects of such a training intervention are not localized to 
transactive memory processes alone, but also extend to performance monitoring 
and supporting behavior, two key teamwork processes (e.g., McIntyre & Salas, 
1995).  
The only measure not affected by TM-training, was the team’s TMS, as 
measured by the Lewis (2003) TMS-scale. Additional analyses on the separate 
subscales (see Footnote 1) showed that TM-training did have positive effects on 
specialization, but not on credibility and coordination. Inspection of the items of 
these subscales helps to explain why TM-training did not affect these scales in the 
present study. The credibility subscale was supposed to measure the extent to 
which team members trusted and relied on other’s expertise (Lewis, 2003). Items of 
this subscale referred, among other things, to the reliability of information team 
members received from each other (e.g., “I was confident relying on the information 
that other team members brought to the discussion”). However, in the present task, 
there was a large amount of unreliable information, coming from sources that could 
not be trusted. Team members would sent this unreliable information to each other, 
for example, to let it be checked. As a consequence, it is likely that participants 
related some of the items of this subscale to the unreliability of scenario-information, 
instead of relating it to the credibility of their teammates’ expertise. Other items of 
the subscale may have been linked to team members’ expertise. The low reliability 
of this subscale (a Cronbach’s alpha of .62) supports this idea. Therefore, in the 
present study, the credibility subscale did not measure what it was supposed to 
measure. This may explain the absence of effects of the TM-training intervention.  
A related argument pertains to the coordination subscale. This subscale was 
supposed to measure the extent to which team members used coordinated 
processes to combine their knowledge (Lewis, 2003). Items of this subscale, for 
example, inquire about misunderstandings, need to backtrack, and accomplishing 
the task efficiently. As we described in the method section, the task participants had 
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to perform was a very complex task. The scenario was constructed in such a way 
that at different moments in time, different routes were optimal. Accordingly, when 
teams processed the scenario events accurately and executed the task as it was 
meant to be executed, they had to change routes, and backtrack and start over a 
lot, making the process seem not very efficient. When they reported their seemingly 
inefficient task processes on the coordination subscale of the TMS-scale, this would 
have resulted in a low coordination score. However, due to the nature of their task, 
their reports of inefficiency, quite paradoxically, might have been the result from 
well-coordinated teamwork. Therefore, the coordination subscale seems not to have 
been very suited to measure TMS coordination processes in the present study. This 
may explain the absence of effects of the TM-training intervention. 
Overall, these results suggest that the use of the TMS-scale was not 
appropriate given the task used in the present study. The scale has been explicitly 
developed as a field measure to study TMSs in organizational teams (Lewis, 2003). 
Results of the present study suggest that caution is warranted when researchers 
plan to apply this measure in more controlled settings.  
The Combined Effect of Threat and TM-Training 
Overall the negative effects of threat were smaller for teams that received TM-
training than for teams that did not receive this training, as hypothesized. 
Accordingly, TM-training had the capacity to mitigate the negative effects of threat. 
While team members’ self-reported transactive memory, information retrieval 
behavior, and performance monitoring were negatively affected by threat when 
teams did not receive TM-training, threat no longer exerted these negative effects 
when teams did receive TM-training. TM-training thus protected team processes 
from deteriorating under threat, by focusing team members on the interdependent 
nature of their task, and by facilitating their utilization of distributed knowledge and 
expertise.  
These results advance our understanding of the effects of threat on teams. 
They support and extend previous research that found that threat causes team 
members to shift their attention away from the team (Driskell et al., 1999; Ellis 2006) 
by showing that an intervention designed to enhance team members’ transactive 
memory, has the ability to moderate these threat effects. In addition, these results 
show that detailed knowledge of the effects of adverse circumstances on team 
processes can be used to design training interventions to overcome these effects. 
Targeting these effects with specific interventions might prove more efficient and 
effective than training teams to cope with stress in general. 
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A number of variables did not show an interaction effect of TM-training and 
threat. The lack of an interaction effect for TMSs can be explained by the problems 
of the use of this scale in the present study, as specified above. No interaction was 
found for differentiated information allocation either, because threat had no effect on 
the way team members allocated information. The effects of threat on supporting 
behavior did not interact with TM-training. This can probably be explained by the 
finding that teams that had not received TM-training, hardly showed any supporting 
behavior (i.e., a ‘floor effect’). Consequently, threat could only have a small negative 
effect. TM-training instead could greatly improve supporting behavior under both 
high and low threat conditions, resulting in main effects only. Finally, the negative 
effect of threat on team performance was not mitigated by TM-training. The pattern 
of results, however, corresponded to our expectations. The absence of a significant 
interaction can probably be explained by the fact that there are other factors 
influencing team performance besides the processes affected by TM-training, for 
example individual taskwork processes, leadership, and even luck (cf. Salas et al., 
2008; Smith-Jentsch, Johnston, & Payne, 1998). These factors all may explain 
variance in the team performance measure, with the result that the interactive 
effects of TM-training and threat may have been obscured. 
Practical Implications 
The results of this study show that organizations can successfully prepare teams for 
operating in threatening circumstances through TM-training. TM-training has the 
ability to prevent teams from falling apart under threat due to team members loosing 
their attention for their teammates. In addition, the results of this study show that 
under normal conditions too, teams may benefit from a TM-training intervention. 
Below, we elaborate on what the findings of this study imply for the design of team 
training interventions and the types of teams that could potentially benefit from 
these interventions. 
Organizations that aim to prepare teams for operating in potentially 
threatening circumstances could use the findings of the present study in the design 
of their training interventions. First, results of this study suggest that it could be 
valuable for organizations to consider training interventions that consist of a 
combination of traditional cross-training and methods to enhance the teams’ abilities 
to combine their distributed expertise effectively, rather than placing the entire 
emphasis on the development of interpositional knowledge. The cross-training 
component of such an intervention could simply consist of highlighting the 
distribution of expertise within a team and does not have to be very intensive (i.e., 
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positional clarification rather than positional modeling or rotation). The other 
component, aimed at facilitating the development of strategies to allocate and 
retrieve information in an efficient manner, could consist of a guided group 
discussion (like in the present study) in which a trainer lets team members discuss 
each other’s roles and responsibilities and assists them in developing strategies to 
accurately process information within the team. Apart from being more feasible in 
many settings (consider, for example, surgical teams), such a combination has 
proven to be very effective in the present study. Moreover, designing training 
interventions in this way prevents team members from learning large amounts of 
information that is not functional for their own task performance. 
Second, results of this study show that even a brief team training intervention 
that aims to protect the processes affected by threat, can have substantial effects. 
This can be of considerable value in situations where training time or resources are 
limited. In those situations, it may not be possible to use extensive and costly stress 
inoculation programs (e.g., Stress Exposure Training, Johnston & Cannon-Bowers, 
1996). Instead, the present research suggests that organizations could provide brief 
training interventions specifically targeting transactive memory and transactive 
memory processes. Such interventions ensure that team members maintain their 
team focus and help protect teamwork processes from deteriorating under threat.  
Regarding the types of teams that should be considered for TM-training 
interventions, it is expected that particularly ad hoc teams, consisting of members 
with specialized backgrounds, that have to operate under potentially stressful 
conditions, will benefit from TM-training. Team members in these teams assemble 
for a short period of time to perform a task that requires expertise from different 
fields. These teams are especially vulnerable to the negative effects of threat, 
because members are not familiar with each other and each other’s expertise, and 
consequently have an increased risk of narrowing their team perspective under 
threat. TM-training has the potential to accelerate the process of learning who 
knows what within the team, and as such might protect these teams against threat’s 
negative effects. In addition, it is expected that more permanent teams might benefit 
from TM-training too. Although in these teams, TMSs will have been developed 
(e.g., Lewis, 2004), threat still has the potential to exert negative effects on 
transactive memory and team processes. TM-training in these situations might 
serve literally as a way to update team members’ memories about each other’s 
expertise and remind them of their interdependence and the necessity to collaborate 
in order to accomplish their goals. 
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The results of this study point out that the TM-training intervention was not 
only effective under threat, but also under normal conditions, although to a lesser 
extent. Hence, TM-training might prove useful in any situation where team members 
that do not know each other assemble for the first time. Organizations should 
stimulate that in these situations teams shortly discuss each other’s professional 
backgrounds and consider how each member’s expertise can be used in the team’s 
project, rather than engaging in a standard introduction round. In this way, teams 
will be able to develop functional TMSs more rapidly and as a result will be 
productive faster.  
Limitations and Directions for Future Research 
The findings of the present study were obtained in an experimental setting, with an 
artificial task environment. Given the nature of the research question, we believe 
that the choice for this context was appropriate (cf. Driskell & Salas, 1992). It 
allowed us to test our theoretical predictions and isolate causal phenomena, to 
manipulate threat without running the risk of causing actual damage, and to collect 
valuable, fine-grained behavioral measures next to self-report measures. However, 
future research should also be directed toward investigating the impact of TM-
training in applied settings.  
In addition, this research used ad hoc teams, which were randomly 
assembled to take part in the experiment. Extending these findings directly to 
permanent teams might prove problematic. It is expected that TM-training will be 
most useful in newly formed teams. The extent to which such an intervention has 
the ability to positively influence teams that have a history together should be the 
subject of future investigation. 
Furthermore, results of the present study indicated that the use of the Lewis 
(2003) TMS-scale was not appropriate given the nature of the task. Although results 
for this scale largely did not support our hypotheses, behavioral measures indicative 
of TMSs did. Other researchers (e.g., Ellis, 2006) have employed similar behavioral 
measures in experimental research of TMSs, and a bifurcation seems to be 
developing between field and laboratory investigations of transactive memory, 
whereby field studies employing the Lewis TMS-scale focus on the dimensions 
specialization, credibility, and coordination, whereas laboratory studies focus on the 
processes of directory updating, information allocation, and retrieval coordination as 
behavioral indicators of TMSs. This divergence is questionable, because although 
both may represent valid operationalizations of TMSs (cf. Ellis, 2006) they clearly 
target different aspects of TMSs, as a result of which it may become difficult to 
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compare the findings of laboratory and field research. We suggest that researchers 
include both operationalizations of TMSs in their studies, so as to be able to 
examine the way these operationalizations relate to each other.  
Finally, findings of the present study indicate that augmenting the principles 
of cross-training, with those derived from transactive memory theory has favorable 
effects on team processes and team performance. Future research should compare 
TM-training to cross-training to empirically test whether TM-training indeed has 
added benefits. 
Conclusion 
Overall, the contributions of the present study are threefold. First, the results of the 
present study are useful for organizations, because we developed and tested a 
training intervention that has the potential to successfully mitigate the negative 
effects of threat on the performance of teams. Given the vulnerability of teams to the 
effects of threat, and our current lack of knowledge to avert these effects, the 
developed TM-training intervention is a valuable tool that can be used by 
organizations to protect their teams in dangerous circumstances. It provides 
organizations with a theory-driven method and precise directions for developing 
interventions tailored to the teams in their specific organizations.  
Second, we contribute to the domain of team training by integrating in a 
single intervention the focus on sharedness dominant in cross-training research, 
with a focus on distribution and compatibility characteristic of transactive memory 
theory. Results of the present study indicate that combining a superficial form of 
cross-training (i.e., positional clarification) with a method that highlights the 
distribution of expertise within the team can be highly beneficial for the teams’ 
performance, without having to be intensive. Consequently, the problems of 
feasibility and efficiency surrounding cross-training are overcome, as is the question 
of how much cross-training would be necessary in a given context (e.g., Marks et 
al., 2002). Moreover, we extend the currently limited knowledge concerning how to 
enhance transactive memory in teams (cf. Kozlowski & Ilgen, 2006; Moreland & 
Myaskovsky, 2000). The present research shows that a training intervention that 
combines two key processes of TMSs, directory updating and retrieval coordination, 
has the potential to jump-start the development of a TMS. 
Third, the present study extends previous research on the effects of threat on 
teams by showing that in addition to team perspective and transactive memory, the 
key teamwork processes of performance monitoring and supporting behavior also 
deteriorate under threat. In addition, to our knowledge, this study is the first 
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controlled investigation of the combined effects of threat and a training intervention 
to counter the effects of threat. By showing that the expected effects of threat can 
be mitigated by an intervention that aims to protect those processes threat is 
expected to impair, this study provides additional support for the notion that threat-
rigidity in teams takes the shape of a narrowed team perspective.  
In conclusion, this study presents a training intervention that has the capacity 
to mitigate the detrimental effects of threat on the performance of teams. Our results 
signify the importance of paying explicit attention to the distributed nature of 
expertise in such an intervention. The TM-training intervention we developed shows 
promising results that call for further investigation. Organizations preparing teams 
for effective performance in high-risk situations could greatly benefit from applying 
the principles of TM-training. Understanding who knows what, these teams will be 








Summary and Discussion 
 
 
Many organizations rely on teams to accomplish increasingly complex tasks. These 
teams often operate in the face of threat, whether it be threat of financial loss, loss 
of face, or loss of lives. The goal of the present dissertation was to investigate how 
these threats affect the performance of teams, and how teams can be protected 
against the negative effects of threat. 
The starting point and theoretical framework for this dissertation was the 
threat-rigidity thesis (Staw, Sandelands, & Dutton, 1981). This thesis proposes a 
restriction in information processing and a constriction in control under threat, 
resulting in maladaptive performance in the case of complex and dynamic tasks. 
Previous team research on this subject has been limited, especially where it 
concerns complex tasks. To be able to address the complexity present-day teams 
face, and at the same time objectively capture the relevant team processes, a new 
task environment for team research was developed for the purpose of the present 
dissertation. The propositions of the threat-rigidity thesis were experimentally 
investigated in this environment with teams performing complex planning and 
problem-solving scenarios. 
The studies presented in this dissertation investigated threat-rigidity reactions 
in information processing, exercise of control, and team perspective due to physical 
and social threats. A multiple-mediation model was used to investigate the 
appropriateness of these threat-rigidity reactions in a complex task environment. 
Finally, a training intervention aimed at protecting teams from the negative effects of 
threat by enhancing transactive memory was developed and tested.  
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In the next section, the research of this dissertation will be summarized. In 
the remainder of this chapter, theoretical, methodological, and practical implications 
of the present research will be discussed and directions for future research will be 
suggested. This chapter ends with the identification of some strengths and 
limitations and an overall conclusion. 
Summary 
Chapter 2 
Chapter 2 describes the development of PLATT, a task environment for controlled 
research on team performance in complex environments. The development of this 
environment was guided by a series of requirements that aimed to create the 
appropriate balance between complexity and control. The application of PLATT in a 
broad range of experiments in different research programs has shown that PLATT 
has the ability to meet each of these requirements. Specifically, PLATT has the 
ability to elicit real team behavior and makes it possible to investigate team 
planning, problem-solving and decision-making processes in complex 
environments. It does so, while offering a good degree of experimental control and 
relatively convenient data collection by means of a broad range of team process 
measurement possibilities. Finally, the PLATT software guarantees a high degree of 
flexibility, making it suitable for investigating a wide array of team related research 
questions. The development of PLATT thus provided a research environment in 
which the effects of threat on teams performing complex tasks could be investigated 
in a controlled manner.  
Chapter 3 
In Chapter 3, it was investigated how physical threat affected team processes 
during a complex task. Three-person teams engaged in a complex planning and 
problem-solving scenario in PLATT, either anticipating a potential reduction in 
oxygen level, or under normal conditions. In line with the threat-rigidity thesis, this 
physical threat was expected to cause a restriction in information processing, a 
constriction in control, and a narrowing of team perspective.  
The results of this study confirmed these expectations. Specifically, teams 
under physical threat exhibited reduced peripheral attention, degraded overview, 
more controlling and less participative leadership, less group discussions, and 
reduced coordination and supporting behavior. The results of this Chapter thus 
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show that teams react to physical threat with a restriction in information processing, 
a constriction in control, and a narrowing of team perspective.  
Chapter 4 
In Chapter 4, the findings of Chapter 3 were extended by examining the 
appropriateness of the threat-rigidity reactions of teams for their performance in a 
complex environment, using a multiple-mediation model. Officer cadets of the 
Netherlands Defence Academy engaged in a similar complex planning and 
problem-solving scenario as was used in the study described in Chapter 3. Instead 
of a physical threat, this time a social threat was manipulated. This social threat was 
expected to cause rigidity, manifested in a restriction in information processing, a 
constriction in control, and a narrowing of team perspective. In line with the treat-
rigidity these reactions were expected to contribute negatively to the teams’ 
performance, because the task teams had to perform was characterized by high 
complexity, necessitating flexibility rather than rigidity.  
The results presented in this chapter largely supported these hypotheses. 
Replicating the findings of Chapter 3, teams under threat exhibited reduced 
peripheral attention, degraded overview, more controlling and less participative 
leadership, less group discussions, and reduced supporting behavior. In addition, 
threat negatively affected team performance. Results of a multiple mediation 
analysis showed, as expected, that the total set of processes measured, mediated 
the negative effect of threat on team performance. Examination of the effects for the 
separate processes revealed that threat negatively affected team performance 
through a reduction in overview, participative leadership, group discussions, and 
supporting behavior. The results presented in Chapter 4 thus demonstrate that, in 
general, the rigid reactions caused by threat are maladaptive for team performance 
in a complex work environment.  
Chapter 5 
Finally, in Chapter 5, the effects of a training intervention designed to protect teams 
from the negative effects of threat was investigated. This Transactive Memory 
training intervention (TM-training) combined aspects of cross-training with key 
processes of transactive memory systems, and aimed to reinforce team perspective 
by enhancing team members’ transactive memory. TM-training was tested in a 
study with officer cadets of the Netherlands Defence Academy engaging in a 
complex planning and problem-solving scenario in PLATT. A between-teams design 
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was used, with social threat and TM-training as factors. It was expected that threat 
would cause a narrowing of team perspective, thereby affecting transactive 
memory, teamwork processes, and team performance. TM-training, instead, was 
expected to positively affect transactive memory, teamwork processes, and team 
performance. An interaction between threat and TM-training was predicted, such 
that the effects of threat would be smaller for teams that received TM-training. 
The results presented in this chapter largely supported these hypotheses, 
although the expected interaction was found only for some of the measures. 
Specifically, threat negatively affected transactive memory, teamwork processes, 
and team performance. In contrast, TM-training positively affected all these 
measures. Overall, the negative effects of threat were smaller for teams that 
received TM-training than for teams that did not receive training. Particularly, when 
teams had received the TM-training intervention, threat no longer exerted negative 
effects on transactive memory, certain transactive memory system (TMS) 
behaviors, and performance monitoring. No interaction was found for some 
measures of TMSs, supporting behavior, and team performance. In short, the 
results presented in Chapter 5 reveal that TM-training has the capacity to positively 
affect transactive memory, teamwork processes, and team performance, and 
counters detrimental effects of threat on teams.  
Theoretical Implications and Future Research 
The findings of the present dissertation contribute to the knowledge of the effects of 
threat on team performance. In addition, the results have implications for transactive 
memory theory and for the debate on how to train teams for performance in 
demanding environments. 
Threat-Rigidity Effects 
Despite an apparent vulnerability of teams to the effects of threat, up till now, little 
was known about the specific processes by which threat affects the performance of 
teams, especially during complex tasks. The most comprehensive theory 
addressing the effects of threat, the threat-rigidity thesis (Staw et al., 1981), states 
that teams react to threat with a restriction in information processing and a 
constriction in control, resulting in performance decrements in complex and dynamic 
environments. The limited research on these propositions generally supported the 
proposition of a restriction in information processing (e.g., Gladstein & Reilly, 1985), 
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whereas the proposition of a constriction in control received mixed support (e.g., 
Driskell & Salas, 1991; Gladstein & Reilly, 1985; Harrington, Lemak, & Kendall, 
2002). The meditational properties of these rigidity reactions in the relationship 
between threat and team performance received little research attention up till now.  
Results of the present research supported the proposition of a restriction in 
information processing, by showing that team members narrowed their breadth of 
attention under threat and suffered from a lack of overview. In addition, extending 
research suggesting that this restriction in information processing may cause a 
narrowing of team perspective as well (Driskell, Salas, & Johnston, 1999; Ellis, 
2006), the results presented in this dissertation showed that team members under 
threat engaged in less performance monitoring and supporting behavior. Additional 
support for the notion of a narrowed team perspective under threat was provided by 
the results for the TM-training intervention, because these results showed that an 
intervention aimed at enhancing transactive memory and team perspective in teams 
has the ability to moderate the effects of threat.  
The proposition of a constriction in control was also supported by the results 
of the studies presented in this dissertation. Under threat, team leaders became 
more controlling and allowed less participation in decision making of their team 
members. In addition, in teams under threat, team members communicated less 
about strategies, potential routes, and decisions to be made, but instead mainly 
exchanged information, without collectively trying to integrate this information, or 
make sense of it. These results contribute to the debate concerning the effects of 
threat and stress on the degree of control in teams. Previous research found 
apparently inconsistent results. Some researchers concluded that teams reacted to 
threat with a restriction in control (e.g., Argote, Turner, & Fichman, 1989), whereas 
others instead inferred a loosening of control (Driskell & Salas, 1991).  
We propose that these mixed findings can be explained by the presence of 
formal (vs. emergent) leadership in a team, and suggest that particularly when a 
team has a formal leader, threat will cause a constriction in control, whereas in the 
absence of formal leadership, threat might also result in a loosening of control. As 
opposed to previous research investigating the effects of threat on the exercise of 
control in teams, in the present research, one of the team members always 
occupied a formal leadership role. This leader was appointed by the experimenter 
and bore final responsibility for the team’s decisions. The results of these studies 
provide support for the notion that in teams with formal leadership, a constriction in 
control emerges under threat.  
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This finding is in line with other research addressing team performance in 
adverse circumstances under formal leadership (e.g., Foushee & Helmreich, 1988; 
Hamblin, 1958; Janis, 1954; Klein, 1976). Therefore, we propose that the 
inconsistent findings concerning constriction in control can be explained as follows: 
Threat may make team members feel uncertain and insecure (e.g., Lanzetta, 1955). 
When a leader is present, team members can evade this insecurity by putting 
themselves in the hands of the leader and pass full responsibility to him or her (cf. 
Foushee & Helmreich, 1988). The leader, feeling even more responsible now, will 
become more controlling as a result. Hence, in this situation, threat causes a 
constriction in control. In contrast, when no leader is present, team members have 
no one to depend on. In this situation, they will try to find security in the group, 
displaying group-oriented behaviors such as cooperation and group discussion 
(Lanzetta, 1955). Consequently, in this situation, threat causes a loosening of 
control. Eventually leadership may emerge in this situation as well, as a result of 
which the same processes may surface as in teams with a formal leader (e.g., 
Argote et al., 1989), causing a constriction in control again.  
In the present dissertation, the presence of formal leadership was not varied 
in the designs. Therefore, although the presented results support the proposed 
explanation of previous findings, we could not formally test this explanation. Future 
research therefore should examine the potentially moderating role of formal 
leadership in the relationship between threat and the exercise of control more 
closely, by systematically varying the presence and absence of formal leadership. 
 Finally, the present research was able to demonstrate the inappropriateness 
of threat-rigidity reactions for teams performing complex tasks, as proposed by the 
threat-rigidity thesis. It extended previous research by capturing the mediational 
properties of all central processes in the relationship between threat and team 
performance in a single model. Because of this, the findings of previous research 
that suggested that performance decrements in teams under threat are solely 
attributable to a narrowing of team perspective (Driskell et al., 1999; Ellis, 2006) 
could be refined. Whereas the design of these previous studies did not allow for the 
investigation of other processes, the design of the present research made it 
possible to address the full complexity of the threat-rigidity thesis. The use of a 
complex task environment ensured that information processing was an important 
element of the team’s task performance, and the appointment of a formal leader 
made it possible to address the exercise of control. Using a multiple-mediation 
model, we were thus able to show that restrictions in the processing of task 
information and constrictions in control both mediated the relationship between 
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threat and team performance, over and above the mediational role of team 
perspective. Results showed that the total set of mediators almost fully mediated the 
negative effect of threat on team performance. The original processes proposed by 
the threat-rigidity thesis supplemented with team perspective processes thus seem 
to be able to capture the full array of negative threat effects.  
Nature of threat 
One of the reasons to manipulate physical threat in the study reported in Chapter 3 
was that physical threat was thought to have potentially different effects than other 
threats (cf. Klein, 1976). The results of our study are the first to show that physical 
threat causes a restriction in information processing and a constriction in control in 
teams. Because we manipulated a social threat in Chapter 4, while keeping the 
design of the study very similar to the study in Chapter 3, it is possible to explore 
whether physical threat indeed affected teams differently than social threat did. 
Caution is warranted, however, because the results were obtained in different 
studies, employing different populations.  
When the results of the effects of threat on team processes in both studies 
are compared, the similarity is striking. Only one out of seven effects was not 
replicated. Hence, it appears that physical and social threat did not have 
qualitatively different effects on the team processes measured in the present 
context. However, the magnitude of the effects differed considerably. Where most 
effects of social threat ranged in size between medium and large, most effects of 
physical threat ranged between large and very large (cf. Cohen, 1988). Physical 
threat thus affected the process measures more severely than social threat did. 
Only the size of the effects on leadership behavior was comparable across threat 
manipulations: leaders under physical and social threat both became more 
controlling and less participative to the same extent. Whether this result indicates 
that physical and social threat indeed have equally large effects on leadership 
behavior, remains to be seen, however. An alternative explanation is that officer 
cadets in a leadership role are more prone to behave in a directive fashion than 
their civilian counterparts, as a result of which the effects of threat on directive 
leadership behavior are larger for officer cadets than for civilians. 
Whereas physical and social threat did not seem to differ qualitatively in their 
effects on team processes during complex tasks, they did seem to differ in the way 
they affected team performance. In both studies performance was affected by 
threat, but in Chapter 3 the effects of physical threat appeared not to have gone 
‘through’ the measured team processes (as indicated by an absence of significant 
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correlations between processes and outcomes), whereas in Chapter 4 the team 
processes fully mediated the effects of social threat on team performance. In 
Chapter 3 it was suggested that physical threat, in addition to causing rigidity in 
team processes, might have also distracted team members from their task, because 
they could not control this threat by performing effectively on their task. This 
distraction, in turn, may have been an important additional mediator in the 
relationship between threat and team performance (cf. Gaillard, 2008; Turner & 
Horvitz, 2001), which might have obscured the mediational role of threat-rigidity 
processes. On the contrary, the social threat used in Chapter 4, was contingent 
upon the team’s performance: when teams performed well, they would not suffer 
any negative consequences. Consequently, this threat drew team member’s 
attention to the task, rather than distracting them from the task, as a result of which 
the mediational role of distraction may have become less important. Although this 
social threat may have still distracted them to some extent, the results show that this 
distraction did not cause decrements in performance, because the negative effect of 
threat on the performance of these teams was fully mediated by the threat-rigidity 
processes.  
This observation has relevance in light of the question whether performance-
contingent and non-performance-contingent (or ambient) threats affect teams 
differently (e.g., Driskell & Salas, 1991). Results of the present dissertation suggest 
that they do. Although both types of threats caused rigidity in team processes and a 
deterioration in team performance, in the case of performance-contingent threats, 
rigidity in team processes appeared to be fully responsible for deterioration in team 
performance, whereas in the case of non-performance-contingent threats, 
distraction or loss of concentration may have been an important additional mediator 
of the negative effects of threat on team performance.  
This potential difference would have consequences for the way in which 
teams should be prepared for operating in threatening circumstances. When 
performance-contingent threats are expected, preparation should mainly focus on 
preventing threat-rigidity processes from occurring. However, when non-
performance-contingent threats are expected, team members should also be trained 
to remain focused on their task in the presence of a distracter. Further research is 
required, however, to examine the proposed differences between performance-
contingent and non-performance-contingent threats. 
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Transactive memory theory 
The findings of the present dissertation also have implications for transactive 
memory theory (Wegner, 1987) by contributing to the question of how to enhance 
transactive memory in teams. Several scholars have noted that there is ambiguity 
regarding antecedents of TMSs, and that research on techniques for enhancing 
transactive memory is as yet not sufficiently developed to justify specific 
recommendations for improvement (e.g., Kozlowski & Ilgen, 2006; Peltokorpi, 
2008). The research presented in Chapter 5 addressed the call for more research 
on this subject, by developing and testing a transactive memory training intervention 
(TM-training). Wegner (1995) argued that team members must have knowledge of 
the distribution of expertise within the team to be able to effectively allocate 
information, and a retrieval strategy to be able to get information back from the 
team. Previous research on TMSs also indicated that uncovering one another’s 
domains of expertise and paying explicit attention to coordination issues prior to, or 
in an early phase of task performance, facilitates the development of effective TMSs 
later on (Lewis, 2004; Moreland & Myaskovsky, 2000; Prichard & Ashleigh, 2007; 
Rulke & Rau, 2000). Hence, our TM-training intervention aimed to facilitate two key 
processes of TMSs, directory updating (through which team members learn about 
the distribution of expertise) and retrieval coordination (through which team 
members plan how to retrieve information). The findings presented in Chapter 5 
support the idea that updating of directories and coordination of retrieval in an early 
phase, positively affect transactive memory and transactive memory processes in 
later phases of task performance. Moreover, this study was the first study to show 
that transactive memory can be enhanced through a fairly brief training intervention. 
Future research should investigate whether training interventions based on the 
principles of directory updating and retrieval coordination have the capacity to 
enhance TMSs in applied settings. It is expected that such an intervention will be 
most useful for newly formed teams, in which no TMS is present yet. It has to be 
determined to which extent TM-training also has the ability to positively influence 
teams that have a history together. 
Team training 
The results of Chapter 5 have implications for theories about team training. 
Particularly, they contribute to the question of how intensive cross-training should 
be, in order to enhance team performance (e.g., Marks, Sabella, Burke, & Zaccaro, 
2002), and what components team training should consist of (e.g., Salas et al., 
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2008; Salas, Nichols, & Driskell; 2007). Cross-training, a method for enhancing 
team members’ interpositional knowledge, has been put forward as an important 
strategy for enhancing the performance of interdependent teams, by contributing to 
communication, coordination, and anticipation of needs (e.g., Blickensderfer, 
Cannon-Bowers, & Salas, 1998). Three types of cross-training have been specified 
(i.e., positional clarification, positional modeling, and positional rotation), differing in 
intensity. Although more intensive forms of cross-training have been argued to have 
larger effects, previous research has not been able to substantiate these claims 
(Marks et al., 2002). Intensive forms of cross-training have even been found to 
interfere with individual task performance in a team context (McCann, Baranski, 
Thompson, & Pigeau, 2000). The question of how much cross-training is necessary 
to improve team performance is not without relevance, however, because in many 
settings, training members of a team intensively in the tasks and duties of other 
team members may not be very practical and time-efficient. 
The TM-training developed and tested in Chapter 5 provides a possible way 
out of this impasse. The design of this intervention was inspired by both cross-
training, with its focus on shared knowledge, and transactive memory theory, with its 
focus on distributed and compatible knowledge. The intervention therefore did not 
capitalize on the development of interpositional knowledge, but instead combined 
the least in-depth form of cross-training (positional clarification), with a method to 
enhance the teams’ strategies to combine their expertise effectively. This resulted in 
a training intervention far less intensive than positional rotation or positional 
modeling, because team members did not have to acquire the knowledge of their 
fellow team members, but only had to learn who had what expertise, and 
subsequently discuss how they would use each other’s expertise. Results of this 
study showed that the dual focus on sharedness on the one hand (i.e., positional 
clarification), and distribution on the other hand (i.e., coordination discussion), was 
very effective in enhancing team processes and team performance. Considering the 
question of how intensive cross-training should be to enhance team performance, 
these findings therefore suggest that simply intensifying cross-training to get better 
results might not be as efficient as combining low intensity cross-training with a 
focus on distribution and coordination. Such an approach might also be more 
feasible in teams with divergent professional backgrounds and different educational 
levels. Future research is necessary, however, to directly compare TM-training and 
cross-training. 
The presented findings are in line with recent research that suggests that the 
development of interpositional knowledge alone may not be the optimal strategy for 
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teams to improve their performance, and that attention to coordination needs may 
be a critical component of a successful team training intervention (Gorman et al., 
2007; Salas et al., 2007). The findings extend previous research by combining 
components from different team training strategies in a single intervention. In 
addition, the presented research addresses the call for research establishing the 
mechanisms through which team training interventions determine performance (cf. 
Salas et al., 2007). The findings show that the effects of TM-training are not 
localized to transactive memory processes alone, but also extend to performance 
monitoring and supporting behavior, two key teamwork processes that were highly 
interrelated with team performance in this study.  
Methodological Implications 
As the complexity of the workplace continues to grow, teams increasingly will be 
confronted with complex cognitive tasks. More and more, they will have to perform 
these tasks as virtual teams in networked structures. Theories of teamwork and 
methods of measurement must keep pace with these developments (cf. Salas, 
Cooke, & Rosen, 2008). We believe that, by developing PLATT, we were able to 
successfully address the complexity present-day teams face. PLATT enabled 
controlled experimental research into team planning, problem-solving and decision-
making behavior in a complex, networked world. It offered a broad range of 
automated and embedded real-time measurement possibilities, which allowed for 
the measurement of the dynamic aspects of team processes and team cognition (cf. 
Cooke, Salas, Cannon-Bowers, & Stout, 2000; Cooke, Salas, Kiekel, & Bell, 2004). 
On the basis of these characteristics, PLATT made it possible to extend current 
knowledge and generate valuable practical implications.  
The main methodological implication of the present dissertation therefore is 
that other team researchers should consider employing similar complex team 
research platforms in their research. As has been described in Chapter 2, platforms 
like PLATT could enhance research in numerous domains, including research on 
team structure, team virtuality, and multiteam systems. Moreover, not only research 
questions directly related to virtual or networked teams could benefit from such 
environments. The studies presented in this dissertation show that existing 
knowledge on ‘normal’ teams may also be extended by the use of research 
environments like PLATT, because these environments make it possible to address 
a level of complexity that could not be attained by existing research environments, 
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while maintaining sufficient control. Team research in many domains therefore could 
benefit from using more complex team research environments, and we recommend 
that researchers consider this possibility when setting up experimental team 
research. We believe that research environments like PLATT have the ability to 
shape current and future theorizing about teamwork. 
Practical Implications 
Teams in many different work domains face threat on a regular basis. Typical 
domains associated with threat are the military, the police, and fire-fighting, because 
professionals in these domains face physical threats themselves, as part of their 
job. Teams in other domains have to deal with threat too, because the lives of 
others depend on the way they perform their tasks. Consider, for example, 
emergency medical teams, aircrews, and crisis management teams. But even in 
‘regular’ office jobs, teams may encounter deadlines with severe consequences, run 
the risk of financial loss, and face threats of negative criticisms. 
Organizations in all these domains can use the results of the present 
dissertation to better protect their teams against the negative effects of threat. First 
of all, the studies presented in this dissertation demonstrated in a clear manner how 
threat affects the performance of teams. The studies showed that the way teams 
deal with information, the way leadership and control is exercised, and the way 
team members work as a team rather than as a collection of individuals, are all 
influenced by threat. Organizations may use this knowledge to create awareness of 
the specific effects of threat among their teams. Creating awareness of typical 
reactions to stressors is an important component of many effective individual stress 
training programs (e.g., Stress Exposure Training, Johnston & Cannon-Bowers, 
1996) and might be beneficial in a team context as well. If team members manage 
to maintain awareness of their reactions during performance in threatening 
circumstances, they may be able to adjust their behavior and prevent threat from 
negatively influencing their performance.  
Second, besides merely creating awareness of the effects of threat, 
organizations might use the knowledge of the specific processes affected by threat 
to provide their teams with means that could counter these effects. For example, 
organizations could apply the knowledge concerning threat’s effect on information 
processing, by providing teams with information systems that support operators to 
divide their attention in a better way, or even with software agents that dynamically 
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take over those tasks team members neglect (Bosse, Van Doesburg, Van Maanen, 
& Treur, 2007). These measures could prevent threat from affecting team 
performance through restricting the team’s information processing. Similarly, 
organizations could try to avert the negative effects of a constriction in control, by 
flattening team structures, creating a climate in which team members are 
encouraged to speak up, and training team leaders to invite input from their team 
members, even in threatening circumstances (cf. Edmondson, 1999, 2003). Finally, 
organizations could train teams to maintain a broad team perspective under all 
circumstances. Previously, cross-training has been suggested as a potentially 
promising method to achieve this goal (e.g., Ellis, 2006; Volpe, Cannon-Bowers, 
Salas, & Spector, 1996). Generic team-skills training programs may also have 
positive effects (Prichard & Ashleigh, 2007). The results of Chapter 5 provide 
empirical evidence for the beneficial effects of a new method to enhance team 
perspective: TM-training. 
Therefore, the third way in which organizations can utilize the results of this 
dissertation is by applying the principles of TM-training: a combination of learning 
about the expertise of fellow team members (‘directory updating’) with a method that 
enhances the teams’ strategies to combine their expertise effectively (‘retrieval 
coordination’). The directory updating component of such an intervention could 
simply consist of providing team members with general information of each 
member’s roles and responsibilities (i.e., positional clarification). For this purpose, 
lectures, written material, or video instructions could be used. The retrieval 
coordination component could consist of a guided group discussion, in which a 
trainer lets team members discuss each other’s roles and responsibilities and 
assists them in developing strategies to accurately process information within the 
team (cf. Dalenberg, Vogelaar, & Beersma, 2009). Other methods may be used as 
well, as long as participants are actively involved in the process, and it is somehow 
secured that useful strategies for coordination emerge. 
TM-training does not need to be very intensive. The results of Chapter 5 
suggest that even a brief training intervention may have substantial effects. This can 
be of considerable value when training time or resources are limited. Moreover, the 
design of TM-training ensures that team members do not have to acquire 
knowledge or learn skills that are not functional for their own task performance. In 
addition, it is feasible to apply TM-training in teams with widely divergent 
professional backgrounds (e.g., ad hoc teams) and different educational levels (e.g., 
surgical teams). It is expected that ad hoc teams that have to operate under threat 
will benefit the most from TM-training, but more permanent teams working under 
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threat might benefit from TM-training too. The results of Chapter 5 show that TM-
training may even exert beneficial effects in teams that operate in non-threatening 
circumstances.  
Strengths and Limitations 
The main strength of the research presented in this dissertation is that our research 
approach enabled us to investigate complex team processes under threat in a 
controlled manner. The development of the PLATT task environment facilitated the 
investigation of team processes that had not been studied under threat before. 
Furthermore, in PLATT, all relevant processes could be studied simultaneously, and 
team performance could be measured objectively, making it possible to test a 
comprehensive mediational model of the effects of threat on team performance. 
Moreover, PLATT allowed the collection of objective, behavioral data, in addition to 
subjective questionnaire measures, which contributed to the validity of the findings. 
Taken together, the research approach we developed allowed us to integrate and 
extend previous knowledge on the effects of threat on teams. 
Another strength of the presented research pertains to the chosen approach 
of manipulating threat. In contrast to previous research, the threat manipulations 
used in the present research made it possible to determine the unique effects of 
threat on teams. Because most previous studies combined time pressure or other 
potential stressors with threat to maximize the stress response, determining the 
effects unique to threat had not been feasible up till now (cf. Keinan, 1987). The 
manipulations used in the present research therefore did not combine threat with 
other potential stressors, nor did they contain cues that might be interpreted by 
teams as necessitating alterations of the way they performed their task (cf. Turner & 
Horvitz, 2001). The effects found in the present research therefore can be solely 
attributed to the occurrence of threat.  
At the same time, the research approach used warrants caution in 
generalizing the results of the present research to applied settings. For although a 
high degree of realism could be attained using PLATT, the results were still 
obtained in an experimental setting using an artificial task environment. Given the 
nature of the research question, the choice for this context was appropriate (cf. 
Driskell & Salas, 1992). It allowed us to test theoretical predictions and isolate 
causal phenomena, to manipulate threat without running the risk of causing actual 
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damage, and to collect valuable behavioral measures. The theory that was tested 
and supported can be applied to the real world.  
However, the nature of the research question and the characteristics of the 
research approach should bring about carefulness in trying to apply concrete results 
to specific applied questions. Because in aiming to do so, one should bear in mind 
the specific properties of the task, the participants, and the kind of teams used. For 
example, the present research used ad hoc teams assembled for the sole purpose 
of taking part in the experiments. Extending concrete findings of this research 
directly to more permanent teams in applied settings might therefore prove 
problematic. Other specific properties would include the low mean age of the 
participants, the random appointment of team leaders, the military character of the 
team task, etc. Although these specific properties might limit the generalizability of 
concrete findings to the real world, they do not hamper our ability to draw 
conclusions about theoretical predictions, and use the theoretical knowledge that we 
have gained in our research in applied settings. Future research should determine 
the exact applicability of concrete results in applied settings.  
Concluding Remarks 
This dissertation set out to uncover in which ways threat affects the performance of 
teams and how negative threat effects can be overcome by teams. By developing 
and using a new, complex team task environment and by employing unorthodox 
threat manipulations, we feel that we succeeded in providing a comprehensive 
analysis of team performance under threat. Our research showed that threat causes 
teams to restrict their information processing, leading to the ignorance of potentially 
important information and causing problems in maintaining overview. Furthermore, 
threat affects the exercise of control in teams, such that team leaders become more 
controlling and allow less participation in decision making from their team members, 
while at the same time, team members under threat are less likely to get involved in 
discussions about decisions to be made. In addition, threat causes team members 
to shift from a broad team perspective to a narrow individualistic focus, leading to 
underdeveloped team cognitions and reduced efforts at coordinating actions, 
monitoring the team’s performance, and supporting other team members. Our 
research showed that, all in all, these rigid reactions bring about a deterioration of 
team performance when teams have to carry out a complex task. 
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On a more positive note, however, our fine-grained analysis of team reactions 
to threat makes it possible to develop interventions that accurately target vulnerable 
aspects of teams to help protect them against threat’s destructive effects. The 
transactive memory training intervention we developed, which focused on the 
distributed nature of expertise in teams, proves to be a promising method for this 
purpose. The ‘armoring’ effect of TM-training found in the present research provides 
strong incentives for investigating comparable interventions in future (field) 
research. It is our hope that organizations may benefit from the knowledge gained in 
the present research by being better able to protect their teams from becoming 
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(Summary in Dutch) 
 
 
Veel organisaties maken gebruik van teams om de steeds complexer wordende 
werkomgeving het hoofd te bieden. Deze teams kunnen met allerlei soorten 
dreigingen te maken krijgen. Zo zijn er dreigingen van financieel verlies, verlies van 
aanzien, of zelfs het verlies van levens. Allerlei catastrofale beslissingen uit het 
verleden blijken terug te voeren op het onvermogen van teams goed te blijven 
presteren onder dreiging. Maar ondanks dat we weten dat teams kwetsbaar zijn 
onder dreiging, weten we nog maar heel weinig over hoe teams beïnvloed worden 
door dreiging, laat staan dat we weten wat er tegen te doen valt. De centrale vraag 
van dit proefschrift luidt dan ook: Op wat voor manier beïnvloedt dreiging het 
functioneren van teams tijdens complexe taken, en hoe kunnen teams beschermd 
worden tegen de negatieve effecten van dreiging? 
Het onderzoek in dit proefschrift ging uit van de dreiging-rigiditeitshypothese. 
Hoofdstuk 1 beschrijft deze hypothese aan de hand van de gebeurtenissen tijdens 
een hinderlaag in Irak waar Nederlandse militairen bij betrokken waren. De dreiging-
rigiditeitshypothese veronderstelt dat ieder systeem (individu, groep, organisatie) 
onder dreiging geneigd is zich rigide te gedragen. Die rigiditeit bestaat uit een 
beperking van informatieverwerking (bijvoorbeeld een vermindering van het aantal 
alternatieven dat wordt overwogen) en een centralisatie van macht (bijvoorbeeld 
leiders die minder inspraak in beslissingen toestaan). Samen zorgen deze effecten 
ervoor dat een systeem minder flexibel wordt, maar juist beter in staat is eerder 
aangeleerd gedrag automatisch te vertonen (de zogenaamde dominante respons). 
In een onveranderde en stabiele omgeving kan deze dominante respons adaptief 
zijn, maar in een complexe en dynamische omgeving is juist flexibiliteit vereist. De 
dominante respons zal dan waarschijnlijk niet effectief zijn.  
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Eerder onderzoek in dit domein heeft laten zien dat er in teams onder 
dreiging inderdaad een beperking van informatieverwerking kan optreden. Dit effect 
blijkt ook gevolgen te hebben voor de manier waarop teamleden met elkaar 
omgaan. Teamleden onder dreiging raken namelijk sterk gefocust op hun eigen 
taak en lijken te ‘vergeten’ dat ze onderdeel van een team zijn. Er treedt dus een 
vernauwing van het teamperspectief op. Hierdoor wordt het transactief geheugen 
systeem (TGS) aangetast. Transactief geheugen in een team zorgt ervoor dat niet 
iedereen alles hoeft te weten, als iedereen maar weet wie wat weet. Doordat onder 
dreiging het TGS minder goed werkt, gaan teams minder goed presteren. De 
resultaten van eerder onderzoek met betrekking tot een centralisatie van macht 
onder dreiging zijn minder eenduidig. Sommige onderzoeken hebben dit 
verschijnsel bevestigd, maar andere onderzoeken vonden geen of zelfs 
tegengestelde effecten.  
Het onderzoek in dit proefschrift is erop gericht bestaande kennis te 
vergroten door aandacht te besteden aan aspecten die in eerder onderzoek niet 
voldoende aan bod zijn gekomen. Allereerst ligt in dit onderzoek de nadruk op 
complexe teamtaken en de teamprocessen die daarin een rol spelen. Eerder 
onderzoek richtte zich namelijk vooral op relatief eenvoudige, uitvoerende taken. 
Daarnaast hebben we in dit onderzoek expliciet aandacht voor de rol van de leider, 
aangezien de leider in veel eerder onderzoek afwezig was. Verder hebben we 
ervoor gekozen op zoek te gaan naar de specifieke effecten van dreiging. Eerder 
onderzoek combineerde vaak allerlei factoren (bijvoorbeeld tijdsdruk, geluidshinder 
en dreiging) om op die manier zoveel mogelijk stress te veroorzaken. Hierdoor viel 
echter niet uit te maken welke aspecten verantwoordelijk waren voor de gevonden 
effecten. Ten slotte richten we ons op de vraag hoe de negatieve effecten van 
dreiging kunnen worden tegengegaan. Hoewel organisaties veel baat kunnen 
hebben bij dat soort kennis, heeft hiernaar nog vrijwel geen onderzoek 
plaatsgevonden.  
In Hoofdstuk 2 wordt de ontwikkeling van de onderzoeksmethodologie voor 
dit proefschrift beschreven: de taakomgeving PLATT (PLAnningsTaak voor Teams). 
Deze omgeving werd ontwikkeld om gecontroleerd experimenteel onderzoek te 
kunnen doen naar teams die complexe taken verrichten. Eerder onderzoek 
gebruikte meestal eenvoudige taken, waarin allerlei teamprocessen die tijdens 
complexere taken een rol spelen, afwezig waren. Of er werden zulke complexe 
simulaties gebruikt dat de experimentele controle niet meer gewaarborgd was. De 
ontwikkeling van PLATT werd gestuurd door een serie van vereisten die erop 
gericht was de juiste balans tussen complexiteit en controle te waarborgen. De 
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resulterende taakomgeving bestaat uit een generieke, modulaire software 
architectuur waarin onderzoeksspecifieke scenario’s kunnen worden gedraaid. De 
scenario’s kunnen zich richten op verschillende typen taken in verschillende soorten 
operationele omstandigheden. PLATT biedt een breed scala aan geautomatiseerde 
en geïntegreerde mogelijkheden om teamprocessen te meten. De ontwikkeling van 
deze taakomgeving maakte het mogelijk om de processen waar we in 
geïnteresseerd waren (informatieverwerking, centralisatietendensen en 
teamperspectief) op een gecontroleerde manier integraal te onderzoeken. Op deze 
manier konden we de huidige kennis op het gebied van het functioneren van teams 
onder dreiging integreren en uitbreiden. 
Hoofdstuk 3 rapporteert over een experiment waarin onderzocht is hoe 
fysieke dreiging van invloed is op teamprocessen tijdens een complexe taak. Teams 
worden veelvuldig ingezet in gevaarlijke en complexe omgevingen. Denk 
bijvoorbeeld aan militaire teams, brandweerteams en politieteams. In eerder 
onderzoek is er echter nauwelijks aandacht geweest voor de effecten van fysieke 
dreiging op teams. Bovendien heeft eerder onderzoek weinig aandacht besteed aan 
complexe teamtaken en de teamprocessen die daarin een rol spelen. In het huidige 
experiment werden daarom tijdens een complexe teamtaak de effecten van fysieke 
dreiging op vijf kritieke teamprocessen onderzocht: informatieverwerking, 
leiderschap, communicatie, coördinatie en ondersteunend gedrag. 
Teams van drie personen voerden een plannings- en 
probleemoplossingstaak in PLATT uit, waarbij ze op basis van een veelheid aan 
dynamische en ambigue informatie een planning moesten maken voor de evacuatie 
van een groep personen uit vijandelijk gebied. De teamleden hadden elk hun eigen 
verantwoordelijkheden, expertises en taken. Eén van hen bekleedde de 
leiderschapsrol. Fysieke dreiging werd gemanipuleerd door de helft van de teams te 
laten geloven dat gedurende de taak het zuurstofpercentage in de ruimte waar ze 
zaten naar beneden gebracht zou kunnen worden, waardoor ze last zouden kunnen 
krijgen van ademhalingsproblemen, hoofdpijn, hartkloppingen en flauwvallen. In 
werkelijkheid gebeurde er niets, maar was het de bedoeling dat de deelnemers zich 
door deze informatie bedreigd zouden gaan voelen. Op basis van de dreiging-
rigiditeitshypothese was de verwachting dat teams onder dreiging een beperking 
van informatieverwerking, een centralisatie van macht en een vernauwing van 
teamperspectief zouden vertonen. 
De resultaten van dit experiment bevestigden deze hypotheses. In 
vergelijking met teams onder normale omstandigheden hadden teams onder fysieke 
dreiging minder aandacht voor perifere informatie, een minder goed overzicht, 
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leiders die meer controle uitoefenden en minder inspraak in beslissingen toelieten, 
minder overleg in het team, en minder coördinerend en elkaar ondersteunend 
gedrag. Deze resultaten ondersteunen de veronderstellingen van de dreiging-
rigiditeitshypothese. Bovendien tonen de resultaten deze effecten voor het eerst 
aan in het geval van een fysieke dreiging en bouwen ze bestaand onderzoek uit 
door effecten aan te tonen voor coördinerend en ondersteunend gedrag in teams. 
Het onderzoek dat in Hoofdstuk 4 wordt gerapporteerd, bouwt voort op de 
resultaten van Hoofdstuk 3 door na te gaan op wat voor manier de reacties van 
teams op dreiging van invloed zijn op teamprestaties. De dreiging-
rigiditeitshypothese veronderstelt dat een rigide respons zowel goed als slecht kan 
uitpakken, afhankelijk van de omgeving waarin deze respons wordt vertoond. In 
eerder onderzoek is er weinig aandacht geweest voor de manier waarop de reacties 
veroorzaakt door dreiging uiteindelijk van invloed waren op de prestaties van teams. 
Die kennis is echter wel van belang, omdat het bepaalt waarop interventies zich 
zouden moeten richten. In het huidige experiment werd daarom tijdens een 
complexe teamtaak onderzocht hoe de reacties van teams op dreiging de relatie 
tussen dreiging en teamprestaties medieerden.  
Cadetten van de Nederlandse Defensie Academie namen in teams van drie 
personen deel aan een vergelijkbare plannings- en probleemoplossingstaak als in 
het vorige experiment. In plaats van een fysieke dreiging werd ditmaal een sociale 
dreiging gemanipuleerd. De helft van de teams kreeg negatieve feedback op een 
ongerelateerde individuele taak, waardoor de verwachting werd gecreëerd dat ze 
ook slecht zouden presteren op de teamtaak. Hierna kregen deze teams te horen 
dat er vervelende sociale consequenties zouden volgen als ze slecht zouden 
presteren op de teamtaak. De verwachting was dat deze sociale dreiging, net als in 
het vorige experiment, een beperking van informatieverwerking, een centralisatie 
van macht en een vernauwing van teamperspectief zou veroorzaken. Op basis van 
de dreiging-rigiditeitshypothese werd bovendien verwacht dat deze reacties op hun 
beurt een negatief effect zouden hebben op de prestaties van teams, omdat de taak 
die ze moesten uitvoeren gekenmerkt werd door complexiteit. 
De resultaten gepresenteerd in Hoofdstuk 4 bevestigden deze hypotheses 
grotendeels. Net als in Hoofdstuk 3 hadden teams onder dreiging minder aandacht 
voor perifere informatie en een minder goed overzicht, oefenden leiders meer 
controle uit en lieten ze minder inspraak in beslissingen toe, was er minder overleg 
in het team en ondersteunden teamleden elkaar minder goed. Bovendien 
presteerden teams onder dreiging slechter. Zoals verwacht toonden de resultaten 
van een meervoudige mediatieanalyse aan dat het geheel van de gemeten 
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processen het negatieve effect van dreiging op teamprestatie medieerde. Inspectie 
van de afzonderlijke processen liet zien dat dreiging teamprestaties negatief 
beïnvloedde door een vermindering van overzicht, inspraak in beslissingen, 
groepsoverleg en ondersteunend gedrag. Samengevat tonen de resultaten in 
Hoofdstuk 4 aan dat de rigide reacties die dreiging veroorzaakt niet adaptief zijn in 
een complexe werkomgeving. Daarmee vormen deze resultaten een ondersteuning 
voor de dreiging-rigiditeitshypothese. Bovendien breiden deze bevindingen 
bestaande kennis uit door in een enkel model de mediërende eigenschappen van 
alle belangrijke processen in de relatie tussen dreiging en teamprestaties te vatten 
en zo vrijwel het volledige negatieve effect van dreiging op teams te verklaren. 
In Hoofdstuk 5 is onderzocht of het mogelijk is om de negatieve effecten van 
dreiging tegen te gaan met behulp van een training die we hebben ontwikkeld, de 
‘transactief geheugen training’ (TG-training). Eerder heeft er nog nauwelijks 
onderzoek plaatsgevonden naar methoden om de negatieve effecten van dreiging 
op teams tegen te gaan. Dergelijke methoden kunnen echter van groot belang zijn 
voor organisaties die teams inzetten in gevaarlijke en complexe omgevingen. 
Voortbouwend op de ontwikkelde kennis met betrekking tot de effecten van dreiging 
op teams, werd in dit onderzoek een training ontwikkeld en getest die aspecten van 
een bestaande trainingsmethodiek (cross-training) combineerde met belangrijke 
processen van een transactief geheugen systeem (TGS). In deze TG-training werd 
de eenzijdige nadruk op gedeelde kennis, kenmerkend voor cross-training, 
aangevuld met aandacht voor de verdeling van kennis in het team en de 
bijbehorende noodzaak tot coördinatie. De TG-training had als doel om het 
teamperspectief in teams te versterken door het transactief geheugen van 
teamleden te verbeteren, en op die manier de effecten van dreiging tegen te gaan. 
De TG-training werd getest in een onderzoek met cadetten van de 
Nederlandse Defensie Academie die in teams van drie personen deelnamen aan 
een complexe plannings- en probleemoplossingstaak in PLATT. Sociale dreiging 
(gemanipuleerd op de manier zoals beschreven bij Hoofdstuk 4) en TG-training 
werden gemanipuleerd als tussen-teams factoren. De verwachting was dat dreiging 
een vernauwing van teamperspectief zou veroorzaken, waardoor het transactief 
geheugen, teamwerk processen (bijvoorbeeld elkaar ondersteunend gedrag) en 
teamprestaties zouden verslechteren. Van de TG-training werd juist verwacht dat 
het een positief effect zou hebben op al deze aspecten. Bovendien voorspelden we 
een interactie tussen dreiging en TG-training, waarbij we verwachtten dat de 
effecten van dreiging kleiner zouden zijn voor teams die TG-training zouden krijgen.  
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De resultaten gepresenteerd in Hoofdstuk 5 bevestigden deze hypotheses 
grotendeels. Dreiging had een negatief effect op transactief geheugen, teamwerk 
processen en teamprestaties, terwijl TG-training een positief effect had op al deze 
aspecten. Over het geheel genomen waren de negatieve effecten van dreiging 
kleiner bij teams die TG-training hadden gekregen dan bij teams die geen TG-
training hadden gekregen, hoewel de voorspelde interactie niet in alle gevallen werd 
gevonden. Samengevat tonen de bevindingen van Hoofdstuk 5 aan dat TG-training 
het vermogen heeft om transactief geheugen, teamwerk processen en 
teamprestaties positief te beïnvloeden en zo de negatieve effecten van dreiging op 
teams tegen te gaan. Deze veelbelovende resultaten zijn een belangrijke stap in de 
ontwikkeling van methoden om teams beter voor te bereiden op het functioneren in 
risicovolle situaties en vragen om vervolgonderzoek. 
Hoofdstuk 6, ten slotte, vat de belangrijkste bevindingen van dit proefschrift 
samen, bespreekt de implicaties ervan en geeft richtingen aan voor 
vervolgonderzoek. Samengevat laten de resultaten zien dat teams rigide reageren 
op dreiging: ze vertonen een beperking van informatieverwerking, een centralisatie 
van macht en een vernauwing van teamperspectief. Samen zorgen deze effecten 
ervoor dat dreiging de prestatie van teams op complexe taken negatief beïnvloedt. 
Hiermee vormen de bevindingen van dit proefschrift een solide ondersteuning voor 
de volledige dreiging-rigiditeitshypothese op teamniveau. De resultaten breiden 
bestaande kennis uit door effecten aan te tonen op niet eerder onderzochte 
teamprocessen tijdens complexe taken, door de samenhang tussen de 
verschillende rigiditeitseffecten te laten zien, door licht te werpen op de rol van 
leiders in teams onder dreiging en door de effecten van zowel fysieke als sociale 
dreiging te onderzoeken. Vervolgonderzoek is nodig om te bepalen of het optreden 
van een centralisatie van macht onder dreiging afhankelijk is van de aanwezigheid 
van een formele leiderschapsrol, zoals in de het huidige onderzoek het geval was. 
Verder zou vervolgonderzoek zich kunnen richten op de vraag of het voor de 
prestatie van een team uitmaakt of een dreiging afhangt van de prestatie op de taak 
of niet, zoals het huidige onderzoek suggereert.  
De resultaten laten ook zien dat het mogelijk is om de effecten van dreiging 
tegen te gaan door teams een training aan te bieden die gericht is op het verbeteren 
van het transactief geheugen. Theoretisch zijn deze bevindingen interessant omdat 
er nog maar weinig bekend is over het verbeteren van het TGS in teams. Dit 
onderzoek laat zien dat een relatief korte training waarin twee belangrijke processen 
van een TGS worden gefaciliteerd, positief kan bijdragen aan de effectiviteit van 
een TGS tijdens de taakuitvoering. Bovendien laat dit onderzoek zien dat het 
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effectief is om in teamtraining niet alleen aandacht te hebben voor het ontwikkelen 
van gedeelde kennis (zoals in cross-training), maar vooral ook de aandacht te 
richten op de verdeling van die kennis en mogelijke coördinatiestrategieën. 
Daarmee biedt TG-training een uitweg uit het rond cross-training spelende 
vraagstuk hoe intensief teams getraind moeten worden op het ontwikkelen van 
gedeelde kennis om teamprestaties te verbeteren. Vervolgonderzoek is nodig om 
TG-training en cross-training direct met elkaar te vergelijken. Daarnaast moet 
toekomstig onderzoek uitwijzen of TG-training in een toegepaste context en bij 
teams die al langer met elkaar samenwerken ook kan bijdragen aan het verbeteren 
van het TGS.  
Praktisch zijn de bevindingen van dit onderzoek interessant voor iedere 
organisatie die met teams werkt, aangezien elk team met dreigingen te maken kan 
krijgen (fysiek, sociaal, of materieel). Organisaties kunnen de kennis die dit 
onderzoek heeft opgeleverd op drie niveaus inzetten. Allereerst kunnen ze de 
resultaten van dit onderzoek gebruiken om bewustwording te creëren van de 
effecten van dreiging. Als teamleden zich bewust zijn van hun reacties in 
bedreigende omstandigheden, kunnen ze hun gedrag mogelijkerwijs aanpassen om 
zo de negatieve effecten van dreiging tegen te gaan. Ten tweede kunnen 
organisaties de afzonderlijke rigiditeitseffecten aangrijpen om tegenmaatregelen in 
te zetten. Denk bijvoorbeeld aan het inzetten van informatiesystemen die helpen bij 
het beter verdelen van de aandacht om beperking in informatieverwerking tegen te 
gaan, of het platter maken van teamstructuren om centralisatie van macht tegen te 
gaan. Ten slotte kunnen organisaties de principes van TG-training toepassen om 
hun teams te beschermen tegen de negatieve effecten van dreiging op 
teamperspectief. Een dergelijke training zorgt ervoor dat teamleden van elkaar 
weten wie wat weet, en strategieën tot hun beschikking hebben om op een 
efficiënte manier gebruik te maken van die verdeeld beschikbare kennis. Op die 
manier kan TG-training de vernauwing van het teamperspectief die optreedt onder 
dreiging tegengaan. Al met al hopen we dat de kennis die dit onderzoek heeft 
opgeleverd eraan kan bijdragen dat teams beter beschermd tegen rigiditeit, 









Wie denkt na het lezen van dit proefschrift een goed beeld te hebben van wat ik de 
afgelopen vier en een half jaar heb gedaan, moet ik helaas teleurstellen. Weliswaar 
is een proefschrift het formele resultaat van een promotiestudie, het vertelt slechts 
een van de verhalen. Er zijn ook andere verhalen. Verhalen van mislukte 
experimenten, van twijfel en van proefpersonen die niet bang te krijgen waren. 
Verhalen van vrijheid, uitdaging, ontwikkeling en plezier. Al die verhalen zijn waar. 
Hier wil ik de mensen bedanken die ook deze verhalen kunnen vertellen.  
Allereerst bedank ik mijn promotor en copromotor, Tony Gaillard en Ad 
Vogelaar. Tony, bedankt voor je vertrouwen, voor de ruimte die je me hebt gegeven 
en voor je nuchtere onverstoorbaarheid. Tijdens onze gesprekken heb ik veel 
mogen leren van je diepe inzicht in het menselijk functioneren. Bovendien zorgde je 
met enige regelmaat voor aangename afleiding door me een ornithologisch 
vraagstuk voor te schotelen. Dank voor dat alles. Ad, bedankt voor je betrokkenheid 
en je zorgvuldigheid. Jij had de gave om mijn meest basale aannames ter discussie 
te stellen, waardoor ik gedwongen werd het geheel nog beter te verankeren. Ik heb 
je hulpvaardigheid enorm gewaardeerd.  
Verder wil ik Ton Heinen, manager van het Oldendorff Research Institute van 
de Universiteit van Tilburg, hartelijk bedanken voor de steun die hij gedurende het 
hele proces heeft geboden. Ton, het was erg prettig om te weten dat er altijd 
iemand was bij wie ik terecht kon in geval van ‘nood’. 
Ik bedank ook alle TNO-collega’s die op enig moment bij het onderzoek 
betrokken zijn geweest (of me daar juist van hebben afgeleid). In het bijzonder wil ik 
Peter Essens noemen, die voor dit project de samenwerking tussen TNO, de 
Universteit van Tilburg en de Nederlandse Defensie Academie tot stand bracht. Ik 
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heb altijd erg van onze gesprekken genoten en heb veel bewondering voor je 
onuitputtelijke ideeënstroom en je gave om in een hogere dimensie alles kloppend 
te maken. Verder dank aan mijn ex-begeleidster Heidi (wat zaten we lekker op een 
lijn!), omgevingbouwers Otto en Kees (zonder jullie had ik waarschijnlijk zitten boter-
kaas-en-eieren met mijn teams), artsonderzoekers Ineke en Ries (ik hoop dat ik 
nooit meer zoiets van jullie hoef te vragen...) en interim coach Heather (voor je wijze 
raad op moeilijke momenten).  
Verder wil ik al de leden van de KLI onderzoeksgroep ‘Group and 
Organizational Processes’ bedanken voor de inspirerende discussies, nuttige 
feedback en gezellige borrels. Bernard en Wolfgang, jullie in het bijzonder bedankt 
voor de organisatie en jullie altijd waardevolle input tijdens de meetings.  
En dan natuurlijk mijn AiO lot- en (ex-)kamergenoten. Wat was het fijn om 
met jullie in hetzelfde schuitje te zitten, om samen af te dalen in de krochten van de 
wetenschap, om samen klaagzangen aan te heffen tijdens onze lunchwandelingen, 
om elkaar beurtelings moed te kunnen inspreken tijdens de dips van het 
promovendi-bestaan. Roos, bedankt dat je altijd wilde meedenken als ik ergens 
mee worstelde. Je snelle, scherpe analyses boden vaak nieuwe gezichtspunten en 
gaven me altijd stof tot nadenken. Ik heb ook genoten van onze 
levensbeschouwelijke discussies en hoop die nog lang met je te kunnen 
voortzetten. Bart, bedankt voor de samenwerking. In mijn eentje had ik die twee 
grote experimenten nooit van de grond gekregen, laat staan overleefd. Ik heb veel 
geleerd van je onorthodoxe kijk op het wetenschapsbedrijf. Nanda, het was altijd 
leuk en verfrissend om met jou over onderzoek te praten vanwege je creatieve 
ideeën en je alternatieve invalshoek. Bedankt voor je warme belangstelling, je 
vrolijkheid en je gezelligheid.  
Niet alleen aan personen in mijn werkomgeving ben ik dank verschuldigd. Ik 
bedank ook mijn vrienden daarbuiten, die altijd bereid waren met een serieus 
gezicht te luisteren naar mijn geklaag over absurde manipulatiecheck-resultaten of 
over kortzichtige reviewers. Om vervolgens, misschien niet wetenschappelijk maar 
wel onomstotelijk, de relativiteit van al dit soort zaken aan te tonen. Het laatste jaar 
is behoorlijk intensief geweest. Ik ben benieuwd hoe het met jullie gaat... 
Mijn ouders wil ik bedanken voor de liefdevolle, stabiele en stimulerende 
omgeving waarin ik heb mogen opgroeien. Papa en mama, bedankt, ook voor de 
afgelopen jaren, waarin jullie altijd voor mij hebben klaargestaan en me hebben 
gesteund. Het is ook jullie naam die boven dit proefschrift staat. Want of de 
eigenschappen die noodzakelijk waren voor de totstandkoming ervan nou het 
resultaat zijn van nature of nurture, voor beiden zijn jullie verantwoordelijk geweest. 
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Ook mijn schoonouders wil ik hartelijk bedanken voor hun interesse en al hun 
praktische hulp. Max heeft zijn beide oma’s in ieder geval goed kunnen leren 
kennen het afgelopen jaar! En een niet onaanzienlijk deel van dit proefschrift is 
geschreven in de tijd die mij dat opleverde... 
Ten slotte, lieve Petra, gaat mijn dank naar jou uit. Zonder jou was 
promoveren een illusie geweest. Dank je wel voor het vertrouwen dat je in me hebt. 
Dank je wel voor de zekerheid die je me geeft. Dank je wel voor je 
onvoorwaardelijke steun, ook in het laatste, intensieve jaar. Ik zie uit naar de tijd 
waarin we samen met Max weer zorgenloos kunnen genieten van de dingen waar 
het echt om draait in het leven. 
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